Fundamental Limits in Data Privacy: From Privacy Measures to Economic Foundations by Wang, Weina (Author) et al.
Fundamental Limits in Data Privacy:
From Privacy Measures to Economic Foundations
by
Weina Wang
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved July 2016 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Lei Ying, Co-Chair
Junshan Zhang, Co-Chair
Anna Scaglione
Yanchao Zhang
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
August 2016
ABSTRACT
Data privacy is emerging as one of the most serious concerns of big data analytics,
particularly with the growing use of personal data and the ever-improving capability
of data analysis. This dissertation first investigates the relation between different
privacy notions, and then puts the main focus on developing economic foundations
for a market model of trading private data.
The first part characterizes differential privacy, identifiability and mutual-
information privacy by their privacy–distortion functions, which is the optimal achiev-
able privacy level as a function of the maximum allowable distortion. The results
show that these notions are fundamentally related and exhibit certain consistency:
(1) The gap between the privacy–distortion functions of identifiability and differential
privacy is upper bounded by a constant determined by the prior. (2) Identifiability
and mutual-information privacy share the same optimal mechanism. (3) The mutual-
information optimal mechanism satisfies differential privacy with a level at most a
constant away from the optimal level.
The second part studies a market model of trading private data, where a data
collector purchases private data from strategic data subjects (individuals) through an
incentive mechanism. The value of  units of privacy is measured by the minimum
payment such that an individual’s equilibrium strategy is to report data in an -
differentially private manner. For the setting with binary private data that represents
individuals’ knowledge about a common underlying state, asymptotically tight lower
and upper bounds on the value of privacy are established as the number of individuals
becomes large, and the payment–accuracy tradeoff for learning the state is obtained.
The lower bound assures the impossibility of using lower payment to buy  units
of privacy, and the upper bound is given by a designed reward mechanism. When
the individuals’ valuations of privacy are unknown to the data collector, mechanisms
i
with possible negative payments (aiming to penalize individuals with “unacceptably”
high privacy valuations) are designed to fulfill the accuracy goal and drive the total
payment to zero. For the setting with binary private data following a general joint
probability distribution with some symmetry, asymptotically optimal mechanisms are
designed in the high data quality regime.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
From the monetary coupons offered for revealing opinions of a product to the large-
scale trade of personal information by data brokers such as Acxiom Kroft (2014),
the commoditization of private data has been trending up when big data analytics is
playing a more and more critical role in advertising, scientific research, etc. However,
in the wake of a number of recent scandals, such as the Netflix data breach and
the Veterans Affairs data theft, data privacy is emerging as one of the most serious
concerns of big data analytics. This has given rise to a fundamental question: whether
big data and privacy can go hand-by-hand or giving up our privacy is inevitable in
the big-data era.
1.1 Overview
In this dissertation, we first investigate the relation between different privacy no-
tions. The definition of privacy has been at the center of the research on data privacy,
with different notions proposed to capture different perspectives of privacy-sensitive
scenarios. Studying the relation between these privacy notions can deepen our un-
derstanding of privacy. Privacy concerns become prominent with the ever-improving
capability of data analysis. Analyzing personal data results in new discoveries in
science and engineering, but also puts individual’s privacy at potential risks. There-
fore, privacy-preserving data analysis, where the goal is to preserve the accuracy of
data analysis while maintaining individual’s privacy, has become one of the main
challenges of this big data era. The basic idea of privacy-preserving data analysis
is to inject a right amount of randomness in the released information to guaran-
1
tee that an individual’s information cannot be inferred. Intuitively, the higher the
randomness is, the better privacy protection individual users get, but the less accu-
rate (useful) the output statistical information is. While randomization seems to be
inevitable, for the privacy-preserving data analysis it is of great interest to quantita-
tively define the notion of privacy. Specifically, we need to understand the amount
of randomness needed to protect privacy while preserving usefulness of the data. To
this end, we consider three different notions: identifiability, differential privacy and
mutual-information privacy, where identifiability is concerned with the posteriors of
recovering the original data from the released data, differential privacy is concerned
with additional disclosures of an individual’s information due to the release of the
data, and mutual information measures the average amount of information about the
original database contained in the released data. While these three different privacy
notions are defined from different perspectives, we put these privacy notions under a
unified privacy–distortion framework and show that they are fundamentally related.
Next, taking a forward-looking view, we envisage a market model for private data
analytics where the data collector uses a reward mechanism to incentivize individuals
to report informative data, and individuals control their own data privacy by reporting
noisy data with the randomization algorithms strategically chosen to maximize their
payoffs. We quantify the privacy disclosure of an individual’s data-reporting strategy
by a local variant of differential privacy Dwork et al. (2006b); Kasiviswanathan et al.
(2011); Dwork and Roth (2014), which measures privacy disclosure by the distin-
guishability between the probability distributions of the reported data for different
contents of the private data. A distinctive merit of our approach is that data subjects
take full control of their own data privacy and the data collector gets informative
data but does not need to bear the responsibility of protecting privacy. One signif-
icant challenge, however, is also rooted in this desired merit: the data collector has
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no direct control or even no information on how individuals would randomize their
private data.
We address this challenge by devising a game-theoretic formulation, which allows
us to predict how individuals behave to reconcile the conflict between rewards and
privacy. To make an individual willing to trade a desired amount of privacy, the data
collector needs to incentivize the individual by making sure that doing so benefits
her most. Therefore, to grasp the intrinsic characteristics of the market and find the
balance point where the data collector and the individuals cut a deal, we focus on
individuals’ strategies in a Nash equilibrium of the reward mechanism. The funda-
mental question—“how much is privacy worth”—can then be cast as: what is the
minimum reward to an individual such that her strategy in a Nash equilibrium is to
report data with certain units of privacy disclosure?
1.2 Summary of Contributions
In Chapter 2, we investigate the relation between three different notions of pri-
vacy: identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy. Under a
unified privacy–distortion framework, where the distortion is defined to be the ex-
pected Hamming distance between the input and output databases, we establish
some fundamental connections between these three privacy notions. Given a maxi-
mum allowable distortion D, we define the privacy–distortion functions ∗i (D), 
∗
d(D),
and ∗m(D) to be the smallest (most private/best) identifiability level, differential pri-
vacy level, and mutual information between the input and output, respectively. We
characterize ∗i (D) and 
∗
d(D), and prove that 
∗
i (D) − X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D) for D
within certain range, where X is a constant determined by the prior distribution of
the original database X, and diminishes to zero when X is uniformly distributed.
Further, we show that ∗i (D) and 
∗
m(D) can be achieved by the same mechanism for
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D within certain range, i.e., there is a mechanism that simultaneously minimizes the
identifiability level and achieves the best mutual-information privacy. Based on these
two connections, we prove that this mutual-information optimal mechanism satisfies
-differential privacy with ∗d(D) ≤  ≤ ∗d(D) + 2X . The results in this chapter
indicate a consistency between “worst-case” notions of privacy, identifiability and
differential privacy, and an “average” notion of privacy, mutual-information privacy.
In Chapter 3–Chapter 5, we study a market model of trading private data and
quantify the value of privacy. In Chapter 3, we consider a setting where the private
data of each individual represents her knowledge about an underlying state, which is
the information that the data collector desires to learn. The value of  units of privacy
is measured by the minimum payment of all nonnegative payment mechanisms, under
which an individual’s best response at a Nash equilibrium is to report the data with a
privacy level of . The higher  is, the less private the reported data is. We establish
asymptotically tight lower and upper bounds on the value of  units of privacy as the
number of individuals becomes large. The lower bound assures that it is impossible
to use a lower amount of reward to obtain  units of privacy from an individual.
The upper bound is given by an achievable reward mechanism that we designed, in
which the data collector obtains  units of privacy from each individual in a Nash
equilibrium, and the expected reward to each individual converges to the lower bound
exponentially fast with the number of individuals. We also provide characterizations
on the strategies of individuals in a Nash equilibrium, which advance our understand-
ing of the behavior of privacy-aware individuals. Based on these fundamental limits,
we further derive lower and upper bounds on the minimum total payment for the
data collector to achieve a given learning accuracy target, and show that the total
payment of the designed mechanism is at most one individual’s payment away from
the minimum.
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Then in Chapter 4, we consider a setting where the individuals’s valuations of pri-
vacy are unknown to the data collector. We consider a model where each individual’s
privacy valuation is characterized by a “cost coefficient”, which can be regarded as
her type. By allowing possible negative payments (which penalize individuals with
“unacceptable” valuations of privacy), we are able to cope with the uncertainty in
the cost coefficients and drive down the data analyst’s cost. We design a family of
payment mechanisms, each of which has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the in-
dividuals exhibit a threshold behavior: the individuals with cost coefficients above a
threshold choose not to participate, and the individuals with cost coefficients below
the threshold participate and report data with a guaranteed quality. By choosing
appropriate parameters, we obtain a sequence of mechanisms with the number of in-
dividuals grows large. Each such mechanism fulfills the accuracy goal at a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, and the corresponding total expected payment goes to zero; i.e.,
this sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically optimal.
In Chapter 5, we consider a more general model for the private data. The data
collector is interested in learning the average of the private data. We design a pay-
ment mechanism such that the quality of the collected data is controllable through a
parameter  by making sure that each individual’s strategy in a Nash equilibrium is to
participate and symmetrically randomize her data, while guaranteeing -differential
privacy. With this design, the data collector can achieve any given accuracy objec-
tive by using the payment mechanism associated with an appropriate . The total
expected payment of the designed mechanism at equilibrium is asymptotically optimal
in the high data quality regime.
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1.3 Related Work
1.3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy, as an emerging analytical foundation for privacy-preserving
data analysis, was developed by a line of work Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006);
Dwork et al. (2006a), and since then both interactive model (e.g., Dwork et al.
(2006b); Nissim et al. (2007); Ghosh et al. (2009); Roth and Roughgarden (2010);
Hardt and Rothblum (2010); Gupta et al. (2012); Muthukrishnan and Nikolov
(2012)) and non-interactive model (e.g., Blum et al. (2008); Dwork et al. (2009); Ka-
siviswanathan et al. (2010); Ullman and Vadhan (2011); Gupta et al. (2012); Hardt
et al. (2012); Bun et al. (2014)) have been studied in the literature. There is a vast
and growing body of work on differential privacy, which we do not attempt to survey
but refer interested readers to a comprehensive survey by Dwork and Roth (2014).
1.3.2 Other Notions of Privacy
The privacy guarantee of differential privacy does not depend on the prior distribu-
tion of the original database, since it captures the additional disclosure caused by an
information releasing mechanism on top of any given disclosure. With the prior taken
into account, privacy notions based on the posterior have also been proposed. The
seminal work of differential privacy Dwork et al. (2006b) also proposed a semantically
flavored definition of privacy, named semantic security, and showed its equivalence
to differential privacy. This definition measures privacy by the difference between an
adversary’s prior knowledge of the database and the posterior belief given the output
of the mechanism. Differential identifiability Lee and Clifton (2012) and membership
privacy Li et al. (2013) assume that a database entry can be traced back to the iden-
tity of an individual, and the leakage of the information is quantified on whether an
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individual participates in the database or not. Specifically, differential identifiability
is defined to be the posterior probability for any individual to be the only unknown
participant of a database given the entries of all the known participants and the out-
put of the mechanism. This probability cannot be directly translated to a differential
privacy level. Membership privacy is defined based on the difference between the prior
and the posterior probability for an entity to be included in the database. Choos-
ing appropriate prior distribution families makes differential privacy and differential
identifiability instantiations of membership privacy under their database model. In
this dissertation, the notion of identifiability is defined based on the indistinguisha-
bility between the posterior probabilities of neighboring databases given the output
of the mechanism, which measures the hardness of identifying the data content of a
database entry rather than the identity of the individual who contributes the data.
Information-theoretic privacy measures including mutual information, min-
entropy, equivocation, etc, are relatively classical and have a rich history (e.g.,
Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001); Clark et al. (2005); Smith (2009); Zhu and Bettati
(2005); Chatzikokolakis et al. (2007, 2010); Rebollo-Monedero et al. (2010); Alvim
et al. (2012); du Pin Calmon and Fawaz (2012); Makhdoumi and Fawaz (2013); Mir
(2013); Sankar et al. (2013); Sarwate and Sankar (2014)). When mutual information
is used as the privacy notion, the problem of finding the optimal tradeoff between pri-
vacy and distortion can usually be formulated as a rate–distortion problem in the field
of information theory (see Cover and Thomas (2006) for an introduction) Rebollo-
Monedero et al. (2010); du Pin Calmon and Fawaz (2012); Makhdoumi and Fawaz
(2013); Mir (2013); Sankar et al. (2013); Sarwate and Sankar (2014). In this disserta-
tion, we also utilize results from the celebrated rate–distortion theory to characterize
the optimal privacy–distortion tradeoff. However, we are more interested in the rela-
tion between the optimal privacy–distortion tradeoffs with different privacy notions:
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mutual information, differential privacy, and identifiability, and we quantify the im-
pact of the prior explicitly. The work du Pin Calmon and Fawaz (2012); Makhdoumi
and Fawaz (2013) showed that when a mechanism satisfies -information privacy (de-
fined based on the difference between the prior of the database and the posterior given
the output), it is 2-differentially private, and the mutual information between the
database and the output is upper bounded by / ln 2. But differential privacy alone
does not imply a bound on the mutual information if the possible values and sizes
of the database and the output and the prior can be chosen freely. McGregor et al.
(2010) and De (2012) showed that -differential privacy implies upper bounds on the
mutual information in the order of O(n) and O(d), respectively, where n is the size
of the database and d is the dimension of the data entry. Alvim et al. (2012) showed
that differential privacy implies a bound on the min-entropy leakage. The above
relations between information-theoretic privacy notions and differential privacy, how-
ever, are not for the optimal privacy with distortion constraint, although they can
contribute to building relations between the optimal tradeoffs. Sarwate and Sankar
(2014) showed that the result in McGregor et al. (2010) indicates a one direction
bound between the optimal differential privacy and the optimal mutual information
given the same distortion constraint. Mir (2013) pointed out that the mechanism
that achieves the optimal rate–distortion also guarantees a certain level of differential
privacy. However, whether this differential privacy level is optimal or how far it is
from optimal was not answered.
1.3.3 Market Approaches for Collecting Private Data
Market approaches for collecting data from privacy-aware individuals have led to
a fruitful line of work Ghosh and Roth (2011); Fleischer and Lyu (2012); Ligett and
Roth (2012); Roth and Schoenebeck (2012); Ghosh and Ligett (2013); Xiao (2013);
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Chen et al. (2013); Nissim et al. (2014); Ghosh et al. (2014); Wang et al. (2015a,
2016). Our work uniquely studies a data collector/analyst who is not necessarily
trustworthy. This results in the procurement of noisy data instead of true data.
There are two primary flavors of mechanism design for collecting data from
privacy-aware individuals in the literature, depending on the available actions that
the individuals can take. One approach models the scenario where the private data
is verifiable, but the privacy costs to individuals incurred by using their data are un-
known to the data analyst and individuals have the option to lie about their privacy
costs. The goal of the mechanism design is to conduct privacy-preserving analysis on
the private data with the privacy costs of individuals properly compensated. In the
seminal work Ghosh and Roth (2011), an individual’s privacy cost is modeled as a
linear function of  if her data is used in an -differentially private manner. Mecha-
nisms were designed to elicit truthful reporting of the linear coefficients and estimate
some statistic cheaply. Subsequent work Fleischer and Lyu (2012); Ligett and Roth
(2012); Roth and Schoenebeck (2012); Ghosh and Ligett (2013); Nissim et al. (2014)
explores various models for individuals’ valuation of privacy, especially the correlation
between the coefficients and the private bits.
Another line of research Xiao (2013); Chen et al. (2013); Ghosh et al. (2014)
studies the scenario where individuals can lie about their data and will do so if that
benefits them, but the data analyst is still trusted—revealing information to the data
analyst does not incur privacy costs. In the notable work Ghosh et al. (2014), the
designed mechanism incentivizes truthful data reporting (without adding any noise)
from individuals and satisfies joint differential privacy.
The above work falls into the broad area of the interplay between differential
privacy and mechanism design, which was first studied by McSherry and Talwar
(2007). They treat differential privacy as a tool to design approximately truthful
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mechanisms. A comprehensive survey of the development in this area is given by Pai
and Roth (2013).
The local model of differential privacy, which is a generalization of randomized
response Warner (1965) and is formalized in Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011), has been
studied in the literature Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006); Hsu et al. (2012); Duchi
et al. (2013); Dwork and Roth (2014); Chen et al. (2014); Kairouz et al. (2014);
Wang et al. (2014, 2015b); Bassily and Smith (2015); Shokri (2015). The behavior of
individuals with privacy concerns has been studied in Chen et al. (2014), which inves-
tigates the types of games in which strategic individuals truthfully follow randomized
response, rather than sending some arbitrary bit. The hypothesis testing formula-
tion in this dissertation is similar to a setting in Kairouz et al. (2014), where the
authors find an optimal mechanism that maximizes the statistical discrimination of
the hypotheses subject to local differential privacy constraints. In practice, Google’s
Chrome web browser has implemented the RAPPOR mechanism Erlingsson et al.
(2014); Fanti et al. (2015) to collect users’ data, which guarantees that only limited
privacy of users is leaked by using randomized response in a novel manner. However,
users may still not be willing to report data in the desired way due to the lack of an
incentive mechanism.
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Chapter 2
RELATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT PRIVACY NOTIONS
2.1 Introduction
We investigate the fundamental connections between these three different privacy
notions in the following setting:
• We consider a non-interactive database releasing approach for privacy-preserving
data analysis, where a synthetic database is released to the public. The synthetic
database is a sanitized version of the original database, on which queries and
operations can be carried out as if it was the original database. It is then natural
to assume that the synthetic database and the original database are in the same
“universe” so the entries have the same interpretation. Therefore we focus on
mechanisms that map an input database to an output synthetic database in the
same universe. Specifically, we consider a database consisting of n rows, each of
which takes values from a finite domain D of size m. In this dissertation, the
database is modeled as a discrete random variable X drawn from Dn with prior
distribution pX . A mechanism M takes a database X as input and outputs a
database Y , which is also a random variable with alphabet Dn.
• We define the distortion between the output database and the input database to
be the expected Hamming distance. When the input and output are in the same
universe, the Hamming distance measures the number of rows two databases differ
in, which directly points to the number of rows that need to be modified in order
to guarantee a given privacy level.
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Differential Privacy
- Relative guarantee 
- Pairwise requirements
Identifiability
- Absolute guarantee 
- Pairwise requirements
Mutual-Information Privacy
- Average guarantee 
- Global requirement
Achieved by same optimal mechanism
✏⇤d(D)  ✏  ✏⇤d(D) + 2✏X
This mechanism is   -differentially private with
✏⇤i (D)  ✏X  ✏⇤d(D)  ✏⇤i (D)
✏
Figure 2.1: Relation between identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-
information privacy.
In this dissertation, we use a unified privacy–distortion framework to understand
the relation between the three privacy notions. Given a maximum allowable distor-
tion D, we define the privacy–distortion functions ∗i (D), 
∗
d(D), and 
∗
m(D) to be
the smallest identifiability level, differential privacy level, and mutual information
between the input and output, respectively. Then we have the following main results,
which are also summarized in Figure 2.1.
(1) We derive the exact form of the privacy–distortion function ∗i (D) under the
notion of identifiability, for certain range of the distortion values, by showing
that ∗i (D) = h
−1(D) regardless of the prior distribution, where
h−1(D) = ln
( n
D
− 1)+ ln(m− 1).
We further show that for the privacy–distortion function ∗d(D) under the notion
of differential privacy,
∗i (D)− X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D).
The constant X is determined by the prior distribution pX only, given by
X = max
x,x′∈Dn:x∼x′
ln
pX(x)
pX(x′)
,
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where x ∼ x′ denotes that x and x′ differ in exactly one row. When the in-
put database has a uniform distribution, we have that ∗i = 
∗
d, i.e., differential
privacy is equivalent to identifiability. Note that for X to be finite, the prior
pX needs to have full a support on Dn, i.e., pX(x) > 0 for any x ∈ Dn. When
X is large, differential privacy provides only weak guarantee on identifiabil-
ity. In other words, when X is large, it is possible to identify some entries of
the database with non-trivial accuracy even if the differential privacy is satis-
fied. This is because differential privacy provides a relative guarantee about
disclosures, which ensures that limited additional information of an individual
is leaked in the released data in addition to the knowledge that an adversary has
known. Identifiability, on the other hand, requires an absolute guarantee about
disclosures when individuals’ data is being inferred from the output database
assuming that the prior pX and the mechanism are both known to the adversary.
(2) The privacy–distortion functions ∗i (D) and 
∗
m(D) under the notions of identi-
fiability and mutual-information privacy, respectively, can be achieved by the
same mechanism for D within certain range, i.e., there is a mechanism that
simultaneously minimizes the identifiability level and the mutual information
between X and Y . We further prove that this mutual-information optimal
mechanism satisfies -differential privacy that is within a constant difference
from the optimal differential privacy level for the given maximum allowable
distortion:
∗d(D) ≤  ≤ ∗d(D) + 2X .
These results indicate certain consistency between identifiability and mutual-
information privacy, and between differential privacy and mutual-information
privacy when the prior pX is uniform, although identifiability and differential
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privacy are defined based on “pairwise” requirements on distinguishability and
are considered to be “worst-case” notions of privacy, while mutual-information
privacy is defined by “global” requirements and is considered to be an “aver-
age” notion of privacy. The value of ∗m(D) is in bits and thus is not directly
comparable with ∗i (D) and 
∗
d(D), but the fact that identifiability and mutual-
information privacy can be optimized simultaneously in the setting studied in
this dissertation reveals the fundamental connections between these three pri-
vacy notions.
2.2 Model
Consider a database consisting of n rows, each of which corresponds to the data of
a single individual. Each individual’s data contains some sensitive information such
as the individual’s health status. Suppose that each row takes values from a domain
D. Then Dn is the set of all possible values of a database. Two databases, denoted
by x, x′ ∈ Dn, are said to be neighbors if they differ in exactly one row. Let x ∼ x′
denote the neighboring relation. In this dissertation, we assume that the domain D
is a finite set and model a database as a discrete random variable X with alphabet
Dn and probability mass function (pmf) pX . Suppose |D| = m, where m is an integer
and m ≥ 2. A (randomized) mechanism M takes a database x as the input, and
outputs a random variable M(x).
Definition 1 (Mechanism). A mechanism M is specified by an associated mapping
φM : Dn → F , where F is the set of multivariate cdf’s on some range R. Taking
database X as the input, the mechanism M outputs a R-valued random variable Y
with φM(x) as the multivariate conditional cdf of Y given X = x.
In this dissertation, we focus on mechanisms for which the range is the same as the
alphabet of X, i.e., R = Dn. Then the output Y is also a discrete random variable
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with alphabet Dn, which can be interpreted as a synthetic database. Denote the
conditional pmf of Y given X = x defined by the cdf φM(x) as pY |X(· | x). Then a
mechanism in this setting is fully specified by pY |X . When using this mechanism, the
database curator samples from pY |X(· | x) to generate a synthetic database Y . The
form of the mechanism is assumed to be public since it may be of interest to data
analysts.
Throughout this dissertation we use the following basic notation. We denote the
set of real numbers by R, the set of nonnegative real numbers by R+, and the set of
nonnegative integers by N. Let R+ = R+ ∪ {+∞}.
2.2.1 Different Notions of Privacy
In addition to the output database Y , we assume that the adversary also knows
the prior distribution pX , which represents the side information the adversary has,
and the privacy-preserving mechanism M. The three notions of privacy studied in
this dissertation are defined next.
Definition 2 (Identifiability). A mechanism M satisfies -identifiability for some
 ∈ R+ if for any pair of neighboring elements x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y). (2.1)
The notion of identifiability is defined based on the indistinguishability between
any two neighboring databases from a Bayesian view. When a mechanism satisfies -
identifiability for a small , two close (neighboring) databases cannot be distinguished
from the posterior probabilities after observing the output database, which makes any
individual’s data hard to identify. To see the semantic implications of identifiability,
we consider the following “worst-case” type of adversaries, who are called informed
adversaries Dwork et al. (2006b). An adversary of this type knows n − 1 database
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entries and tries to identify the value of the remaining one. The notation of identifi-
ability is defined based on neighboring databases to reflect this worst-case scenario.
Consider adversaries who know X−i, i.e., all the database entries except Xi. The
requirement (2.1) of -identifiability indicates that for any xi, x
′
i ∈ D, any x−i ∈ Dn−1
and any y ∈ Dn,
P{Xi = xi | X−i = x−i, Y = y} ≤ eP{Xi = x′i | X−i = x−i, Y = y}.
Therefore, when -identifiability is satisfied, even for such a worst-case adversary, the
probability of correctly identifying the value of Xi is still no greater than
1
1+(m−1)e− ,
which is close to randomly guessing when  is small. We say that identifiability pro-
vides an absolute guarantee about disclosures since when it is satisfied, the probability
of correctly identifying some individual’s data is limited, and thus no bad disclosure
can occur. This will become more clear when we discuss the relative guarantee pro-
vided by differential privacy.
We remark that in some cases, not all values of  are achievable for -identifiability.
The smallest achievable identifiability level is constrained by the prior pX , since an
adversary can always identify the values of the database entries based on the prior.
When the prior itself is very disclosive, no mechanism can make the database entries
less identifiable. To illustrate, we give the following example.
Example 1. Consider a database X with a single binary entry, i.e., D = {0, 1} and
n = 1. Suppose the prior is given by pX(0) = 0.55 and pX(1) = 0.45. Consider the
mechanism M specified by
pY |X(0 | 0) = pY |X(1 | 1) = 0.6, pY |X(1 | 0) = pY |X(0 | 1) = 0.4.
Then the mechanismM satisfies -identifiability for  ≈ 0.6. Therefore, the probabil-
ity of correctly identifying X is guaranteed to be no greater than 1
1+e− ≈ 0.65. The
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smallest identifiability level that can be achieved for this prior is  = ln(0.55/0.45) ≈
0.2. Now consider another prior that is given by pX(0) = 0.9 and pX(1) = 0.1. Then
the mechanism M satisfies -identifiability for  ≈ 2.6. In this case, no matter what
mechanism is used, guessing that X = 0 yields a probability of correctness that is no
less than 0.9. For an adversary with this prior, which indicates that the adversary
has very good knowledge about the entry, no mechanism can achieve -identifiability
for  < ln(0.9/0.1) ≈ 2.2.
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006)). A mecha-
nismM satisfies -differential privacy for some  ∈ R+ if for any pair of neighboring
elements x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pY |X(y | x) ≤ epY |X(y | x′). (2.2)
Note that Definition 3 is equivalent to the definition of differential privacy in the
seminal work Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006) under the model in this dissertation,
although the languages used are slightly different. The differential privacy property
of a mechanism is only determined by the associated mapping represented by pY |X
and does not depend on the prior.
In contrast to identifiability, differential privacy provides a relative guarantee
about disclosures Dwork (2006). For any possible given disclosure about an indi-
vidual, differential privacy ensures that only limited additional risk will be caused by
the mechanism. To illustrate, we give the following example.
Example 2. We still consider the database X and the mechanismM in Example 1.
The mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy for  = ln(0.6/0.4) ≈ 0.4 regardless
of the prior pX . If the prior is given by pX(0) = 0.9 and pX(1) = 0.1, then before
seeing the output Y , the probability of correctly identifying X is 0.9. Suppose that the
adversary observes an output Y = 0. Then the probability of correctly identifying X
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becomes P(X = 0 | Y = 0) ≈ 0.93, which improves by a factor of approximately e0.03.
In this case, a bad disclosure occurs since the adversary is able to identify X with high
probability, but differential privacy is still satisfied as the mechanism M guarantees
that the probability of identification only increases by a bounded multiplicative factor.
Definition 4 (Mutual-Information Privacy). A mechanism M satisfies -mutual-
information privacy for some  ∈ R+ if the mutual information between X and Y
satisfies I(X;Y ) ≤ , where
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y∈Dn
pX,Y (x, y) log
pX,Y (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
.
The notion of mutual information is an information-theoretic notion of privacy,
which measures the average amount of information about X contained in Y . The
mutual information is minimized and equal to 0 when X and Y are independent, and
it is maximized and equal to H(X) when Y = X.
2.2.2 Distortion
In this dissertation, we measure the usefulness of a mechanism by the distortion
between the input database X and the output Y , where smaller distortion corresponds
to greater usefulness. Consider the (generalized) Hamming distance d : Dn×Dn → N,
where the distance d(x, x′) between any two elements x, x′ ∈ Dn is the number of rows
they differ in. We define the distortion between X and Y to be the expected Hamming
distance
E[d(X, Y )] =
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y).
The Hamming distance also characterizes the neighboring relation on Dn. Two ele-
ments x, x′ ∈ Dn are neighbors if and only if d(x, x′) = 1.
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2.2.3 Privacy–Distortion Function
A privacy–distortion pair (,D) is said to be achievable if there exists a mechanism
M with output Y such that M satisfies -privacy level and E[d(X, Y )] ≤ D. The
privacy–distortion function ∗ : R+ → R+ is defined by
∗(D) = inf{ : (,D) is achievable},
which is the smallest privacy level given the distortion constraint E[d(X, Y )] ≤ D.
We are only interested in the range [0, n] for D since this is the meaningful range for
distortion. The privacy–distortion function depends on the prior pX , which reflects the
impact of the prior on the privacy–distortion tradeoff. To characterize the privacy–
distortion function, we also consider the distortion–privacy function D∗ : R+ → R+
defined by
D∗() = inf{D : (,D) is achievable},
which is the smallest achievable distortion given privacy level .
In this dissertation we consider three different notions of privacy: identifiabil-
ity, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy, so we denote the privacy–
distortion functions under these three notions by ∗i , 
∗
d and 
∗
m, respectively.
2.3 Identifiability versus Differential Privacy
In this section, we establish a fundamental connection between identifiability and
differential privacy. We characterize their privacy–distortion functions through study-
ing the distortion–privacy functions. Given privacy level i and d, the minimum
distortion level is the solution to the following optimization problems.
The Privacy–Distortion Problem under Identifiability (PD-I):
min
pX|Y , pY
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
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subject to pX|Y (x | y) ≤ eipX|Y (x′ | y),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′, y ∈ Dn,
(2.3)
∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y) = 1, ∀y ∈ Dn, (2.4)
pX|Y (x | y) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn, (2.5)∑
y∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)pY (y) = pX(x),
∀x ∈ Dn,
(2.6)
pY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Dn. (2.7)
The Privacy–Distortion Problem under Differential Privacy (PD-DP):
min
pY |X
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y)
subject to pY |X(y | x) ≤ edpY |X(y | x′),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′, y ∈ Dn,
(2.8)
∑
y∈Dn
pY |X(y | x) = 1, ∀x ∈ Dn, (2.9)
pY |X(y | x) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn. (2.10)
Note that to obtain the distortion–privacy functions, we need to find a mechanism
pY |X to minimize the distortion subject to privacy constraints. However, for identifia-
bility, since it is defined based on pX|Y , we change the optimization variable from pY |X
to (pX|Y , pY ) in PD-I, and the constraints (2.4)–(2.7) ensure that PD-I is equivalent
to the original distortion–privacy problem.
For convenience, we first define two constants X and ˜X that are determined by
the prior pX . Let
X = max
x,x′∈Dn:x∼x′
ln
pX(x)
pX(x′)
, (2.11)
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Figure 2.2: The privacy–distortion functions ∗i under identifiability and 
∗
d under
differential privacy satisfy ∗i (D)− X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D) for D within certain range.
which is the maximum prior probability difference between two neighboring databases.
For X to be finite, the prior distribution pX needs to have full support on Dn, i.e.,
pX(x) > 0 for any x ∈ Dn. To define ˜X , note that the prior pX puts constraints on
the posterior probabilities, as given by the constraint (2.6) in PD-I. We say {pX|Y (x |
y), x, y ∈ Dn} is feasible if there exists a pmf pY such that it is the marginal pmf of Y .
Let ˜X be the smallest  such that the following posterior probabilities are feasible:
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn.
We will see that the pX|Y in the above form plays an important role in solving PD-I.
For any pX , ˜X is finite since when  → +∞, the pmf pY = pX is the marginal pmf
of Y . Finally we define the function
h−1(D) = ln
( n
D
− 1
)
+ ln(m− 1).
Recall that ∗i (D) and 
∗
d(D) denote the minimum identifiability level and mini-
mum differential privacy level for a maximum allowable distortion D. The connection
between the privacy–distortion functions ∗i and 
∗
d is established in the following the-
orem. See Figure 2.2 for an illustration.
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Theorem 1. For identifiability, the privacy–distortion function ∗i of a database X
with X < +∞ satisfies
∗i (D) = h
−1(D), 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X),
∗i (D) ≥ max{h−1(D), X}, h(˜X) < D ≤ n.
(2.12)
For differential privacy, the privacy–distortion function ∗d of a database X satisfies
the following bounds for any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n:
max{h−1(D)− X , 0} ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ max{h−1(D), 0}. (2.13)
From the theorem above, we can see that 0 ≤ ∗i (D)− ∗d(D) ≤ X when 0 ≤ D ≤
h(˜X). The lemmas needed in the proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
Here we give a sketch of the proof, which consists of the following key steps:
• The first key step is to show that both PD-I and PD-DP, through (respective)
relaxations as shown in Figure 2.3, boil down to the same optimization problem.
Relaxed Privacy–Distortion (R-PD):
min
pX|Y , pY
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
subject to pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′, y ∈ Dn,
(2.14)
∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y) = 1, ∀y ∈ Dn, (2.15)
pX|Y (x | y) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn, (2.16)∑
y∈Dn
pY (y) = 1, (2.17)
pY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Dn. (2.18)
Relaxing the constraint (2.6) in PD-I to the constraint (2.17) gives R-PD. Now
consider PD-DP. For any neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn, pX(x) ≤ eXpX(x′) according
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PD-I
(Identifiability)
PD-DP
(Differential Privacy)
R-PD
(Relaxed)
Relaxation on (2.8)Relaxation on (2.6)
Figure 2.3: Both PD-I and PD-DP boil down to R-PD through different relaxations.
to the definition of X , and a necessary condition for the constraint (2.8) to be
satisfied is
pX(x)pY |X(y | x) ≤ ed+XpX(x′)pY |X(y | x′). (2.19)
Therefore, replacing constraint (2.8) with (2.19) and letting  = d + X , we
obtain R-PD. So R-PD can be regarded as a relaxation of both PD-I and PD-
DP.
• To solve R-PD, it suffices to solve the following optimization problem for any
fixed y ∈ Dn:
min
pX|Y
∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
subject to pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′,∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y) = 1,
pX|Y (x | y) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Dn.
Intuitively, to minimize the objective function, which is the average distortion
between X and y, we should assign larger probability to pX|Y (x | y) with smaller
d(x, y), and smaller probability to pX|Y (x | y) with larger d(x, y). For the x such
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that x = y, we should assign the largest value to pX|Y (x | y) since d(x, y) = 0,
and as x goes far way from y, we should assign smaller and smaller values to
pX|Y (x | y). However, the privacy constraint limits the decreasing rate we can
use as x goes far away from y due to the neighboring relations. In Lemma 7,
we prove that the optimal solution is given by
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (2.20)
where the probability pX|Y (x | y) decreases with rate e as d(x, y) increases.
This is the fastest possible decreasing rate with the privacy constraint, so this
solution gives the smallest distortion.
• By Lemma 7, the minimum distortion of R-PD is D∗relaxed() = h(), which gives
lower bounds on the distortion–privacy functions under identifiability and under
differential privacy. By the connection between distortion–privacy function and
privacy–distortion function, Lemma 8 shows that ∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D) and ∗d(D) ≥
h−1(D)− X for any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n. Lemma 9 shows another lower bound
on ∗i , combining which with the lower bound in Lemma 8 gives the lower bound
in Theorem 1.
• Next we design achievable mechanisms to prove the upper bounds in Theorem 1.
Notice that when the posterior probabilities given by the solution pX|Y in (2.20)
is feasible, the mechanism that corresponds to this pX|Y satisfies -identifiability.
Therefore, the lower bound for identifiability is achievable in this case. Consider
the mechanism E i specified by
pY |X(y | x) = pY (y)e
−d(x,y)
pX(x)
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (2.21)
where  ≥ ˜X and pY is the corresponding pmf of Y . The mechanism E i corre-
sponds to the posterior distributions given by pX|Y in (2.20). Lemma 10 shows
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that the mechanism E i guarantees an identifiability level of  with distortion
h() when  ≥ ˜X , which yields the equality in (2.12) when combining with the
lower bound above.
• For differential privacy, consider the mechanism E d specified by the conditional
probabilities
pY |X(y | x) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (2.22)
where  ≥ 0. Note that in contrast with the mechanism E i , the mechanism E d
itself has the same form as the solution pX|Y in (2.20). Lemma 11 shows that
the mechanism E d satisfies -differential privacy with distortion h(), which pro-
vides the upper bound in (2.13). We remark that the mechanism E d has the
same form as an exponential mechanism with score function q = −d McSherry
and Talwar (2007), where the score function has a sensitivity ∆q = 1. In gen-
eral, an exponential mechanism with parameter  is 2∆q-differentially private.
However, the mechanism E d is -differentially private without the factor 2 since
the normalizing term in the denominator of (2.22) does not depend on x.
Illustration. We demonstrate the characterizations of the privacy–distortion func-
tions in Theorem 1 using prior distributions based on a databaset constructed for
Netflix Prize. The dataset consists of movie ratings from users, with each rating on
a scale from 1 to 5 (integer) stars. We view the ratings of a movie from active users
as a database and generate ratings uniformly at random for missing entries. We first
calculate the corresponding X , assuming that entries of a database are drawn i.i.d.
from a distribution. The constant X bounds the gap between the upper and lower
bounds on ∗d(D), and also bounds 
∗
i (D) − ∗d(D). In Figure 2.4a, we show the his-
togram of X for 887 most reviewed movies (databases). Next, we pick a database
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of the characterizations of the privacy–distortion functions
in Theorem 1. (a) Histogram of X for 887 databases. (b) The privacy–distortion
function under identifiability is given by ∗i (D) = h
−1(D) for 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), where
h(˜X) = 0.73n. The privacy–distortion function under differential privacy, 
∗
d(D), lies
between ∗i (D) = h
−1(D) and h−1(D)− X , where X = 0.33.
whose prior distribution of each entry is given by
pXi(1) = 0.2533, pXi(2) = 0.1821, pXi(3) = 0.1821,
pXi(4) = 0.1873, pXi(5) = 0.1953.
For this prior, we have X = 0.33 and ˜X = 0.41. In Figure 2.4b, we draw the privacy–
distortion function ∗i (D) = h
−1(D) under identifiability for 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), where
the value h(˜X) = 0.73n is displayed in the figure. The curve 
∗
i (D) = h
−1(D) gives
an upper bound on the privacy–distortion function ∗d(D) under differential privacy.
We also draw the curve max{h−1(D)− X , 0}, which is a lower bound on ∗d(D).
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2.4 Identifiability, Differential Privacy versus Mutual-Information Privacy
In this section, we first discuss the relation between identifiability and mutual-
information privacy. Then we further establish a connection between differential
privacy and mutual-information privacy based on this relation between identifiability
and mutual-information privacy and the relation between identifiability and differen-
tial privacy derived in the last section.
Theorem 2. For any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), the identifiability optimal mechanism
E i with  = h−1(D) is also mutual-information optimal.
By this theorem, the privacy–distortion functions ∗i (D) and 
∗
m(D) under the no-
tions of identifiability and mutual-information privacy, respectively, can be achieved
by the same mechanism for D within certain range. This theorem indicates a con-
sistency between identifiability and mutual-information privacy under the privacy–
distortion framework since they can be optimized simultaneously.
Recall that given a maximum allowable distortion D, the privacy–distortion func-
tion ∗m(D) under mutual-information privacy for an input database X with prior pX
is given by the optimal value of the following convex optimization problem.
The Privacy and Distortion Problem under Mutual-Information Privacy
(PD-MIP):
min
pY |X
I(X;Y )
subject to
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y) ≤ D, (2.23)
∑
y∈Dn
pY |X(y | x) = 1, ∀x ∈ Dn, (2.24)
pY |X(y | x) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn. (2.25)
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Note that this formulation has the same form as the formulation in the cele-
brated rate–distortion theory (e.g., see Cover and Thomas (2006)), and thus the
privacy–distortion function under mutual-information privacy is identical to the rate–
distortion function in this setting. Studies on the rate–distortion function Blahut
(1972); Cover and Thomas (2006) have revealed the structure of an optimal solution
of PD-MIP using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004). We utilize these results to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By the KKT conditions for PD-MIP, the mutual information is
minimized by
pY |X(y | x) = pY (y)e
−λd(x,y)∑
y′∈Dn pY (y
′)e−λd(x,y′)
, x, y ∈ Dn,
if there exists a pmf pY of Y and λ ≥ 0 such that
∑
x∈Dn
pX(x)e
−λd(x,y)∑
y′∈Dn pY (y
′)e−λd(x,y′)
= 1, if pY (y) > 0, (2.26)
∑
x∈Dn
pX(x)e
−λd(x,y)∑
y′∈Dn pY (y
′)e−λd(x,y′)
≤ 1, if pY (y) = 0, (2.27)
λ
(∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY (y)e
−λd(x,y)∑
y′∈Dn pY (y
′)e−λd(x,y′)
d(x, y)−D
)
= 0, (2.28)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the distortion constraint (2.23). This optimal
solution has an exponential form. Recall that the identifiability optimal mechanism
E i in (2.21) also has an exponential form. In what follows we prove that for properly
chosen λ, the conditions (2.26)–(2.28) are satisfied under E i .
For any 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), consider the mechanism E i with  = h−1(D). Let λ = .
Recall that under E i ,
pY |X(y | x) = pY (y)e
−d(x,y)
pX(x)
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn.
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Since pY |X satisfies that ∑
y′∈Dn
pY |X(y′ | x) = 1,
we have ∑
y′∈Dn
pY (y
′)e−d(x,y
′) = pX(x)
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n.
Then for any y ∈ Dn,
∑
x∈Dn
pX(x)e
−d(x,y)∑
y′∈Dn pY (y
′)e−d(x,y′)
=
∑
x∈Dn
pX(x)e
−d(x,y)
pX(x)
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
= 1,
which indicates that (2.26) and (2.27) are satisfied. We can verify that
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY (y)e
−d(x,y)∑
y′∈Dn pY (y
′)e−d(x,y′)
d(x, y)
=
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
∑
x∈Dn
pX(x)e
−d(x,y)d(x, y)
pX(x)
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
= h()
= D,
which indicates that (2.28) is satisfied. Therefore, the mechanism E i with  = h−1(D)
gives an optimal solution of PD-MIP, which completes the proof.
Next, we establish a connection between differential privacy and mutual-
information privacy based on Theorem 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), the mutual-information optimal
mechanism E i with  = h−1(D) is d-differentially private with ∗d(D) ≤ d ≤ ∗d(D) +
2X .
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It has been pointed out in Mir (2013) that a mechanism that achieves the opti-
mal rate–distortion also guarantees a certain level of differential privacy. However,
whether this differential privacy level is optimal or how far it is from optimal was not
answered. Our result in Corollary 1 further shows that the gap between the differen-
tial privacy level of the mutual-information optimal mechanism E i and the optimal
differential privacy level is no greater than 2X , which is a constant determined by the
prior pX . Therefore, given a distortion constraint, optimizing for mutual information
leads to a differentially private mechanism whose privacy level is close to the optimal
differential privacy level. When the prior is uniform, this mutual-information opti-
mal mechanism achieves exactly the optimal differential privacy level. Similar to the
relation between identifiability and mutual-information privacy, differential privacy
and mutual-information privacy also show a consistency for uniform prior under the
privacy–distortion framework, although differential privacy is usually considered to
be a “worst-case” notion of privacy and mutual-information is usually considered to
be an “average” notion of privacy.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Theorem 2, the mechanism E i with  = h−1(D) is mutual-
information optimal. According to its form, we can verify that E i with  = h−1(D)
is d-differentially private with d = h
−1(D) + X . Since ∗d(D) is the minimum
differential privacy level with distortion constraint given by D, we have d ≥ ∗d(D).
By Theorem 1, h−1(D) ≤ ∗d(D) + X . Thus d ≤ ∗d(D) + 2X , which completes the
proof.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigated the relation between three different notions of
privacy: identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy, where
identifiability guarantees indistinguishability between posterior probabilities, differ-
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ential privacy guarantees limited additional disclosures, and mutual information is an
information-theoretic notion. Under a unified privacy–distortion framework, where
the distortion is defined to be the expected Hamming distance between the input and
output databases, we established some fundamental connections between these three
privacy notions. Given a maximum allowable distortion D within certain range, the
smallest identifiability level ∗i (D) and the smallest differential privacy level 
∗
d(D) are
proved to satisfy ∗i (D) − X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D), where X is a constant determined
by the prior of the original database, and diminishes to zero when the prior is uni-
form. Next, we showed that there is a mechanism that simultaneously minimizes the
identifiability level and the mutual information given the same maximum allowable
distortion within certain range. We further showed that this mechanism satisfies
-differential privacy with ∗d(D) ≤  ≤ ∗d(D) + 2X .
Our findings in this study reveal some fundamental connections between the three
notions of privacy. With these three notions of privacy being defined, many interest-
ing issues deserve further attention. The connections we have established in this work
are based on the distortion measure of Hamming distance, which is closely tied with
the neighboring relations, and we assume that the output synthetic database and the
original database are in the same universe. It would be of great interest to study the
connections of these privacy notions under other common distortion measures and
other output formats. We remark that our results for Hamming distance can be used
to prove lower bounds on the distortion of a differentially private mechanism when
the distortion is measured by the distortion at the worst-case query in a query class
Wang et al. (2015b). Some other interesting directions are as follows. In some cases,
the prior pX is imperfect. Then for privacy notions depending on the prior such as
identifiability and mutual-information privacy, it is natural to ask how we can pro-
tect privacy with robustness over the prior distribution. Identifiability and differential
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privacy impose requirements on neighboring databases to protect an individual’s pri-
vacy. Then are there any practical scenarios that we would desire to generalize this
“pairwise” privacy to “group” privacy? The connections between membership pri-
vacy and these three notions of privacy also need to be explored, since membership
privacy has been proposed as a unifying framework for privacy definitions.
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Chapter 3
MARKET MODEL OF TRADING PRIVATE DATA
3.1 Introduction
We consider a game-theoretic model of collecting private data in hypothesis test-
ing, where the data collector is interested in learning information from a population
of N individuals. An illustration of our model is shown in Figure 3.1. The informa-
tion is represented by a binary random variable W , which is called the state. Each
individual i possesses a binary signal Si, which is her private data, representing her
knowledge about the state W . Conditional on the state W , the signals are indepen-
dently generated such that the probability for each signal Si to be the same as W is
θ, where 0.5 < θ < 1. To protect her privacy, an individual reports only a privacy-
preserving version of her signal, denoted by Xi, or chooses to not participate after
considering both the payment from the data collector and the loss of privacy. The
data collector needs to decide the amount of payment and the payment mechanism
to get informative reports, i.e., not completely random data. Intuitively, the higher
the payment is, the more informative the reported data should be. We will answer
the following fundamental questions in this dissertation: What is the minimum pay-
ment needed from the data collector to obtain reported data with a privacy level ?
Which payment mechanism can be used to collect private data with minimum cost?
This setting without accounting for data privacy has garnered much attention in the
literature (see, e.g., Miller et al. (2009); Acemoglu et al. (2011); Le et al. (2014)),
including the application of estimating the underlying value of a new technology by
eliciting opinions from individuals.
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Figure 3.1: Information structure of the model. The data collector is interested
in the state W , which is a binary random variable. Each individual i possesses a
binary signal Si, which is her private data. Conditional on W , S1, S2, . . . , SN are i.i.d.
Individual i’s reported data is Xi, which is generated based on Si using a randomized
strategy.
Intuitively, the data collector can purchase more informative data (so higher pri-
vacy) by offering higher payment. However, the strategic behavior of the privacy-
aware individuals makes this more complicated. Due to privacy concerns, an individ-
ual’s action/strategy is the conditional distributions of the reported data given the
realizations of the signal. But the actions of the individuals are not observable to the
data collector. Instead, what the data collector receives is the reported data, gener-
ated randomly according to the individuals’ strategies, so the payments can only be
designed based on the reported data. This differs our problem from the conventional
mechanism design.
Furthermore, the privacy-aware individuals weigh the privacy loss against the
payment to choose the best quantity of privacy to trade. To make an individual
willing to trade  level of privacy, the data collector needs to make sure doing this
benefits the individual most. We reiterate that the data collector has access only to
the reported data instead of the individuals’ actions. Note that only compensating the
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privacy cost incurred is not sufficient. The payment mechanism needs to ensure that 
is the best privacy level such that when an individual uses a less-private strategy, the
decrease in her payment is faster than the decrease in her privacy cost, and similarly,
when an individual uses a more-private strategy, the increase in her payment is slower
than the increase in her privacy cost. In other words, with a game-theoretic approach,
we consider an individual’s best response in a Nash equilibrium, and the value of data
privacy is measured by the minimum payment that makes this equilibrium strategy
have a privacy level of , which represents the monetary value of data privacy in a
market for private data.
Summary of Results
It is assumed that individuals use the celebrated notion of differential privacy
Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006) to evaluate their data privacy. When an indi-
vidual i uses an -differentially private randomization strategy to generate Xi, the
privacy loss incurred is , and the individual’s cost of privacy loss is a function of
, whose form is assumed to be publicly known. The value of  units of privacy is
measured by the minimum payment of all nonnegative payment mechanisms under
which an individual’s best response in a Nash equilibrium is to report the data with a
privacy level of , where nonnegativity ensures that individuals would not be charged
for reporting data. Denote this value by V (). Our contributions are summarized as
follows:
1. We establish a lower bound on V (). First we characterize the strategies of indi-
viduals at a Nash equilibrium to prove that from a payment perspective, it suffices
to focus on nonnegative payment mechanisms under which the best response of
an individual in a Nash equilibrium is a symmetric randomized response with a
privacy level of . This strategy generates the reported data by flipping the signal
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with probability 1
e+1
: for convenience, this is called the -strategy. Next we prove
that the expected payments resulting from any Nash equilibrium of any payment
mechanism can be “replicated” by a genie-aided payment mechanism, where the
payments are determined with the aid of a genie who knows the underlying state
W . This makes the analysis of the Nash equilibria more tractable by decoupling
the individuals. The lower bound is then given by necessary conditions for  to
be the best privacy level in the genie-aided mechanism. We remark that although
the genie-aided mechanism that achieves the lower bound is not implementable, it
can be well-approximated, when the number of individuals is large, by the feasible
payment mechanism that we design to prove the upper bound.
2. We observe that the equilibrium strategies exhibit some interesting characteristics:
the strategy of an individual in a Nash equilibrium is either a symmetric random-
ized response, which treats the realizations of the private signal symmetrically, or
a non-informative strategy, where the reported data is independent of the signal.
This characterization holds regardless of the prior distribution of the state, and
it also holds for more general probability models of the signals. This character-
ization advances our understanding of the behavior of privacy-aware individuals.
It is worth pointing out that finding an equilibrium strategy of a privacy-aware
individual under some payment mechanism involves non-convex optimization.
3. We prove an upper bound on V () by designing a payment mechanism R(N,), in
which the strategy profile consisting of -strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
The expected payment to each individual at this equilibrium gives an upper bound
on V (). This upper bound converges to the lower bound exponentially fast as the
number of individuals N becomes large, which indicates that the lower and upper
bounds are asymptotically tight.
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4. The above fundamental bounds on the value of privacy can be further used to study
the payment–accuracy problem, where the data collector aims to minimize the total
payment while achieving an accuracy target in learning the state W . Given an
accuracy target τ , which can be regarded as the maximum allowable error, let F (τ)
denote the minimum total payment for achieving τ . We obtain lower and upper
bounds on F (τ) based on the lower and upper bounds on the value of privacy.
The upper bound is given by the designed mechanism R(N,) with properly chosen
parameters, which shows that the total payment of the designed mechanism is at
most one individual’s payment away from the minimum.
3.2 Model
We consider a single-bit learning problem with privacy-aware individuals as shown
in Figure 3.1. Recall that the data collector is interested in learning the state W ,
which is a binary random variable. For example, the state W can describe the under-
lying value of some new technology. Let PW denote the prior PMF of W . We assume
that PW (1) > 0, PW (0) > 0, and the prior is common knowledge.
Individuals and Strategies. Consider a population of N individuals and denote
the set of individuals by N = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Denote all individuals other than some
given individual i by “−i.” Each individual i possesses a bit Si, which is her private
data, reflecting her knowledge about the state W . For example, the signal Si can
represent individual i’s opinion towards the new technology. We call Si individual i’s
signal. Let S = (S1, S2, · · · , SN). Conditional on either value of the state W , the
signals S1, S2, . . . , SN are i.i.d. with the conditional distributions below, where the
parameter θ with 0.5 < θ < 1 is called the quality of signals since larger value of θ
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means that each signal is equal to the state with higher probability:
P(Si = 1 | W = 1) = θ, P(Si = 0 | W = 1) = 1− θ,
P(Si = 0 | W = 0) = θ, P(Si = 1 | W = 0) = 1− θ.
Let Xi denote the data reported by individual i and let X = (X1, X2, . . . , XN).
The acceptable values for reported data are 0, 1, and “nonparticipation.” So Xi takes
values in the set X = {0, 1,⊥}, where ⊥ indicates that individual i declines to partic-
ipate. A strategy of individual i for data reporting is a mapping σi : {0, 1} → D(X ),
where D(X ) is the set of probability distributions on X . Let σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σN).
The strategy σi prescribes a distribution to Xi for each possible value of Si, which
defines the conditional distribution of Xi given Si. Since we will discuss different
strategies of individual i, we let Pσi(Xi = xi | Si = si) with xi ∈ X and si ∈ {0, 1} de-
note the conditional probabilities defined by strategy σi. If a strategy σi satisfies that
Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1) = Pσi(Xi = 0 | Si = 0) and Pσi(Xi = ⊥ | Si = 1) = Pσi(Xi = ⊥ |
Si = 0) = 0, we say σi is a symmetric randomized response. If a strategy σi makes Xi
and Si independent, we say σi is non-informative; otherwise we say σi is informative.
Mechanism. The data collector uses a payment mechanism R : XN → RN to de-
termine the amount of payment to each individual, where Ri(x) is the payment to
individual i when the reported data is X = x. We are interested in payment mecha-
nisms in which the payment to each individual is nonnegative, i.e., Ri(x) ≥ 0 for any
individual i and any x ∈ XN , which we call nonnegative mechanisms. This constraint
is motivated by the fact that in many practical applications such as surveys, the data
collector has no means to charge users and can only use payments to incentivize user
participation.
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Privacy Cost. We quantify the privacy loss incurred when a strategy is in use by
the level of (local) differential privacy of the strategy (Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork
(2006); Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011); Dwork and Roth (2014)), defined as follows.
Definition 5. The level of (local) differential privacy, or simply the privacy level, of
a strategy σi, denoted by ζ(σi), is defined to be
ζ(σi) = max
{
ln
(
Pσi(Xi ∈ E | Si = si)
Pσi(Xi ∈ E | Si = 1− si)
)
: E ⊆ {0, 1,⊥}, si ∈ {0, 1}
}
,
where we follow the convention that 0/0 = 1, and the strategy σi is said to be ζ(σi)-
differentially private.
The level of differential privacy quantifies the indistinguishablity between the con-
ditional distributions of the reported data given different values of the signal, therefore
measuring how disclosive the strategy is. The privacy loss causes a cost to an individ-
ual. We assume that when using strategies with the same privacy level, individuals
experience the same cost of privacy. Thus, we model each individual’s cost of privacy
by a function g of the privacy level. We call g the cost function and the cost the
privacy cost. Our results can be extended to the case where the cost functions are
heterogeneous (see the discussion in Section 3.3.3). We assume that the form of g is
publicly known (Ghosh and Roth Ghosh and Roth (2011) and subsequent work study
the scenario that cost functions are private and design truthful mechanisms to elicit
them).
We say the cost function g is proper if it satisfies the following three conditions:
g(ξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ≥ 0, (3.1)
g(0) = 0, (3.2)
g is non-decreasing, (3.3)
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where (3.1) follows from the fact that a privacy cost is nonnegative, (3.2) indicates
that the privacy cost is 0 when the reported data is independent of the private data,
and (3.3) means that the privacy cost will not decrease when the privacy loss becomes
larger. In this dissertation, we will focus on a proper cost function that is convex,
continuously differentiable, and g(ξ) = 0 only for ξ = 0. With a little abuse of
notation, we also use g(σi) to denote g(ζ(σi)), which is the privacy cost to individual i
when the strategy σi is used.
Nash Equilibrium. The utility of each individual is the difference between her
payment and her privacy cost. We assume that the individuals are risk neutral, i.e.,
they are interested in maximizing their expected utility. We focus on Nash equilibria
of a payment mechanism, where each individual has no incentive to unilaterally change
her strategy given other individuals’ strategies. Formally, a Nash equilibrium in our
model is defined as follows.
Definition 6. A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium in a payment mechanism
R if for any individual i and any strategy σ′i,
Eσ[Ri(X)− g(σi)] ≥ E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(σ′i)],
where the expectation is over the reported data X, and the subscripts σ and (σ′i,σ−i)
indicate that X is generated by the strategy profile σ and (σ′i,σ−i), respectively.
3.3 The Value of Data Privacy
We say that the data collector obtains  units of privacy from an individual i in
a payment mechanism if individual i’s best response in a Nash equilibrium of the
mechanism is to report data with a privacy level of . Let R(i; ) denote the set
of nonnegative payment mechanisms in which the data collector obtains  units of
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privacy from individual i. Then we measure the value of  units of privacy by the
minimum payment to individual i of all mechanisms inR(i; ). Note that this measure
does not depend on the specific identity of i due to the symmetry across individuals.
For any mechanismR ∈ R(i; ), let σ(R;) denote the corresponding Nash equilibrium.
Then, formally, the value of  units of privacy is measured by
V () = inf
R∈R(i;)
Eσ(R;) [Ri(X)]. (3.4)
In this chapter, we first derive a lower bound on V () by characterizing the Nash
equilibria and replicating payment mechanisms in R(i; ) by genie-aided mechanisms.
We then design a payment mechanism in R(i; ), and consequently the equilibrium
payment to individual i in this mechanism serves as an upper bound of V (). The
gap between the lower and upper bounds diminishes to zero exponentially fast as the
number of individuals N becomes large, which indicates that the lower and upper
bounds are asymptotically tight.
3.3.1 Lower Bound
We present a lower bound on V () in Theorem 3 below. For convenience, we define
VLB() = g
′()
e + 1
e
(
θ
2θ − 1(e
 + 1)− 1
)
, (3.5)
where g′ is the derivative of the privacy cost function of an individual and θ is the
quality of signals.
Theorem 3. The value of  units of privacy measured in (3.4) is lower bounded
as V () ≥ VLB(). Specifically, for any nonnegative payment mechanism R, if the
strategy of an individual i in a Nash equilibrium has a privacy level of , then the
expected payment to individual i at this equilibrium is lower bounded by VLB().
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We remark that the lower bound in Theorem 3 can be achieved by a hypothetical
payment mechanism in which a genie who knows the realization of the underlying
state W guides the data collector on how much to pay each individual. Intuitively,
the knowledge of the state W provides more information about the system, which
helps the data collector to obtain privacy with less payment. While it may sound like
a chicken-and-egg problem as the data collector’s sole purpose of paying individuals
for their private data is to learn the state W , it will become clear that the philosophy
applies and the data collector should utilize the best estimate of W in the payment
mechanism to minimize the payment. The insight we gain from this mechanism sheds
light on the asymptotically tight upper bound on the value of privacy in Section 3.3.2.
This genie-aided payment mechanism, denoted by R̂(), determines the payment
to each individual i based on her own reported data Xi and the state W as follows:
R̂
()
i (Xi,W ) =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
ÂXi,W , (3.6)
where
Â1,1 =
1
(2θ − 1)PW (1) , Â0,0 =
1
(2θ − 1)PW (0) ,
Â0,1 = Â1,0 = 0.
In this payment mechanism, it can be proved that the following symmetric randomized
response of individual i, which is -differentially private and is denoted by σ
()
i , is the
best response:
P
σ
()
i
(Xi = 1 | Si = 1) = Pσ()i (Xi = 0 | Si = 0) =
e
e + 1
,
P
σ
()
i
(Xi = 1 | Si = 0) = Pσ()i (Xi = 0 | Si = 1) =
1
e + 1
,
P
σ
()
i
(Xi = ⊥ | Si = 1) = Pσ()i (Xi = ⊥ | Si = 0) = 0.
(3.7)
For convenience, we will refer to this strategy as the -strategy. The expected payment
to individual i at this strategy equals to the lower bound in Theorem 3.
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Next we sketch the proof of Theorem 3. We first give three lemmas that form
the basis of the proof, and then present the proof based on that. The proofs of the
lemmas are presented in Appendix B–D.
Characterization of Nash Equilibria
We first characterize individuals’ behavior in a Nash equilibrium. In general, an
-differentially private strategy has uncountably many possible forms. However, pro-
vided that the strategy is part of a Nash equilibrium (i.e., a best response of an
individual), the following lemma substantially reduces the space of possibilities. We
remark that a similar phenomenon for privacy-aware individuals has been observed
in Chen et al. (2014) in a different setting.
Lemma 1. In any nonnegative payment mechanism, the strategy of an individual in
a Nash equilibrium is either a symmetric randomized response, or a non-informative
strategy.
We remark that Lemma 1 holds for more general probability models of the signals.
The proof carries over as long as the support of the joint distribution of the signals
is the entire domain {0, 1}N .
By Lemma 1, if an individual’s strategy in a Nash equilibrium has a privacy level of
, where  > 0, this equilibrium strategy is either the -strategy or the (−)-strategy.
The following lemma says that from the payment perspective, it suffices to further
focus on the case that it is the -strategy.
Lemma 2. For any nonnegative payment mechanism R in which the strategy profile
(σ
(−)
i ,σ−i) with some  > 0 is a Nash equilibrium, there exists another nonnegative
payment mechanism R′ in which (σ()i ,σ−i) is a Nash equilibrium, and the expected
payment to each individual at these two equilibria of the two mechanisms are the same.
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This lemma is proved by considering the payment mechanism R′ that is con-
structed by applying R on the reported data after modifying Xi to 1−Xi.
Genie-Aided Payment Mechanism
A genie-aided payment mechanism R̂ : XN × {0, 1} → RN determines the payment
to an individual based on not only the reported data X but also the underlying
state W . Compared with a standard payment mechanism, a genie-aided mechanism
is hypothetical since the data collector has access to the underlying state, as if she
were aided by a genie. Unless otherwise stated, we consider those nonnegative genie-
aided payment mechanisms where R̂i(X,W ), the payment to individual i, depends
on only her own reported data Xi and the underlying state W . Therefore, we will
write R̂i(Xi,W ) to represent R̂i(X,W ) for conciseness. The following lemma shows
that the expected payments resulting from any Nash equilibrium of any payment
mechanism can be replicated by a genie-aided payment mechanism with the same
Nash equilibrium. Thus we can restrict our attention to genie-aided mechanisms to
obtain a lower bound on the value of privacy.
Lemma 3. For any nonnegative payment mechanism R and any Nash equilibrium σ
of it, there exists a nonnegative genie-aided mechanism R̂, such that σ is also a Nash
equilibrium of R̂ and the expected payment to each individual at this equilibrium is
the same under R and R̂.
This lemma is proved by constructing the following genie-aided payment mech-
anism R̂ according to the desired equilibrium σ: for any individual i and any
xi ∈ X , w ∈ {0, 1},
R̂i(xi, w) = Ri(xi;w) ..= Eσ[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w].
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Our intuition is as follows. A genie-aided mechanism can use the state W to generate
an incentive to individual i instead of using the reported data X−i of others. The
above genie-aided payment mechanism R̂ is constructed such that no matter what
strategy individual i uses, her expected utility is the same under R and R̂. Since an
individual calculates her best response according to the expected utility, her equilib-
rium behavior and expected payment are the same under R̂ and R. We remark that
the Nash equilibria of a genie-aided mechanism are much easier to analyze since the
individuals are decoupled in the payments and thus an individual’s strategy does not
have an influence on other individuals’ utility.
Let R̂(i; ) denote the set of nonnegative genie-aided payment mechanisms in
which the -strategy is an individual i’s strategy in a Nash equilibrium, and let σ
()
i
denote the -strategy. Consider
V̂ () = inf
R̂∈R̂(i;)
E
σ
()
i
[
R̂i(Xi,W )
]
,
which is a definition similar to the value of  units of privacy, V (), measured in
(3.4). Then V̂ () ≤ V () for the following reasons. Consider any R ∈ R(i; ), i.e.,
any nonnegative payment mechanism R in which individual i’s strategy in a Nash
equilibrium has a privacy level of . With Lemma 1 and 2, we can assume without
loss of generality that this equilibrium strategy is the -strategy. Then by Lemma 3,
we can map R to a R̂ ∈ R̂(i; ), such that
Eσ(R;) [Ri(X)] = Eσ()i
[
R̂i(Xi,W )
]
.
Therefore, the infimum over R̂(i; ) is no greater than the infimum over R(i; ), i.e.,
V̂ () ≤ V ().
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Proof of Theorem 3
With Lemma 1, 2 and 3, we can prove the lower bound in Theorem 3 by focusing
on the genie-aided mechanisms in R̂(i; ). Then there is no need to consider the
strategies of individuals other than individual i since a genie-aided mechanism pays
individual i only according to Xi and W . A necessary condition for the -strategy to
be a best response of individual i is that  yields no worse expected payment than
other privacy levels. We utilize this necessary condition to obtain a lower bound on
the expected payment to individual i, which gives a lower bound on V̂ () and further
proves the lower bound in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 1, 2 and 3, it suffices to focus on nonnegative genie-
aided payment mechanisms in which the -strategy is an individual i’s strategy in a
Nash equilibrium, i.e., mechanisms in R̂(i; ). Consider any R̂ ∈ R̂(i; ) and denote
the -strategy by σ
()
i . Consider the ξ-strategy of individual i with any ξ ≥ 0 and
denote it by σ
(ξ)
i . Then the expected utility of individual i at the strategy σ
(ξ)
i can
be written as
E
σ
(ξ)
i
[
R̂i(Xi,W )
]
− g(σ(ξ)i )
=
∑
xi,si,w
P
σ
(ξ)
i
(Xi = xi | Si = si)P(Si = si,W = w)R̂i(xi, w)
− g(ξ),
= K1
eξ
eξ + 1
+K0
1
eξ + 1
+K − g(ξ),
where
K1 = {R̂i(1, 1)PW (1)θ + R̂i(1, 0)PW (0)(1− θ)}
− {R̂i(0, 1)PW (1)θ + R̂i(0, 0)PW (0)(1− θ)},
K0 = {R̂i(1, 1)PW (1)(1− θ) + R̂i(1, 0)PW (0)θ}
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− {R̂i(0, 1)PW (1)(1− θ) + R̂i(0, 0)PW (0)θ},
K = R̂i(0, 1)PW (1) + R̂i(0, 0)PW (0).
It can be seen that K1, K0 and K do not depend on ξ. Let this expected utility
define a function f of ξ; i.e.,
f(ξ) = K1
eξ
eξ + 1
+K0
1
eξ + 1
− g(ξ) +K.
Then since the -strategy is individual i’s strategy in a Nash equilibrium, the level 
maximizes f(ξ). Since
f ′(ξ) = (K1 −K0) e
ξ
(eξ + 1)2
− g′(ξ),
and f ′() = 0, we must have
K1 −K0 = g′()(e
 + 1)2
e
. (3.8)
Now we calculate the expected payment to individual i at the -strategy:
E
σ
()
i
[
R̂i(Xi,W )
]
= −(K1 −K0) 1
e + 1
+ (K1 +K).
By definition,
K1 +K = R̂i(1, 1)PW (1)θ + R̂i(1, 0)PW (0)(1− θ)
+ R̂i(0, 1)PW (1)(1− θ) + R̂i(0, 0)PW (0)θ,
and
K1 −K0 =
(
R̂i(1, 1)− R̂i(0, 1)
)
PW (1)(2θ − 1)
+
(
R̂i(0, 0)− R̂i(1, 0)
)
PW (0)(2θ − 1).
Therefore,
K1 +K =
θ
2θ − 1(K1 −K0)
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+ R̂i(1, 0)PW (0) + R̂i(0, 1)PW (1)
≥ θ
2θ − 1(K1 −K0)
= g′()
(e + 1)2
e
θ
2θ − 1 ,
where we have used the nonnegativity of R̂. Then the expected payment to individ-
ual i is bounded as follows:
E
σ
()
i
[
R̂i(Xi,W )
]
= −(K1 −K0) 1
e + 1
+ (K1 +K)
≥ g′()e
 + 1
e
(
θ
2θ − 1(e
 + 1)− 1
)
, (3.9)
which proves the lower bound.
Now beyond the proof, we take a moment to check when this lower bound can be
achieved. To achieve the lower bound, we need the equality in (3.9) to hold and the
equation (3.8) to be satisfied, which is equivalent to the following conditions:
R̂i(1, 0) = 0, (3.10)
R̂i(0, 1) = 0, (3.11)
(2θ − 1)
(
R̂i(1, 1)PW (1) + R̂i(0, 0)PW (0)
)
= g′()
(e + 1)2
e
. (3.12)
It is easy to check that the genie-aided payment mechanism R̂() defined in (3.6) is
in R̂(i; ) and satisfies (3.10)–(3.12), and therefore achieves the lower bound. Can
this lower bound can be achieved by a standard nonnegative payment mechanism?
Consider any payment mechanism R ∈ R(i; ). Following similar arguments, we can
prove that to achieve the lower bound, R needs to satisfy the following conditions:
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Ri(1; 0) = 0, (3.13)
Ri(0; 1) = 0, (3.14)
(2θ − 1)(Ri(1; 1)PW (1) +Ri(0; 0)PW (0))
= g′()
(e + 1)2
e
, (3.15)
where recall that Ri(xi;w) = Eσ(R,) [Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w] for xi, w ∈ {0, 1}. It
can be proved that if R satisfies (3.13) and (3.14), then Ri(x) = 0 for any x ∈ XN ,
which contradicts (3.15). Therefore, no standard nonnegative payment mechanism
can achieve the lower bound. However, as will be shown in the next section, we can
design a class of standard nonnegative payment mechanisms such that the expected
payment approaches the lower bound as the number of individuals increases. The
design follows the insights indicated by the genie-aided mechanism R̂(): to minimize
the payment, the data collector should utilize the best estimate of W in the payment
mechanism based on the noisy reported data.
3.3.2 Upper Bound
We present an upper bound on V () in Theorem 4 below. For convenience, define
d =
1
2
ln
(e + 1)2
4(θe + 1− θ)((1− θ)e + θ) , (3.16)
where θ is the quality of signal. Note that d > 0 for any  > 0. Recall that VLB() is
the lower bound in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. The value of  units of privacy measured in (3.4) is upper bounded as
V () ≤ VLB() + O(e−Nd), where the O(·) is for N → ∞. Specifically, there exists
a nonnegative payment mechanism R(N,) in which the strategy profile σ() consisting
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of -strategies is a Nash equilibrium, and the expected payment to each individual i at
this equilibrium is upper bounded by VLB() +O(e
−Nd).
Comparing this upper bound with the lower bound VLB() in Theorem 3 we can
see that the gap between the lower and upper bounds is just the term O(e−Nd), which
diminishes to zero exponentially fast as N goes to infinity.
We present the payment mechanism R(N,) in the following section. We will show
that under R(N,), the strategy profile σ() consisting of -strategies is a Nash equi-
librium. Therefore, R(N,) is a member of R(i; ), and the payment to individual i at
σ() gives an upper bound on the value of privacy.
The design of R(N,) is enlightened by the hypothetical payment mechanism R̂()
defined in (3.6). But without direct access to the state W , the mechanismR(N,) relies
on the reported data from an individual i’s peers, i.e., individuals other than individ-
ual i, to obtain an estimate of W . We borrow the idea of the peer-prediction method
Miller et al. (2009), which rewards more for the agreement between an individual
and her peers to encourage truthful reporting. However, unlike the peer-prediction
method, the individuals here have privacy concerns and they will weigh the privacy
cost against the payment to choose the best privacy level. We modify the payments in
R̂() to ensure that the -strategy is still a best response of each individual in R(N,),
given that other individuals also follow the -strategy, which yields the desired Nash
equilibrium σ().
The equilibrium payment to each individual inR(N,) converges to the lower bound
in Theorem 3 as the number of individuals N goes to infinity. The intuition behind
is that as the number of individuals N goes to infinity, the majority of the reported
data from other individuals converges to the underlying state W , and thus R(N,)
works similar as the genie-aided mechanism R̂(), whose equilibrium payment to each
individual equals to the lower bound in Theorem 3.
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A Payment Mechanism R(N,)
The payment mechanism R(N,) is designed for purchasing private data from N
privacy-aware individuals, parameterized by a privacy parameter , where N ≥ 2
and  > 0.
1. Each individual reports her data (which can be the decision of not participating).
2. The data collector counts the number of participants n.
3. For non-participating individuals, the payment is zero.
4. If there is only one participant, pay zero to this participant. Otherwise, for each
participating individual i, the data collector computes the variable
M−i =

1 if
∑
j : Xj 6=⊥,j 6=i
Xj ≥
⌊n− 1
2
⌋
+ 1,
0 otherwise,
which is the majority of the other participants’ reported data. Then the data
collector pays individual i the following amount of payment according to her
reported data Xi and M−i:
R
(N,)
i (X) =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
AXi,M−i ,
where the parameters A1,1, A0,0, A0,1, A1,0 are defined in Section 3.3.2.
Payment Parameterization
Let
α = θ
e
e + 1
+ (1− θ) 1
e + 1
.
The physical meaning of α can be seen by considering the strategy profile σ(), where
given the state W , the reported data X1, X2, . . . , XN are i.i.d. with
P
σ
()
i
(Xi = 1 | W = 1) = Pσ()i (Xi = 0 | W = 0) = α.
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Given that the number of participants is n with n ≥ 2, define the following quantities.
Consider a random variable that follows the binomial distribution with parameters
n−1 and α. Let β(n) denote the probability that this random variable is greater than
or equal to bn−1
2
c+ 1. Let
γ(n) =

1−
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
α
n−1
2 (1− α)n−12 if n− 1 is even,
1 if n− 1 is odd.
(3.17)
To see the physical meaning of β(n) and γ(n), still consider σ(), where the number of
participants is n = N . Then for an individual i,
Pσ()(M−i = 1 | W = 1) = β(N),
Pσ()(M−i = 1 | W = 0) = γ(N) − β(N).
With the introduced notation, the parameters A1,1, A0,0, A0,1, A1,0 used in the
payment mechanism R(N,) are defined as follows:
A1,1 =
PW (1)(1− β(n)) + PW (0)(1− (γ(n) − β(n)))
(2β(n) − γ(n))(2θ − 1)PW (1)PW (0) ,
A0,0 =
PW (1)β
(n) + PW (0)(γ
(n) − β(n))
(2β(n) − γ(n))(2θ − 1)PW (1)PW (0) ,
A0,1 = 0,
A1,0 = 0.
It is easy to verify that these parameters are nonnegative. ThusR(N,) is a nonnegative
payment mechanism. The proof of the equilibrium properties of R(N,) in Theorem 4
is given below.
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Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. It suffices to prove that the strategy profile σ() is a Nash equilibrium in R(N,)
and the expected payment to each individual i at this equilibrium satisfies that
Eσ()
[
R
(N,)
i (X)
]
≤ VLB() +O(e−Nd),
where recall that
VLB() =
g′()(e + 1)
e
(
θ
2θ − 1(e
 + 1)− 1
)
.
For conciseness, we suppress the explicit dependence on N and , and write R and σ
to represent R(N,) and σ(), respectively, in the remainder of this proof.
We first prove that the strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium in R; i.e., for any
individual i, the -strategy is a best response of individual i when other individuals
follow σ−i. Following the notation in the proof of Lemma 1, for any individual i we
consider any strategy σ′i of individual i and let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 1), q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 1),
p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 0), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 0).
Then by the proof of Lemma 1, the best response satisfies either p1 = p0, q1 = q0,
or p1 = q0, p0 = q1, p1 + q1 = 1, depending on the form of the utility function
Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0), which is the expected utility of individual i at the strategy σ
′
i when
other individuals follow σ−i. Thus, we derive the form of Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0) next. Recall
that we let Ri(xi;w) denote E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w] for xi, w ∈ {0, 1}.
Then
Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0)
= E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(ζ(σ′i))]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)),
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with
K1 = {Ri(1; 1)PW (1)θ +Ri(1; 0)PW (0)(1− θ)},
K0 = {Ri(1; 1)PW (1)(1− θ) +Ri(1; 0)PW (0)θ},
L1 = {Ri(0; 1)PW (1)θ +Ri(0; 0)PW (0)(1− θ)},
L0 = {Ri(0; 1)PW (1)(1− θ) +Ri(0; 0)PW (0)θ}.
In the designed mechanism R, the payment to individual i only depends on Xi
and M−i. Thus we can write
Ri(Xi;M−i) = Ri(X).
Then the value of Ri(xi;w) is calculated as follows:
Ri(1; 1) = E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = 1,W = 1]
= β(N)Ri(1; 1) + (1− β(N))Ri(1; 0),
Ri(1; 0) = E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = 1,W = 0]
= (γ(N) − β(N))Ri(1; 1) + (1− (γ(N) − β(N)))Ri(1; 0),
Ri(0; 1) = E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = 0,W = 1]
= (1− β(N))Ri(0; 0) + β(N)Ri(0; 1),
Ri(0; 0) = E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = 0,W = 0]
= (1− (γ(N) − β(N)))Ri(0; 0) + (γ(N) − β(N))Ri(0; 1),
and it can be verified that K1, K0, L1 and L0 are all positive. Therefore, by the proof
of Lemma 1, the possibility for the best response to be p1 = p0, q1 = q0, 0 < p1+q1 < 1
can be eliminated and the best response strategy must be in one of the following three
forms:
p1 = p0 = q1 = q0 = 0, (3.18)
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p1 = p0, q1 = q0, p1 + q1 = 1, (3.19)
p1 = q0, p0 = q1, p1 + q1 = 1. (3.20)
The strategy in (3.18) is to always not participate, which yields an utility of zero.
For strategies in the form of (3.19) or (3.20), we can write the expected utility as a
function of p1 and p0 as follows:
U i(p1, p0) = K1p1 +K0p0 +K − g(ζ(p1, p0)),
where K1 = K1−L1, K0 = K0−L0, K = L1+L0, and with a little abuse of notation,
ζ(p1, p0) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣}.
Inserting the value of Ri(Xi;M−i) gives
K1 =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
, K0 = −g
′()(e + 1)2
2e
.
Then a strategy in the form of (3.19) yields an utility of K > 0. A strategy in the
form of (3.20) can be written as
p1 = q0 =
eξ
eξ + 1
, p0 = q1 =
1
eξ + 1
.
Then the expected utility can be further written as a function f of ξ as follows:
f(ξ) = K1
eξ
eξ + 1
+K0
1
eξ + 1
− g(|ξ|) +K.
Therefore, to prove that the -strategy is a best response of individual i, it suffices to
prove that  maximizes f(ξ) and f() ≥ K. For any ξ < 0, it is easy to see that
K1
eξ
eξ + 1
+K0
1
eξ + 1
< 0 < K1
e−ξ
e−ξ + 1
+K0
1
e−ξ + 1
.
Thus f(ξ) achieves its maximum value at some ξ ≥ 0. For any ξ ≥ 0,
f ′(ξ) = (K1 −K0) e
ξ
(eξ + 1)2
− g′(ξ),
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f ′′(ξ) = −(K1 −K0)e
ξ(eξ − 1)
(eξ + 1)3
− g′′(ξ) ≤ 0,
where the second inequality is due to the convexity of the cost function g. Therefore,
h is concave. Since f ′() = 0,  maximizes f(ξ). The optimal value is
f() = g′()
e − e−
2
− g() +K.
By the convexity of g,
g() ≤ g′() ≤ g′()e
 − e−
2
.
Thus f() ≥ K, which completes the proof for the -strategy to be a best response of
individual i.
Next we calculate the expected payment to individual i at σ, which can be written
as
Eσ[Ri(X)] = −(K1 −K0) 1
e + 1
+K1 +K.
By definitions,
K1 +K
=
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
1
(2β(N) − γ(N))(2θ − 1)
·
(
2
(
β(N)
)2
+ (4θ − 2− 2γ(N))β(N)
+ 2(1− θ)γ(N) + β(N)(1− β(N))PW (1)
PW (0)
+ (γ(N) − β(N))(1− (γ(N) − β(N)))PW (0)
PW (1)
)
=:
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
h(β(N)).
Then
Eσ[Ri(X)] =
g′()(e + 1)
e
(
1
2
h(β(N))(e + 1)− 1
)
= VLB() +
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
(
h(β(N))− 2θ
2θ − 1
)
.
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To derive an upper bound on the expected payment, we first analyze the function h.
Rearranging terms gives
h(β(N)) =
1
2θ − 1
1
2β(N) − γ(N)
·
(
(2− t)(β(N))2 + (4θ − 2− 2γ(N) + PW (1)
PW (0)
+ (2γ(N) − 1)PW (0)
PW (1)
)
β(N)
+ 2(1− θ)γ(N) + γ(N)(1− γ(N))PW (0)
PW (1)
)
,
where
t =
(PW (1))
2 + (PW (0))
2
PW (1)PW (0)
≥ 2.
Taking derivative yields
h′(β(N)) =
1
2θ − 1
1
(2β(N) − γ(N))2
·
(
2(2− t)
(
β(N) − γ
(N)
2
)2
− (γ(N))2
− γ
(N)t
2
(2− γ(N))− 2γ(N)(1− γ(N))
)
.
Therefore, h′(β(N)) ≤ 0 and h is a non-increasing function.
Next we derive a lower bound on β(N). Let Y1, Y2, . . . , YN−1 be i.i.d. Bernoulli
random variables with parameter α. Then by the definition of β(N):
β(N) = P
(
N−1∑
l=1
Yl ≥
⌊
N − 1
2
⌋
+ 1
)
= γ(N) − P
(
N−1∑
l=1
(1− Yl) ≥ N − 1−
⌈
N − 1
2
⌉
+ 1
)
≥ γ(N) − P
(
N−1∑
l=1
(1− Yl) ≥ N − 1
2
)
.
By the Chernoff bound Srikant and Ying (2014),
P
(
N−1∑
l=1
(1− Yl) ≥ N − 1
2
)
≤ e−(N−1) 12 ln 14α(1−α) = e−(N−1)d,
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where d = 1
2
ln 1
4α(1−α) > 0 is the parameter defined in (3.16). Thus,
β(N) ≥ γ(N) − e−(N−1)d.
By the monotonicity of h,
h(β(N))− 2θ
2θ − 1
≤ h
(
γ(N) − e−(N−1)d
)
− 2θ
2θ − 1
=
1
2θ − 1
1
γ(N) − 2e−(N−1)d
·
(
(2− t)e−2(N−1)d +
(
2(1− γ(N)) + 2γ(N)t
− PW (1)
PW (0)
− (2γ(N) − 1)PW (0)
PW (1)
)
e−(N−1)d
+ γ(N)
PW (1)
PW (0)
+
(
γ(N)
)2PW (0)
PW (1)
− (γ(N))2t)
≤ 1
2θ − 1
1
γ(N) − 2e−(N−1)d
·
(
(2− t)e−2(N−1)d + (2(1− γ(N)) + t)e−(N−1)d
+ γ(N)(1− γ(N))PW (1)
PW (0)
)
.
Notice that
1− γ(N) =

(
N − 1
N−1
2
)
α
N−1
2 (1− α)N−12 if N − 1 is even,
0 if N − 1 is odd.
Then when N − 1 is odd, γ(N) = 1, and when N − 1 is even,
1− γ(N) =
(
N − 1
N−1
2
)
α
N−1
2 (1− α)N−12
= e−(N−1)d ·
(
N − 1
N−1
2
)
2−(N−1),
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where
lim
N→∞
(
N − 1
N−1
2
)
2−(N−1) = 0.
Thus 1− γ(N) = O(e−Nd) as N →∞.
Therefore,
Eσ[Ri(X)]
≤ VLB() + g
′()(e + 1)2
2e
(
h
(
γ(N) − e−(N−1)d
)
− 2θ
2θ − 1
)
≤ VLB() + g
′()(e + 1)2
2e
1
2θ − 1
1
γ(N) − 2e−(N−1)d
·
(
(2− t)e−2(N−1)d + (2(1− γ(N)) + t)e−(N−1)d +O(e−Nd)
)
= VLB() +O(e
−Nd),
as N →∞, which completes the proof.
3.3.3 Extension to Heterogeneous Cost Functions
Our results on the value of privacy are also valid in the scenario where individuals’
privacy cost functions are heterogeneous and known. In this case, the value of  units
of privacy is still measured by the minimum payment of all nonnegative payment
mechanisms under which an individual’s best response in a Nash equilibrium is to
report the data with a privacy level of . However, with heterogeneous cost functions,
this value differs from individual to individual. Following similar notation, we let
Vi() denote the value of  units of privacy to individual i, and let gi denote the
cost function of individual i. Then the following lower and upper bounds, which are
almost identical to those in Theorem 3 and 4 except the heterogeneous cost function
gi(), hold
g′i()
e + 1
e
(
θ
2θ − 1(e
 + 1)− 1
)
≤ Vi()
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≤ g′i()
e + 1
e
(
θ
2θ − 1(e
 + 1)− 1
)
+O(e−Nd).
The lower bound above can be derived directly from the proof of Theorem 3, since the
proof does not depend on whether the cost functions are homogeneous or not. The
upper bound above is given by a payment mechanism that works similar to R(N,),
with the g′ in R(N,)i replaced by g
′
i. In this mechanism, the strategy profile σ
() is
still a Nash equilibrium, and the expected payment to individual i at this equilibrium
can still be upper bounded as in Theorem 4 but again with g′ replaced by g′i.
3.4 Payment vs. Accuracy
In this section, we apply the fundamental bounds on the value of privacy to
the payment–accuracy problem, where the data collector aims to minimize the total
payment while achieving an accuracy target in learning the state. The solution of this
problem can be used to guide the design of review systems. For example, to evaluate
the underlying value of a new product, a review system can utilize the results in
this section to design a payment mechanism for eliciting informative feedback from
testers.
3.4.1 Payment–Accuracy Problem
The data collector learns the state W from the reported data X1, X2, . . . , XN ,
which is collected through some payment mechanism, by performing hypothesis test-
ing between the following two hypotheses:
H0 : W = 0,
H1 : W = 1.
The conditional distributions of the reported data given the hypotheses are specified
by the strategy profile in a Nash equilibrium of the payment mechanism. According
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to Lemma 1, we can write an equilibrium strategy profile in the form of (σ
(i)
i ) =
(σ
(1)
1 , σ
(2)
2 , . . . , σ
(N )
N ) with i ∈ R\{0}∪{⊥}, where recall that σ(i)i is the i-strategy.
For ease of notation, a non-informative strategy is also called an -strategy but with
 = ⊥ . Let R(1, 2, . . . , N) denote the set of nonnegative payment mechanisms in
which (σ
(i)
i ) is a Nash equilibrium.
We consider an information-theoretic approach based on the Chernoff information
Cover and Thomas (2006) to measure the accuracy that can be achieved in hypothesis
testing. For each individual i, let D(i) denote the Chernoff information between the
conditional distributions of Xi given W = 1 and W = 0. The larger D(i) is, the more
possible that the two hypotheses can be distinguished. In later discussions we will
see that the Chernoff information is closely related to the best achievable probability
of error.
The data collector aims to minimize the total payment while achieving an accuracy
target. The design choices include the number of individuals N , the parameters
1, 2, . . . , N , and the payment mechanism R in which the strategy profile (σ
(i)
i ) is a
Nash equilibrium. Then we formulate the mechanism design problem as the following
optimization problem, which we call the payment–accuracy problem:
min
N∈N, i∈R\{0}∪{⊥},∀i
R∈R(1,2,...,N )
N∑
i=1
E
(σ
(i)
i )
[Ri(X)]
subject to e−
∑N
i=1D(i) ≤ τ,
where the accuracy target is represented by τ , which is related to the maximum
allowable error. We focus on the range τ ∈ (0, 1) for nontriviality. Let F (τ) denote
the optimal payment in this problem, i.e., the infimum of the total payment while
satisfying the accuracy target τ .
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3.4.2 Bounds on the Payment–Accuracy Problem
We present bounds on F (τ) in Theorem 5 below. For convenience, we define
˜ = inf
{
arg max
{
D()
VLB()
:  > 0
}}
, N˜ =
⌈
ln(1/τ)
D(˜)
⌉
, (3.21)
where recall that VLB() is the lower bound in Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. The optimal payment F (τ) in the payment–accuracy problem for a
given accuracy target τ ∈ (0, 1) is bounded as: (N˜ − 1)VLB(˜) ≤ F (τ) ≤ N˜VLB(˜) +
O(τ ln(1/τ)), where the O(·) is for τ → 0.
The upper bound in Theorem 5 is given by the designed mechanism R(N,) with
parameters chosen as  = ˜ and N = N˜ . Note that ˜ can be proved to have a well-
defined finite value independent of τ . By the lower and upper bounds on the value
of privacy, the payment to each individual in R(N˜,˜) is roughly equal to the lower
bound VLB(˜). Then Theorem 5 indicates that the total payment of the designed
mechanism R(N˜,˜) is at most one individual’s payment away from the minimum, with
the diminishing term O(τ ln(1/τ)) omitted. Figure 3.2 shows an illustration of the
lower and upper bounds.
Theorem 5 is proved by Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 below, where the lower bound is
given by the lower bound on the value of privacy, and the upper bound is given by
R(N˜,˜).
Lower Bound
First, notice that it suffices to limit the choice of each i to (0,+∞) in the payment–
accuracy problem, since when i = ⊥ , D(i) = 0, and when i < 0, D(i) = D(|i|)
and there exists another nonnegative payment mechanism with the same payment
property and a Nash equilibrium at (σ
(|i|)
i ) by Lemma 2.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the lower and upper bounds in Theorem 5 on the minimum
total payment for achieving an accuracy target τ , where the upper bound is given
by the designed mechanism R(N˜,˜). In this example, the prior PMF of the state is
PW (1) = 0.7, PW (0) = 0.3. The quality of signals is θ = 0.8. The cost function is
g() = . The range of τ shown in the figure is 0.001–0.4.
Now we use the lower bound on the value of privacy to prove the lower bound on
F (τ). By Theorem 3,
inf
R∈R(1,2,...,N )
N∑
i=1
E
(σ
(i)
i )
[Ri(X)] ≥
N∑
i=1
VLB(i).
Therefore, the optimal payment F (τ) is lower bounded by the optimal value of the
following optimization problem (P1):
min
N∈N, i∈(0,+∞),∀i
N∑
i=1
VLB(i)
subject to e−
∑N
i=1D(i) ≤ τ.
(P1)
Lemma 4. Any feasible solution (N, 1, 2, . . . , N) of (P1) satisfies
N∑
i=1
VLB(i) ≥ (N˜ − 1)VLB(˜),
where ˜ and N˜ are defined in (3.21).
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Lemma 4 states that the total expected payment of the data collector is at least
(N˜ − 1)VLB(˜). Note that the value given by the genie-aided payment mechanism
R̂(˜) for N˜ individuals is N˜VLB(˜), which is at most one VLB(˜) away from the op-
timal value of (P1). We can think of VLB() as the price for  units of privacy and
D() as the quality that the data collector gets from  units of privacy due to its
contribution to the accuracy. Then the intuition for (N˜ , ˜, . . . , ˜) to be a near-optimal
choice is that the privacy level ˜ gives the best quality/price ratio and N˜ is the fewest
number of individuals to meet the accuracy target. The proof of Lemma 4 is pre-
sented is Appendix E. With this lemma, the lower bound on F (τ) in Theorem 5 is
straightforward.
Upper Bound
Lemma 5. Choose the parameters in the payment mechanism R(N,) defined in Sec-
tion 3.3.2 to be  = ˜ and N = N˜ , where ˜ and N˜ are defined in (3.21). Then in the
Nash equilibrium σ(˜) of R(N˜,˜), the accuracy target τ can be achieved, and the total
expected payment is upper bounded as
Eσ(˜)
[
N˜∑
i=1
R
(N˜,˜)
i (X)
]
≤ N˜VLB(˜) +O(τ ln(1/τ)).
This lemma follows from Theorem 4 and we omit the proof here. Since the pay-
ment mechanism R(N,) together with  = ˜ and N = N˜ is a feasible solution of the
payment–accuracy problem, the upper bound in this lemma gives the upper bound
on F (τ) in Theorem 5.
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3.5 Discussions on the Accuracy Metric
When we study the relation between payment and accuracy, the accuracy can also
be measured by the best achievable probability of error, defined as
pe = inf
ψ
P
(σ
(i)
i )
(ψ(X) 6= W ),
where ψ(x) is a decision function, with ψ(x) = 0 implying that H0 is accepted
and ψ(x) = 1 implying that H1 is accepted. However, pe is difficult to deal with
analytically since its exact form in terms of 1, 2, . . . , N is intractable.
We measure the accuracy based on the Chernoff information, which is an
information-theoretic metric closely related to pe. It can be proved by the Bhat-
tacharyya bound Kailath (1967) that at the strategy profile (σ
(i)
i ),
pe ≤ e−
∑N
i=1D(i). (3.22)
Therefore, if we want to guarantee that pe ≤ pmaxe for some maximum allowable
probability of error pmaxe , we can choose τ = p
max
e in the payment–accuracy problem.
In fact, the metric based on the Chernoff information is very close to the metric pe,
since the upper bound (3.22) is tight in exponent when all the i are the same, i.e.,
when the reported data is i.i.d. given the hypothesis.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied “the value of privacy” under a game-theoretic model,
where a data collector pays strategic individuals to buy their private data for a learn-
ing purpose. The individuals do not consider the data collector to be trustworthy,
and thus experience a cost of privacy loss during data reporting. The value of  units
of privacy is measured by the minimum payment of all nonnegative payment mech-
anisms under which an individual’s best response in a Nash equilibrium is to report
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the data with a privacy level of . We derived asymptotically tight lower and upper
bounds on the value of privacy as the number of individuals becomes large, where
the upper bound was given by a designed payment mechanism R(N,). We further
applied these fundamental limits to find the minimum total payment for the data
collector to achieve certain learning accuracy target, and derived lower and upper
bounds on the minimum payment. The total payment of the designed mechanism
R(N,) with properly chosen parameters is at most one individual’s payment away
from the minimum.
66
Chapter 4
TRADING PRIVATE DATA WITH UNKNOWN VALUATIONS OF PRIVACY:
THE EFFECT OF NEGATIVE PAYMENTS
4.1 Introduction
It is natural to expect that different individuals may have different valuations of
privacy and their valuations are unknown to the data analyst. Specifically, we study
a model where the privacy cost of an individual is a function of her privacy loss. The
privacy loss is determined by the individual’s data reporting strategy, and the cost
function represents the individual’s personal valuation of privacy. The exact forms of
the privacy cost functions are unknown to the data analyst, which complicates the
mechanism design problem. We elaborate further on this in the following. When
the cost functions are known to the data analyst, as shown in Chapter 3, she can
tune the mechanism such that all the individuals are willing to participate in the
market in an equilibrium and the surplus payment is minimal. However, when the
cost functions are unknown, the data analyst may need to set the payment high to
ensure the participation of an individual in case the individual has high valuation of
privacy, but it is also possible that the individual has a low valuation and then the
high payment is not a cost-effective choice.
Impact of negative payments
As noted above, because different individuals may have different valuations of
privacy, it can be costly for the data analyst to set a payment mechanism which
guarantees nonnegative payment to each individual and every data report. With
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this observation, we consider payment mechanisms where the expected payment of
each individual is nonnegative, but the realizations of the payments can be negative.
In practice, this can model the scenario where there are repeated data collection
(e.g., to learn the ratings of different movies). In some rounds the payments received
by the individual may be negative, but in the long run, the total payment will be
nonnegative. This is in contrast with the approach that enforces all the realizations
of the payments to be nonnegative (which is called a nonnegative mechanism). The
constraint of nonnegativity is appealing in practice since paying individuals is more
convenient than charging individuals, but it will surely incur higher cost of the data
analyst and makes the data analysis more difficult. To see this, let us consider a
nonnegative mechanism and an individual whose valuation of privacy is very high.
Then participating and reporting only noise to the data analyst is a better strategy for
this individual than opting out since she may still receive some nonnegative payment
without incurring any privacy cost. Therefore, the data analyst’s payment does not
buy her any useful information from this data subject, and moreover, the data analyst
has to work with these unusable reports during data analysis. To address these
difficulties, we utilize negative payments to “filter out” individuals with high privacy
costs, i.e., we design the mechanism such that their expected utility is negative if they
report only noise. This saves the data analyst’s payments on poor quality data and
simplifies the data analysis. We will see that we can actually drive the total cost to
zero for the data analyst as the population size becomes large.
To implement negative payments in practice, the data analyst can set up an online
payment system using virtual currency or credits. Instead of paying real money to an
individual every time she reports a data, virtual currency or credits can be added to or
reduced from the user’s account. An individual can be paid a weekly or monthly with
real dollars. Since the expected payment is nonnegative, the real-dollar payment over
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a long time period is nonnegative with a high probability. We remark that negative
payments may not be feasible in many scenarios. The focus of this chapter is to reveal
the fundamental benefit of negative payments to the data analyst when feasible.
With the above formulation, the interaction between the data analyst and indi-
viduals is clear: an individual acts upon the payment mechanism and her privacy cost
function; the data analyst designs the payment mechanism to incentivize the individ-
uals such that they are willing to report data with small enough perturbation that
allows the data analyst to achieve the desired learning accuracy. In this formulation,
we aim to answer the following questions: (1) How will the individuals behave to
reconcile the conflict between privacy and rewards? (2) How should the data analyst
design the mechanism such that she can achieve her learning goal cost-effectively?
Summary of Results
We consider the following model for private data, which is the same as the model
considered in Chapter 3. A data analyst is interested in learning, from a population
of N individuals, an underlying state represented by a binary random variable W . As
illustrated in Figure 4.1, each individual i possesses a binary signal Si, which is her
private data, reflecting her knowledge about the state W . Conditional on the state
W , the signals are independently generated such that the probability for each Si to
be the same as W is θ, where 0.5 < θ < 1. At the beginning of the data procurement,
the data analyst announces a payment mechanism, which determines the amounts of
payments according to the reported bits X1, X2, . . . , XN of individuals.
The model for privacy cost considered in this chapter is different from those in
previous chapters. Recall that the privacy cost of an individual is a function of her
privacy loss. We measure the privacy loss of an individual’s data reporting strategy
by the level of (local) differential privacy Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006) of
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Figure 4.1: Information structure of the model with unknown valuations of privacy.
The data analyst is interested in the state W , which is a binary random variable.
Each individual i has a private binary signal Si and a type Ci that characterizes her
valuation of privacy. Conditional on W , S1, S2, . . . , SN are i.i.d. Individual i reports
data Xi, which is generated based on Si and Ci using a randomized strategy.
the strategy. Then the privacy cost function of individual i is characterized by her
type Ci: when individual i reports data with a (local) differential privacy level of 
after observing her type Ci = ci, her privacy loss is  and the corresponding privacy
cost is ci. The type of an individual is also called her cost coefficient due to this
linear form. We assume that an individual’s type is independent from her private
data, which is applicable to the scenario where an individual’s valuation of privacy
is intrinsic and thus is not affected by the specific private data she has. The cost
coefficients are also illustrated in Figure 4.1. We remark that both settings where an
individual’s valuation of privacy is independent and correlated with her private data
have been studied in the “trustworthy data analyst” model in the literature. In this
chapter, we assume that the prior distribution of the state, signals and types is public
information. However, the data analyst does not know the private signal and the
type of an individual. An individual’s utility is the difference between the payment
she receives and her privacy cost.
70
The data analyst learns the state by performing hypothesis testing. The goal
of the mechanism design is to elicit data with certain amount of information in a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium to fulfill an accuracy goal with minimized total payment.
Our main result is on constructing a family of payment mechanisms parameterized
by the population size, the prior, and (cth, ). These mechanisms provide answers to
the proposed questions from the following perspectives.
• Behavior of individuals with privacy concerns. We show that the individuals
exhibit a threshold behavior in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the proposed
mechanisms: the individuals with cost coefficients above a threshold cth choose
not to participate, and the individuals with cost coefficients below cth partic-
ipate and report data with a privacy level no smaller than . Since a larger
privacy level means that the data is less perturbed, the data analyst can incen-
tivize the participants to limit the perturbation to a desired extent by choosing
an appropriate . By this result, we can also see that this family of mecha-
nisms resolve the otherwise nuisance that individuals with high privacy costs
may participate and report only noise: they are “filtered out”, and the “left”
participants all report data with quality guarantee.
• Tradeoff between learning accuracy and cost. We show that as the population
size grows to infinity, the data analyst can learn the underlying state with
arbitrarily small probability of error, with the total expected payment at the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium going to zero. That is to say, if the data analyst can
recruit a large number of individuals, she can choose appropriate parameters
to fulfill her learning goal and in the meanwhile drive her cost to zero at a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Since the total equilibrium expected payment of
any mechanism is nonnegative due to individual rationality, this implies that the
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designed mechanism with properly chosen parameters asymptotically minimizes
the cost for achieving any accuracy goal.
4.2 Model
We study the setting in which the data analyst is interested in learning an un-
derlying state W , represented by a binary random variable. Consider a set N =
{1, 2, . . . , N} of individuals. Each individual i possesses a binary signal Si, which
is her private data, and reports data Xi, which takes values in X = {0, 1,⊥},
with ⊥ meaning “to opt out.” The data analyst announces a payment mechanism
R : XN → RN , which takes the reported data X = (X1, . . . , XN) as input and pro-
duces R(X), where Ri(X) is the payment to individual i. The model is illustrated
in Figure 3.1. The payment mechanism induces a game among the individuals. The
elements of the game are as follows.
• Players. The players in this game are the individuals, who are self-interested,
rational and risk-neutral. Following conventional game theory notation, we let “−i”
denote all the individuals other than some given individual i.
• Prior Distributions. The state W follows a probability distribution given by the
PMF PW . We assume that PW (1) > 0 and PW (0) > 0. The individuals’ signals
S = (S1, S2, . . . , SN) reflect their knowledge about the state W . Conditional on
the state W , the signals S1, S2, . . . , SN are independently generated according to the
following conditional distributions:
P(Si = 1 | W = 1) = θ, P(Si = 0 | W = 1) = 1− θ,
P(Si = 0 | W = 0) = θ, P(Si = 1 | W = 0) = 1− θ,
where the parameter θ with 0.5 < θ < 1 is called the quality of signals. We refer to
these conditional distributions as the signal structure of the model.
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• Types and Strategies. An individual i’s type Ci, also called her cost coefficient,
characterizes her valuation of privacy. The meaning of Ci will become clear after we
introduce the privacy cost function. Roughly, an individual with larger Ci experiences
more privacy cost for the same privacy loss. A data reporting strategy for individual i
is a plan on what to report according to her signal Si and her type Ci. Thus it
is a mapping σi : {0, 1} × (0,+∞) → D(X ), where D(X ) is the set of probability
distributions on X = {0, 1,⊥}, prescribing a distribution to the reported data Xi
for each possible value pair of Si and Ci. Therefore, the strategy corresponds to the
set of conditional distributions of Xi given Si and Ci. Since we will discuss different
strategies of individual i, we denote these conditional probabilities by
Pσi(Xi = xi | Si = si, Ci = ci), xi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, si ∈ {0, 1}, ci ∈ (0,+∞).
Let σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σN), which is called a strategy profile. A strategy profile is said
to be homogeneous if all the strategies in the profile are the same.
• Utility Functions. The utility of each individual is the difference between the
payment she receives and her privacy cost. An individual experiences a cost due to
the privacy loss during data reporting. Recall that we model the privacy cost of an
individual as consisting of two components: privacy loss and a privacy cost function,
where the privacy loss depends on her data reporting strategy and the privacy cost
function represents her valuation of privacy. For an individual i, conditional on her
type Ci = ci, we measure individual i’s privacy loss for reporting data with strategy
σi by the privacy level defined as follows:
ζ(ci, σi) = max
{
ln
Pσi(Xi ∈ E | Si = si, Ci = ci)
Pσi(Xi ∈ E | Si = 1− si, Ci = ci)
: E ⊆ {0, 1,⊥}, si ∈ {0, 1}
}
,
where we follow the convention that 0/0 = 1. This measure of privacy loss is in the
same vein as the local model of differential privacy Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011);
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Dwork and Roth (2014), which views each individual’s data as a database of size
1 and quantifies the privacy guarantee of her local randomizer by the differential
privacy level. The difference here is that the strategy σi has another input Ci, since an
individual can choose the way of perturbing her data according to her cost coefficient.
Our measure of privacy loss is the differential privacy level of the strategy σi when
Ci is given.
Then we model individual i’s cost incurred by this privacy loss as a linear function
with Ci as the coefficient, i.e., the cost can be written as
g(Ci, σi) = Ci · ζ(Ci, σi).
We call g the privacy cost function.
We assume that the coefficients C1, C2, . . . , CN are i.i.d. positive random variables
with CDF FC , and they are independent of W and S. The randomness of these
coefficients captures the data analyst’s uncertainty of individuals’ valuations of pri-
vacy. The independence assumption is applicable to the scenario where individuals’
valuations of privacy are intrinsic and thus are not affected by the specific private
data they have. We further assume that FC is a continuous function and FC(c) > 0
for any c > 0, which means that it is possible for individuals to have an arbitrarily
low valuation of privacy.
Mechanism design
The data analyst cannot force an individual to report data with a specific strategy.
However, the data analyst can design the payment mechanism to impact individuals’
strategies to drive the individuals to act in a desired way since the individuals are
rational, i.e., they will choose the strategies that benefit them most. We consider the
Bayesian Nash equilibria in a payment mechanism, viewing Ci as individual i’s type.
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Definition 7. A strategy profile σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a payment
mechanism R if for any individual i, any ci > 0 and any strategy σ
′
i,
Eσ[Ri(X)− g(Ci, σi) | Ci = ci] ≥ E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(Ci, σ′i) | Ci = ci],
where the subscript σ and (σ′i, σ−i) indicate that the distribution of X is determined
by the strategy profile σ and (σ′i, σ−i), respectively.
The data analyst is interested in learning the state W from the reported data X,
so she performs hypothesis testing between the following two hypotheses:
H0 : W = 0,
H1 : W = 1.
The learning accuracy is measured by the probability of error, denoted by pe. An
accuracy goal can be written as pe ≤ pmaxe for some pmaxe .
Then the data analyst aims to design a payment mechanism such that her accuracy
goal can be fulfilled at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the corresponding total
expected payment is minimized. It is easy to see that the equilibrium total expected
payment is nonnegative in any mechanism due to the nonnegativity of privacy cost
functions and individual rationality. In this mechanism design problem, the joint
distribution P of the state W , the signal S and the cost coefficients, which can be
represented by (PW , θ, FC), is common knowledge. The data analyst announces the
form of the payment mechanism and then the individuals report data simultaneously.
The reported data X is public. Each individual i’s signal and type, Si and Ci, are
not observable to other individuals or the data analyst. No one has access to the
state W .
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4.3 Asymptotically Optimal Mechanisms
Theorem 6. To achieve any accuracy goal of the data analyst, the total expected
payment needed at an equilibrium is o(1). Specifically, there exists a sequence of
mechanisms, each of which is designed for a different population size N , such that
the accuracy goal can be fulfilled at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of every mechanism
in the sequence, and the total expected payment goes to zero as the population size N
goes to infinity; i.e., this sequence of mechanisms is asymptotically optimal.
In the remainder of this section, we present the design of a family of payment
mechanisms, parameterized by the population size N , the prior P , a cost coefficient
threshold parameter cth and a data quality parameter . The asymptotically optimal
sequence of mechanisms in Theorem 6 is given by a sequence of mechanisms within
this family with properly chosen parameters. In particular, cth is a threshold on cost
coefficients such that an individual is expected to participate if her coefficient does
not exceed the threshold; and  is the target quality which is the level noise expected
in the reported data. The formula for calculating cth and  will be presented in (4.5)–
(4.11). Theorem 6 is a high level description of Theorem 8, which will be proved in
the remainder of this chapter.
Payment Mechanism R(N,P,cth,)
1. Each individual reports her data (which can also be “to opt out”).
2. Compute the number of participants n.
3. For non-participating individuals, the payment is zero.
4. If there is only one participant, the data analyst pays zero to this participant.
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Otherwise, for each participating individual i, compute
M−i =

1 if
∑
j : Xj 6=⊥,j 6=i
Xj ≥
⌊n− 1
2
⌋
+ 1,
0 otherwise,
which is the majority of other participants’ reported data. Then the data ana-
lyst pays individual i according to Xi and M−i as follows:
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X) = AXi,M−i
cth(e
 + 1)2
2e
+BM−i
(
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth
)
,
where A1,1, A0,1, A1,0, A0,0, B1, B0 are given below.
Next we define the coefficients A1,1, A0,1, A1,0, A0,0, B1, B0 used in the mechanism
R(N,P,cth,) through a series of calculations. In a nutshell, A1,1 and A0,0 determine the
reward part of the payment to an individual when her reported data matches the
majority of others; similarly, A0,1 and A1,0 determine the penalty part of the payment
to an individual when her reported data does not match the majority of others. They
incentivize the individuals to report data that reveals certain amount of information
about their private signals. The coefficients B1 and B0 offset the payments for the
cases that the majority of others’ reports is 1 and 0, respectively, to discourage the
individuals with cost coefficients above threshold parameter cth from participating.
We remark that when an individual’s reported data does not match with the majority
of others, these coefficients make sure that the payment to this individual is negative.
The definition of the coefficients A1,1, A0,1, A1,0, A0,0, B1, B0 involves some inter-
mediate quantities, the physical meanings of which will be given after we characterize
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism in Section 4.4. Given a cth ∈ (0,+∞)
and  ∈ (0,+∞), for each ci ∈ (0, cth), we consider the following equation with
variable ξ:
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
eξ
(eξ + 1)2
− ci = 0.
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It can be proved that this equation has a unique solution in (0,+∞). Let this solution
define a function ξ(ci). Specifically,
ξ(ci) = ln
(
1
1
2
−
√
1
4
− ci
cth
e
(e+1)2
− 1
)
. (4.1)
Let
µ =
∫ cth
0
eξ(ci)
eξ(ci) + 1
dFC|Ci≤cth(ci),
and
α = θµ+ (1− θ)(1− µ), (4.2)
where FC|Ci≤cth is the conditional distribution of Ci given Ci ≤ cth.
Given that the number of participants is n with n ≥ 2, we define the following
quantities. Consider a random variable that follows the binomial distribution with
parameters n− 1 and α. Let β(n) denote the probability that this random variable is
greater than or equal to bn−1
2
c+ 1. For convenience, we define the following quantity
to deal with technical details:
γ(n) =

1−
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
α
n−1
2 (1− α)n−12 if n− 1 is even,
1 if n− 1 is odd.
Let P≥1 = 1− (1− FC(cth))N−1, where recall that FC is the CDF of Ci. We define
A1,1 =
PW (1)θ(1− β(n)) + PW (0)(1− θ)(1− (γ(n) − β(n)))
P≥1PW (1)PW (0)(2θ − 1)(2β(n) − γ(n)) ,
A0,1 = −PW (1)(1− θ)(1− β
(n)) + PW (0)θ(1− (γ(n) − β(n)))
P≥1PW (1)PW (0)(2θ − 1)(2β(n) − γ(n)) ,
A1,0 = −PW (1)θβ
(n) + PW (0)(1− θ)(γ(n) − β(n))
P≥1PW (1)PW (0)(2θ − 1)(2β(n) − γ(n)) ,
A0,0 =
PW (1)(1− θ)β(n) + PW (0)θ(γ(n) − β(n))
P≥1PW (1)PW (0)(2θ − 1)(2β(n) − γ(n)) ,
B1 = −PW (1)(1− β
(n))− PW (0)(1− (γ(n) − β(n)))
2P≥1PW (1)PW (0)(2β(n) − γ(n)) ,
B0 =
PW (1)β
(n) − PW (0)(γ(n) − β(n))
2P≥1PW (1)PW (0)(2β(n) − γ(n)) .
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4.4 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we first characterize the individuals’ behavior at a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the designed mechanism. The equilibrium behavior affects the quality
of the reported data and the payments. Then we leverage the properties of the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium to explain the physical meanings of the quantities defined
during the construction of the mechanism in Section 4.3.
Theorem 7. The mechanism R(N,P,cth,) yields a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ, in
which each individual i’s strategy σi is described as follows:
• If ci > cth,
Pσi(Xi = ⊥ | Si = si, Ci = ci) = 1, for any si ∈ {0, 1};
i.e., if individual i’s cost coefficient is larger than the parameter cth, individual i
declines to participate regardless of her signal.
• If ci ≤ cth,
Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1, Ci = ci) = Pσi(Xi = 0 | Si = 0, Ci = ci) =
eξ(ci)
eξ(ci) + 1
,
Pσi(Xi = 0 | Si = 1, Ci = ci) = Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 0, Ci = ci) =
1
eξ(ci) + 1
,
where ξ(ci) is defined in (4.1); i.e., if individual i’s cost coefficient is no larger
than the parameter cth, individual i flips her signal with a probability depending
on her cost coefficient to generate her reported data.
This theorem presents our results on the threshold behavior of individuals and
the quality guarantee of the reported data. We sketch the proof of Theorem 7 below.
A complete proof is given in Appendix F.
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Proof Sketch. We write R to represent the mechanism R(N,P,cth,) for conciseness in
this proof. Consider any individual i and any strategy σ′i. Given Ci = ci, let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 1), p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 0),
q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 1), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 0).
Then the differential privacy level of σ′i at ci can be written as
ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln q1q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− q11− q0
∣∣∣∣,∣∣∣∣ln 1− p1 − q11− p0 − q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln p1 + q1p0 + q0
∣∣∣∣}.
By the design of the mechanism, when other individuals follow σ−i, the expected
utility of individual i can be written as
U(p1, p0, q1, q0)
, E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(Ci, σ′i) | Ci = ci]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − ciζ(p1, p0, q1, q0),
where
K1 = L0 =
1
2
(
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth
)
,
K0 = L1 =
1
2
(
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth− cth(e
 + 1)2
e
)
.
Now we find the best response of individual i, i.e., an optimal solution of the
optimization problem below, by three steps:
max
p1,p0,q1,q0
U(p1, p0, q1, q0)
subject to 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p1 + q1 ≤ 1,
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0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 + q0 ≤ 1.
Step 1: First, by the symmetry that K1 = L0 and K0 = L1, we can focus on an
optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) such that p
∗
1 = q
∗
0 and p
∗
0 = q
∗
1, since for any feasible
solution (p1, p0, q1, q0), the solution (p
′
1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) given by p
′
1 = q
′
0 =
p1+q0
2
, p′0 =
q′1 =
p0+q1
2
yields U(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) ≥ U(p1, p0, q1, q0). Further, an optimal solution
(p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) such that p
∗
1 = q
∗
0 and p
∗
0 = q
∗
1 must satisfy that p
∗
1 ≥ q∗1, since otherwise
by swapping p∗1 and p
∗
0 with q
∗
1 and q
∗
0, respectively, the utility is increased, which
contradicts with the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0).
Step 2: Next, for any such an optimal solution, i.e., (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) with p
∗
1 = q
∗
0
and p∗0 = q
∗
1, we can prove that one of the following two holds: p
∗
1 = q
∗
0 = p
∗
0 = q
∗
1 = 0
or p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 = 1, p
∗
1 > q
∗
1.
Step 3: According to Step 1 and Step 2, we can find an optimal solution among
those feasible solutions, say (p1, p0, q1, q0), with p1 = q0 and p0 = q1, and satisfy either
p1 = q0 = p0 = q1 = 0, or (4.3)
p1 + q1 = p0 + q0 = 1, p1 > q1. (4.4)
Consider any feasible solution (p1, p0, q1, q0) with p1 = q0 and p0 = q1 and satisfies
(4.4), which can be written as
p1 = q0 =
ei
ei + 1
, p0 = q1 =
1
ei + 1
,
for some i > 0. Then
U(p1, p0, q1, q0) = −cth(e
 + 1)2
e
1
ei + 1
− cii + cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth.
Consider a function h : (0,+∞)→ R defined as
h(i) = −cth(e
 + 1)2
e
1
ei + 1
− cii.
81
Then h is a strictly concave function, and thus ∗i that satisfies
h′(∗i ) =
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
e
∗
i
(e
∗
i + 1)2
− ci = 0,
i.e., ∗i = ξ(ci) defined in (4.1), maximizes h(·), and hence maximizes the utility.
Therefore, among those feasible solutions that satisfy (4.4), the solution (p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0)
with
p˜∗1 = q˜
∗
0 =
eξ(ci)
eξ(ci) + 1
, p˜∗0 = q˜
∗
1 =
1
eξ(ci) + 1
maximizes the utility. This implies that an optimal solution is either (0, 0, 0, 0)
or (p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0). Next, we can prove that if ci > cth, we have ξ(ci) <  and
U(p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0) < 0 = U(0, 0, 0, 0), so (0, 0, 0, 0) is an optimal solution. For the
other case that ci ≤ cth, we can prove that U(p˜∗1, p˜∗0, q˜∗1, q˜∗0) ≥ 0 = U(0, 0, 0, 0), so
(p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0) is an optimal solution.
In summary, by the three steps above, a best response of individual i is the strategy
σi described in the theorem, which completes the proof that σ is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the mechanism R(N,P,cth,).
The following corollary describes the quality of the reported data and the expected
payment to each participant at the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Theorem 7.
Corollary 1. For the mechanism R(N,P,cth,), consider the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
σ given in Theorem 7.
• For each participating individual i,
Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1, individual i participates)
= Pσi(Xi = 0 | Si = 0, individual i participates)
= µ
≥ e

e + 1
.
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• The expected payment to each participating individual i is bounded as
Eσ[R(N,P,cth,)i (X) | individual i participates] ≤ cth(1 + e− + ).
Proof. The proof for these two results is intuitive once we have Theorem 7. In the
equilibrium σ, the event {individual i participates} is equivalent to the event {Ci ≤
cth}. Thus
Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1, individual i participates) = Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1, Ci ≤ cth)
=
∫ cth
0
eξ(ci)
eξ(ci) + 1
dFC|Ci≤cth(ci)
= µ.
By the definition of ξ(ci) in (4.1), ξ(ci) ≥  when ci ≤ cth. Hence
Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1, individual i participates) ≥
e
e + 1
.
Since for any ci ≤ cth, Pσi(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 0) = Pσi(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 1),
we have
Pσi(Xi = 0 | Si = 0, individual i participates)
= Pσi(Xi = 1 | Si = 1, individual i participates).
By the calculations in the proof of Theorem 7, the expected payment of individual i
given Ci = ci with ci ≤ cth satisfies
Eσ[R(N,P,cth,)i (X) | Ci = ci] = −
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
1
eξ(ci) + 1
+
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth
≤ cth(1 + e− + ).
Hence
Eσ[R(N,P,cth,)i (X) | individual i participates]
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=∫ cth
0
Eσ[Ri(X) | Ci = ci] dFC|Ci≤cth(ci)
≤ cth(1 + e− + ).
Theorem 7 and Corollary 1 show how individuals with high privacy costs are
“filtered out” in the equilibrium by negative payments. In other words, they will
decide not to participate because the expected payment is negative, which is a result
of possible negative payments in the proposed mechanism. The “left” individuals,
i.e., participants, all report data with quality guarantee. The roles of the parameters
cth and  in the designed mechanism R
(N,P,cth,) are as follows: The parameter cth
works as a threshold on the cost coefficients for participation; The parameter  gives
a guarantee on the probability that a participant’s reported data is the same as the
signal, which measures the quality of the reported data. We remark that in this
equilibrium, each individual’s exact cost coefficient is not revealed to other.
The physical meanings of the quantities ξ(ci), µ, α, β
(n), γ(n) and P≥1 defined
during the construction of the mechanism in Section 4.3 can be well explained at
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium given in Theorem 7. The quantity ξ(ci) shows up in
Theorem 7, characterizing the strategy σi of individual i when ci ≤ cth. It is the
differential privacy level of σi given Ci = ci when ci ≤ cth. Now let us condition on
the event that individual i participates, which, by Theorem 7, is equivalent to the
event Ci ≤ cth. The quantity µ shows up in Corollary 1, and it is the probability
that individual i truthfully reports her signal, given whatever the signal is. Then the
quantity α is the probability that the reported data Xi is consistent with the state W ,
given whatever the state is. Conditional on the event that there are n−1 participants
among the individuals other than individual i, where n ≥ 2, the quantities βn and
1 − (γn − βn) are the probabilities that the majority of these participants’ reported
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data agrees with the state, given that the state is 1 and 0, respectively. Finally, the
quantity P≥1 is the probability that at least one individual among the individuals
other than individual i participates.
4.5 Accuracy and Payment
In this section, we show that the data analyst can achieve any accuracy goal in
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium with proper choice of parameters N, cth and . The
cost of the data analyst, which is the total expected payment at the equilibrium, goes
to zero as the number of individuals goes to infinity. Since the privacy cost of an
individual is always nonnegative, the total expected payment at an equilibrium of
any mechanism is nonnegative due to individual rationality. Therefore, the designed
mechanism asymptotically minimizes the cost for the data analyst to achieve any
accuracy goal.
Recall that with the purchased data X, the data analyst learns the state W by
performing hypothesis testing between the following two hypotheses:
H0 : W = 0,
H1 : W = 1.
An accuracy goal can be written as pe ≤ pmaxe for some pmaxe , where pe is the proba-
bility of error for hypothesis testing. We consider the decision function of maximum
likelihood and choose the values for N, cth,  as follows. First pick any  such that
 ∈ (0,+∞). (4.5)
Let
D() =
1
2
ln
(e + 1)2
4(θe + 1− θ)((1− θ)e + θ) , (4.6)
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ne() =
− ln(1
2
pmaxe )
D()
, (4.7)
ρ() =
1
ne()pmaxe
+ 2 +
√
1
(ne())2(pmaxe )
2
+
2
ne()pmaxe
. (4.8)
Then pick any integer N such that
N > ρ()ne(). (4.9)
For the selected N , let
pth(N, ) =
ρ()ne()
N
, (4.10)
which is roughly the participation percentage, and
cth(N, ) = inf{c : FC(c) = pth(N, )}. (4.11)
Recall that we assume FC to be a continuous function, so the set {c : FC(c) =
pth(N, )} is nonempty and thus cth(N, ) ≥ 0 is finite. An example of this pro-
cedure of parameter selection (4.5)–(4.11) (and the resulted upper bound on total
expected payment) is shown in Figure 4.2.
The choices in (4.5)–(4.11) first fix the quality that the data analyst expects to
obtain from each participant and the types of individuals the data analyst would like
to collect data from, and the accuracy goal can be met when the population size is
large enough to make sure that there are enough participants.
Theorem 8. For the mechanism R(N,P,cth,), consider the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
σ given in Theorem 7. Given an accuracy goal pe ≤ pmaxe , let the parameter tuple
(N, cth, ) be chosen according to (4.5)–(4.11) and the data analyst performs hypothesis
testing using the maximum likelihood approach.
• The decision function ψ has the following form:
ψ(X) =

1 if
∑
i 1{Xi=1} ≥
∑
i 1{Xi=0},
0 otherwise;
(4.12)
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the upper bound in Theorem 8 on the total expected
payment of the designed mechanism. In this example, the quality of signals is θ = 0.8,
the maximum allowable probability of error is pmaxe = 0.05, and the CDF FC is a
log-normal distribution. Pick  = 2, and then D(), ne() and ρ() are calculated
according to (4.6)–(4.8). We consider the population size N within the range 200–
600, which satisfies (4.9). As shown in the figure, tripling the population size from
200 to 600 drives the cost down by more than 99%.
• The probability of error, pe, meets the accuracy goal pe ≤ pmaxe ;
• The total expected payment is bounded as
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
]
≤ cth(,N)ρ()ne() · (1 + e− + ). (4.13)
Since ρ() and ne() are constants for given , and cth(,N) goes to 0 as N →∞,
this total expected payment goes to zero, with the accuracy goal met, as N →∞.
This theorem shows that the approach of choosing parameters according to (4.5)–
(4.11) for the designed family of mechanisms not only meets the accuracy goal of the
data analyst but is also cost-effective. The intuition is that as N becomes large, the
requirement on the participation percentage becomes lower, which allows the mech-
anism to collect data from individuals with lower privacy costs and thus drives down
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the data analyst’s cost. Fix an  ∈ (0,+∞) and consider a sequence of mechanisms,
each of which is designed for a different population size N that satisfies (4.9) and has
parameter cth chosen according to (4.11). Then this sequence of mechanisms gives
the asymptotically optimal sequence in Theorem 6.
Figure 4.2 shows an illustration of the upper bound on the total expected payment
in (4.13). In this example, tripling the population size from 200 to 600 drives the cost
down by more than 99%. The rate at which the total expected payment converges to
0 depends on the distribution FC . An interesting question is which distribution can
better characterize individuals’ valuations of privacy in real world. We will evaluation
the convergence rates for different FC ’s in our full report.
To prove Theorem 8, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For an accuracy goal pe ≤ pmaxe , let the parameter tuple (N, cth, ) be
chosen according to (4.5)–(4.11). Then for any fixed  ∈ (0,+∞),
lim
N→+∞
cth(,N) = 0. (4.14)
Proof. Recall that we assume that FC is a continuous function and for any c > 0,
FC(c) > 0. For any δ > 0, let N0 =
ρ()ne()
FC(δ)
, where FC(δ) > 0 due to our assumption.
Then for any N ≥ N0, any c such that FC(c) = ρ()ne()N satisfies that c ≤ δ, since
a CDF is a non-decreasing function. Thus, we have cth(,N) = inf{c : FC(c) =
ρ()ne()
N
} ≤ δ, which implies that limN→+∞ cth(,N) = 0.
We sketch the proof of Theorem 8 below. A complete proof is given in Appendix G.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 8. Let the parameter tuple (N, cth, ) be chosen according
to (4.5)–(4.11). Then cth is a function of N and . We write ne, ρ, pth, cth to rep-
resent ne(), ρ(), pth(N, ), cth(N, ) and keep their dependence on N,  in mind for
conciseness in this proof.
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Theorem 7 describes the form of σ, which determines the distribution of each Xi
given Si and Ci. For any realization X = x, since ψ uses maximum likelihood,
ψ(x) =

1 if Pσ(X = x | W = 1) ≥ Pσ(X = x | W = 0),
0 otherwise.
(4.15)
The probabilities Pσ(X = x | W = 1) and Pσ(X = x | W = 0) can be calculated
according to the form of σ. Then the condition Pσ(X = x | W = 1) ≥ Pσ(X = x |
W = 0) can be proved to be equivalent to the condition that the number of 1’s is
larger than or equal to the number of 0’s in x, and the form of ψ in (4.12) is derived.
Next we calculate the probability of error, pe. Let
k =
√
2
pmaxe
, d =
√
Npth(1− pth).
Then we split pe into two parts as follows
pe = Pσ(ψ(X) 6= W )
= Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
+ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
.
Since the random variables 1{Xi 6=⊥} = 1{Ci≤cth} are i.i.d. with mean pth and variance
d2
N
, the first term can be bounded by Chebyshev’s inequality as
Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
≤ p
max
e
2
.
For the second term of pe, we have
Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
≤ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
∣∣∣∣ W = 1
)
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+ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
∣∣∣∣ W = 0
)
=
∑
x∈B∩R1
Pσ(X = x | W = 1) +
∑
x∈B∩R0
Pσ(X = x | W = 0),
where
B = {x ∈ XN : ∣∣|A(x)| −Npth∣∣ < kd},
R1 =
{
x ∈ XN : ψ(x) 6= 1}, R0 = {x ∈ XN : ψ(x) 6= 0},
and |A(x)| is the number of participants, i.e., the cardinality of the set A(x) = {i ∈
N : xi 6= ⊥}. Then B ∩ R1 consists of the reported data such that the number of
participants departs from Npth by at most kd and the maximum likelihood decision
rejects W = 1. Similar explanation applies to B ∩ R0. By the choice of ne, ρ, pth
and N , such number of participants is large enough to make sure that with maximum
likelihood decision, the sum of the two types of error satisfies
∑
x∈B∩R1
Pσ(X = x | W = 1) +
∑
x∈B∩R0
Pσ(X = x | W = 0) ≤ e−neD() = p
max
e
2
.
This gives an upper bound on the second term of pe; i.e.,
Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
≤ p
max
e
2
.
Therefore, pe ≤ pmaxe .
Finally, we bound the total expected payment. Let J be the number of partici-
pants. By Corollary 1,
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
∣∣∣∣ J
]
≤ Jcth(1 + e− + ).
By Theorem 7, J =
∑N
i=1 1{Ci≤cth}. Then Eσ[J ] = Npth = ρne. Therefore,
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
]
= Eσ
[
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
∣∣∣∣ J
]]
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≤ Eσ[J ]cth(1 + e− + )
= ρnecth(1 + e
− + ).
The parameters ρ and ne do not depend on the choice of N . However, by Lemma 6,
limN→+∞ cth = 0. Therefore, the total expected payment goes to zero as the chosen
N goes to infinity.
4.6 Conclusions
We considered incentive mechanisms for collecting private data from strategic,
privacy-aware individuals, whose valuations of privacy are unknown. The data analyst
is interested in learning an underlying state from the private data of individuals
with minimum overall payment. We considered a model where a data analyst is not
necessarily trustworthy, and data subjects are endowed with the ability to control their
own privacy, which frees the data analyst from the responsibility of privacy protection.
We designed a family of payment mechanisms for the data analyst, which utilize
negative payments to prevent individuals with high privacy valuations from reporting
only noise and cut down the cost of the data analyst. In each designed mechanism,
the individuals exhibit a threshold behavior at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium: only
those with cost coefficients below some threshold participate, and they report data
with certain quality guarantee, where the threshold and the quality guarantee are
both parameters of the mechanism. With appropriate choices of parameters, the
data analyst can fulfill any accuracy goal with diminishing cost at the equilibrium as
the number of individuals grows to infinity.
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Chapter 5
TRADING PRIVATE DATA WITH GENERAL PRIOR DISTRIBUTION
5.1 Introduction
We consider the following model, which is illustrated in Figure 5.1. There are N
individuals and each individual i has a private bit Si, e.g., her rating of a movie, which
is either “good” or “bad” like in the rotten tomatoes website. The joint probability
distribution of S1, S2, . . . , SN is common knowledge. The data collector is interested in
learning the proportion of 1’s in the private bits, which can be viewed as the popularity
of a movie. The data collector uses a payment mechanism to determine the amount
of payment to each individual based on their reported data X1, X2, . . . , XN . When an
individual i uses an -differentially private randomization algorithm to generate her
reported data Xi, the privacy loss incurred is , and her cost of privacy is a function
of . The form of this function is also publicly known.
We study this problem with a game-theoretic approach, where we assume the
individuals are strategic and hence the quality of data an individual reports is de-
termined by her best response that takes into account both the payment and the
privacy loss. A primary goal of the data collector is to design a payment mecha-
nism in which an individual’s best response (or the Nash equilibrium of the game)
has the desired level of quality. To design such a payment mechanism, we borrow
ideas from the peer prediction method Miller et al. (2009), which makes use of the
correlation among private data (which is called signals in their context) to induce
truthful reporting from individuals who have no privacy concern. We should caution
that different from the peer prediction method, the privacy concern of individuals in
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Figure 5.1: Information structure of the model with general prior distribution. Each
individual i has a private bit Si and reports Xi, which is generated based on Si using
a randomized strategy.
this study fundamentally changes the structure of the game and gives the following
distinctive features to our problem. First, since the notion of differential privacy is
adopted, the privacy loss of an individual i is determined by both the strategy for
Si = 1 and that for Si = 0. Therefore, when choosing the randomization strategy, an
individual needs to perform joint optimization over the two possibilities and make a
contingent plan. Second, the mechanism in this dissertation is not intended to elicit
truthful data reporting. The data collector is satisfied with the data quality as long
as the accuracy objective can be achieved. In fact, truthful reporting may even not
be preferred since it would otherwise cost the data collector unnecessary additional
payments. Consequently, when we build this study upon the peer prediction method,
the prediction should be made on the randomized data instead of the original data.
Taking these features into consideration, we design a payment mechanism in which
the randomized response strategy Warner (1965) that generates the reported data by
flipping the private bit with probability 1
e+1
, where  > 0, proves to be an equilib-
rium. This equilibrium strategy is -differentially private, so the collected data itself
is privacy preserving. By adjusting the corresponding parameter in the mechanism,
the data collector can control the privacy level  and thus control the data quality to
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achieve any given accuracy objective. In contrast to most of the existing work, which
considers a trusted data collector and thus focuses on designing truthful mechanisms,
our designed mechanism addresses individuals’ privacy concern where the data col-
lector may not be trusted, and is the first one that considers quality control in such
a scenario to suit the principle’s accuracy objective.
5.2 Model
In this chapter, the model for private data is more general than Chapter 3. We
still let Si denote player i’s private bit, and let S = (S1, S2, · · · , SN). The joint
probability distribution of S1, S2, · · · , SN is common knowledge. We assume that
this distribution is symmetric over players; i.e., for any binary sequence s ∈ {0, 1}N
and any of its permutations s′, P(S = s) = P(S = s′). Other notation is the same
as that in Chapter 3.
The data collector is interested in learning the proportion of 1’s in S1, S2, . . . , SN ,
i.e., S¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Si. Let µˆ be an estimate of S¯ from the reported data X1, X2, . . . , XN .
Then we measure the accuracy of µˆ by the following definition, which has been used
in the literature (e.g., Ghosh and Roth (2011), where a fixed number 1
3
is used instead
of δ).
Definition 8. An estimate µˆ of S¯ is (α, δ)-accurate if |S¯ − µˆ| ≤ α holds with
probability at least 1− δ.
5.3 A Payment Mechanism for Quality Control
We wish to design mechanisms such that the quality of the collected data in
equilibrium is controllable. Then the data collector can achieve her accuracy objective
by adjusting parameters in the mechanism. In this section, we present our design
of the payment mechanism. Consider the following payment mechanism R(N,) for
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collecting privacy-preserving data from N players, parameterized by a data quality
parameter , where N ≥ 2 and  > 0.
The payment mechanism R(N,)
1. Each player reports her data (which can also be the decision of not participat-
ing).
2. For non-participating players, the payment is zero.
3. If there is only one participant, pay zero to this participant. Otherwise, for each
participating player i, arbitrarily choose another participating player j and pay
player i according to Xi and Xj as follows:
R
(N,)
i (X) =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
AXi,Xj , (5.1)
where parameters A1,1, A0,0, A0,1, A1,0 are calculated in the next section.
After the collection of data, the data collector estimates S¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Si by
µˆ =
e + 1
e − 1
(
1
n
∑
i : Xi 6=⊥
Xi
)
− 1
e − 1 , (5.2)
where n is the number of participants.
5.3.1 Payment Parameterization
Recall that we assume that the joint distribution of S1, S2, . . . , SN is symmetric
over players. As a consequence, the private bits of the players have the same marginal
distribution. Denote this marginal distribution as follows:
P1 = P(Si = 1), P0 = P(Si = 0). (5.3)
Due to symmetry, the marginal distribution of any two private bits Si and Sj with
i 6= j does not depend on the specific identities i and j either. Denote the marginal
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distribution of Si and Sj with i 6= j as follows:
P1,1 = P(Si = 1, Sj = 1), P0,0 = P(Si = 0, Sj = 0),
P0,1 = P(Si = 0, Sj = 1) = P1,0 = P(Si = 1, Sj = 0).
(5.4)
We further define a constant D as follows:
D = P(Sj = 1, Si = 1)P(Sj = 0, Si = 0)
− P(Sj = 0, Si = 1)P(Sj = 1, Si = 0)
= P1,1P0,0 − P0,1P1,0,
(5.5)
which can be verified to equal to the covariance of Si and Sj. We assume that D 6= 0,
which is equivalent to the case that Si and Sj are not independent for any two distinct
players i and j (See Appendix H for the proof of the equivalence).
The parameters A1,1, A0,0, A0,1, A1,0 used in the payment mechanism R
(N,) are
defined as follows:
• If D > 0,
A1,1 =
(e + 1)2
e2 − 1
1
D
(
1
e + 1
P1 +
e
e + 1
P0
)
, (5.6)
A0,0 =
(e + 1)2
e2 − 1
1
D
(
e
e + 1
P1 +
1
e + 1
P0
)
, (5.7)
A0,1 = 0, (5.8)
A1,0 = 0. (5.9)
• If D < 0,
A1,1 = 0, (5.10)
A0,0 = 0, (5.11)
A0,1 = −(e
 + 1)2
e2 − 1
1
D
(
1
e + 1
P1 +
e
e + 1
P0
)
, (5.12)
A1,0 = −(e
 + 1)2
e2 − 1
1
D
(
e
e + 1
P1 +
1
e + 1
P0
)
. (5.13)
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From the above definition of these parameters we can see the intuition behind the
design of mechanism R(N,). When the private bits of two players are positively cor-
related (D > 0), they tend to be the same. Thus, the mechanism rewards agreement
on the reported data to encourage informative data reporting. Similarly, when the
private bits of two players are negatively correlated (D < 0), they tend to be dif-
ferent, and thus correspondingly, the mechanism rewards disagreement to encourage
informative data reporting. However, the more informative the reported data is, the
more privacy cost a player will experience. This tension will make each player choose
a compromise, which is telling truth to some extent.
5.3.2 Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 9. The strategy profile, consisting of the following strategy of player i that
is denoted by σ∗i , is a Nash equilibrium under the payment mechanism R
(N,):
Pσ∗i (Xi = 1 | Si = 1) = Pσ∗i (Xi = 0 | Si = 0) =
e
e + 1
,
Pσ∗i (Xi = 0 | Si = 1) = Pσ∗i (Xi = 1 | Si = 0) =
1
e + 1
,
Pσ∗i (Xi =⊥ | Si = 1) = Pσ∗i (Xi =⊥ | Si = 0) = 0,
(5.14)
i.e., each player generates her reported data by flipping the private bit with probability
1
e+1
.
Proof. See Appendix I.
By Theorem 9, the parameter  of the payment mechanismR(N,) plays two roles in
the equilibrium σ∗. On one hand, the strategy each player uses to randomize her data
is -differentially private. Therefore, the parameter  controls how much privacy each
player is willing to trade for payment. On the other hand, the parameter  describes
the quality of the reported data of each player i, since  controls the probability that
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the reported data is the same as the true private data as follows:
Pσ∗i (Xi = Si) =
e
e + 1
. (5.15)
Therefore, the larger  is, the more privacy each player is willing to sell, and the
higher data quality the data collector obtains. With the payment mechanism R(N,),
the data collector is not only able to know how the data has been randomized, but
also able to control the quality of the collected data.
5.3.3 Estimation Accuracy
In this section, we discuss how the data collector should choose the parameter 
to achieve the accuracy objective of estimating S¯.
Theorem 10. For any α, δ with α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, if
 ≥ ln
(
2 +
1
Nα2δ
)
, (5.16)
then in the equilibrium σ∗ of the payment mechanism R(N,), the estimate µˆ given in
(5.2) is (α, δ)-accurate.
Proof. See Appendix J.
Since the parameter  of the payment mechanism R(N,) describes the quality of
the collected data in the equilibrium σ∗, intuitively, the data collector can achieve
higher accuracy objective by increasing . Theorem 10 confirms this intuition. For an
accuracy objective (α, δ), the smaller α and δ are, the higher accuracy is required to
achieve according to the definition of accuracy in Definition 8. However, no matter
how high the accuracy objective is, by Theorem 10, the data collector can always
achieve it by choosing large enough , i.e., good enough data quality.
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5.3.4 Asymptotic Optimality in the High Quality Regime
From the principal’s perspective, the strategy profile σ∗ given in Theorem 9 is
very attractive. When players follow σ∗, the quality of the collected data can be con-
trolled by a single parameter , and S¯ can be estimated by the simple estimator µˆ. In
this section, we focus on nonnegative payment mechanisms in which σ∗ forms a Nash
equilibrium. We study the optimality of the proposed mechanism in terms of the total
expected payment needed to collect data with a given quality level . We first derive
an lower bound on the total expected payment of a nonnegative payment mechanism
in which σ∗ is an equilibrium. Then we compare the expected payment of the pro-
posed mechanism with this lower bound and show that the proposed mechanism is
asymptotically optimal in the high quality regime, i.e., as  goes to infinity.
Proposition 1. For any nonnegative payment mechanism R in which σ∗ is a Nash
equilibrium, the total expected payment at σ∗ is lower bounded, given as follows:
Eσ∗
[
N∑
i=1
Ri(X)
]
≥ Ng′()(e + 1). (5.17)
Proof. See Appendix K.
Therefore, to have an equilibrium at σ∗, a nonnegative payment mechanism needs
to pay at least Ng′()(e + 1) to the players. In the asymptotic regime that  goes to
infinity, this lower bound is on the order of O(g′()e). In the equilibrium σ∗ of the
payment mechanism R(N,), the total expected payment is given by
Eσ∗
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,)
i (X)
]
= Ng′()(e + 1) (5.18)
+
Ng′()(e + 1)2
2e
(e + 1)2
e2 − 1
1
|D| (5.19)
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·
(
e2
(e + 1)2
P0,1 +
e
(e + 1)2
(P 21 + P
2
0 ) (5.20)
+
1
(e + 1)2
(P1P1,1 + P0P0,0)
)
, (5.21)
which can be obtained from the proof of Theorem 9.
In the asymptotic regime that  goes to infinity, the total expected payment of
mechanismR(N,) is dominated by the first term, which is identical to the lower bound
Ng′()(e+1), so the mechanism is asymptotically optimal in the high-quality regime.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we showed how to design the payment mechanism to achieve quality
control when collecting data from privacy-sensitive individuals. We considered a
model in which individuals do not trust the data collector and take into account a
privacy cost that depends on the level of the (local) differential privacy of the data
reporting strategy. Due to privacy concerns, an individual may be only willing to
report a noisy version of the private data, which degrades the quality of the collected
data. Our proposed mechanism incentives individuals to use a randomized response
strategy with a desired noise level in the Nash equilibrium. This strategy generates
the reported data by flipping the private data with probability 1
e+1
, where  > 0
is a parameter of the mechanism. Therefore, the quality of the collected data is
controllable by adjusting . With properly selected parameters, any accuracy goal can
be fulfilled at the Nash equilibrium, and the total expected payment of the designed
mechanism is asymptotically optimal in the high quality regime. Note that the model
of the private data in this work is a very general one. Considering some specific but
well motivated structure for the model of the private data, such as the model we
considered in Chapter 3 and 4, to find better mechanisms is an exciting direction for
future work.
100
Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, data privacy was studied from two perspectives: the relation
between different privacy notions (Chapter 2) and the economic foundations for a
market model of trading private data (Chapter 3–Chapter 5).
Chapter 2 investigated the relation between three different notions of privacy:
identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy, where identifiabil-
ity guarantees indistinguishability between posterior probabilities, differential privacy
guarantees limited additional disclosures, and mutual information is an information-
theoretic notion. Under a unified privacy–distortion framework, where the distor-
tion is defined to be the expected Hamming distance between the input and output
databases, we established some fundamental connections between these three privacy
notions. Given a maximum allowable distortion D within certain range, the smallest
identifiability level ∗i (D) and the smallest differential privacy level 
∗
d(D) are proved
to satisfy ∗i (D) − X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D), where X is a constant determined by the
prior of the original database, and diminishes to zero when the prior is uniform. Next,
we showed that there is a mechanism that simultaneously minimizes the identifiabil-
ity level and the mutual information given the same maximum allowable distortion
within certain range. We further showed that this mechanism satisfies -differential
privacy with ∗d(D) ≤  ≤ ∗d(D) + 2X .
Our findings in this part reveal some fundamental connections between the three
notions of privacy. With these three notions of privacy being defined, many interest-
ing issues deserve further attention. The connections we have established in this work
are based on the distortion measure of Hamming distance, which is closely tied with
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the neighboring relations, and we assume that the output synthetic database and the
original database are in the same universe. It would be of great interest to study the
connections of these privacy notions under other common distortion measures and
other output formats. We remark that our results for Hamming distance can be used
to prove lower bounds on the distortion of a differentially private mechanism when
the distortion is measured by the distortion at the worst-case query in a query class
Wang et al. (2015b). Some other interesting directions are as follows. In some cases,
the prior pX is imperfect. Then for privacy notions depending on the prior such as
identifiability and mutual-information privacy, it is natural to ask how we can pro-
tect privacy with robustness over the prior distribution. Identifiability and differential
privacy impose requirements on neighboring databases to protect an individual’s pri-
vacy. Then are there any practical scenarios that we would desire to generalize this
“pairwise” privacy to “group” privacy? The connections between membership pri-
vacy and these three notions of privacy also need to be explored, since membership
privacy has been proposed as a unifying framework for privacy definitions.
Starting from Chapter 3, we studied a market for trading private data, where
a data collector purchases private data from strategic data subjects (individuals)
through an incentive mechanism. The data subjects do not consider the data collector
to be trustworthy, and thus experience a cost incurred by the privacy loss during data
reporting. The data subjects are endowed with the ability to control their own privacy,
which also frees the data collector from the responsibility of privacy protection.
Chapter 3 studied “the value of privacy” under a setting where the private data
of individuals is binary data and represents their knowledge about a common under-
lying state. The value of  units of privacy is measured by the minimum payment
of all nonnegative payment mechanisms under which an individual’s best response
in a Nash equilibrium is to report the data with a privacy level of . We derived
102
asymptotically tight lower and upper bounds on the value of privacy as the num-
ber of individuals becomes large, where the upper bound was given by a designed
payment mechanism R(N,). We further applied these fundamental limits to find the
minimum total payment for the data collector to achieve certain accuracy target for
learning the underlying state, and derived lower and upper bounds on the minimum
payment. The total payment of the designed mechanism R(N,) with properly chosen
parameters is at most one individual’s payment away from the minimum.
Chapter 4 considered a setting where the individuals’s valuations of privacy are
unknown to the data collector/analyst. The data analyst is interested in learning
the underlying state from the reported data with minimum overall payment. We
designed a family of payment mechanisms for the data analyst, which utilize negative
payments to prevent individuals with high privacy valuations from reporting only
noise and cut down the cost of the data analyst. In each designed mechanism, the
individuals exhibit a threshold behavior at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium: only those
with cost coefficients below some threshold participate, and they report data with
certain quality guarantee, where the threshold and the quality guarantee are both
parameters of the mechanism. With appropriate choices of parameters, the data
analyst can fulfill any accuracy goal with diminishing cost at the equilibrium as the
number of individuals grows to infinity.
Chapter 5 showed how to design the payment mechanism to achieve quality control
when individuals’ binary private data follows a general joint probability distribution
with some symmetry. The data collector is interested in learning the average of the
private data. Our proposed mechanism incentives individuals to use a randomized
response strategy with a desired noise level in the Nash equilibrium. This strategy
generates the reported data by flipping the private data with probability 1
e+1
, where
 > 0 is a parameter of the mechanism. Therefore, the quality of the collected data is
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controllable by adjusting . With properly selected parameters, any accuracy goal can
be fulfilled at the Nash equilibrium, and the total expected payment of the designed
mechanism is asymptotically optimal in the high quality regime.
Our study from the economic perspective suggested a market-based model to
address the privacy concerns in data collection for big data analytics. Under this
market model, many interesting directions can be further explored. We just list a
few of them below. We can consider more general but still structured models for
private data. We have considered the structure where the private data is binary and
is correlated through a common underlying state, which is also binary. We have also
considered a general distribution for the private data where the distribution is sym-
metric over individuals. To broaden the range of applications, it would be of great
interest to study models with larger alphabets for the private data and the underly-
ing state, or with a more complicated correlation structure among the private data.
The learning goal of the data collector should also be set accordingly. For example,
people’s opinions can have impacts on each other and form certain dynamics (see,
e.g., Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010)) in reality. Models that capture the structure of
the dynamics would be very appealing. We can also consider a market where there
are multiple rounds of interactions between the data collector and the data subjects.
For example, in a crowdsourcing scenario, a worker (data subject) may be interested
in participating in multiple tasks released by the same crowdsourcer (data collector).
The multi-round setting provides an opportunity of learning for the data collector.
Some characteristics of the data subjects may be learnable during the process and
provide useful information. The data collector may adjust the design of the payment
mechanism after seeing the results from previous rounds. Another direction worth
further investigations goes back to the privacy notions. We have studied the rela-
tions between three different privacy notions: identifiability, differential privacy and
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mutual-information privacy. We used local differential privacy as the privacy mea-
sure in the market model. However, other privacy notions also deserve comprehensive
investigations in a market model. Using different notions of privacy will change the
structure of incentives, thereby resulting in new fundamental tradeoffs. To tackle
different privacy notions in a market model, we may leverage the relations we have
established. This is by no means a complete list of the problems worth studying. In-
corporating privacy protection into big data analytics is a complicated problem that
needs persistent efforts from various aspects.
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Lemma 7. The minimum distortion D∗relaxed() of the relaxed optimization problem
R-PD satisfies
D∗relaxed() = h(), (A.1)
where
h() =
n
1 + e

m−1
.
Proof. We first prove the following claim, which gives a lower bound on the minimum
distortion D∗relaxed().
Claim. Any feasible solution {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} of R-PD satisfies∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) ≥ h().
Proof of the Claim. Consider any feasible {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn}. For any y ∈ Dn
and any integer l with 0 ≤ l ≤ n, let Nl(y) be the set of elements with distance l to
y, i.e.,
Nl(y) = {v ∈ Dn : d(v, y) = l}. (A.2)
Denote Pl = P{X ∈ Nl(y) | Y = y}. Then
∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) =
n∑
l=0
lPl.
We first derive a lower bound on Pn. For any u ∈ Nl−1(y), N1(u)∩Nl(y) consists
of the neighbors of u that are in Nl(y). By the constraint (2.14), for any v ∈ N1(u)∩
Nl(y),
pX|Y (u | y) ≤ epX|Y (v | y). (A.3)
Each u ∈ Nl−1(y) has n− (l− 1) rows that are the same with the corresponding rows
of y. Each neighbor of u in Nl(y) can be obtained by changing one of these n− (l−1)
rows to a different element in D, which is left with m−1 choices. Therefore, each u ∈
Nl−1(y) has (n−l+1)(m−1) neighbors inNl(y). By similar arguments, each v ∈ Nl(y)
has l neighbors in Nl−1(y). Taking summation of (A.3) over u ∈ Nl−1(y), v ∈ Nl(y)
with u ∼ v yields ∑
u∈Nl−1(y)
(n− l + 1)(m− 1)pX|Y (u | y)
≤ e
∑
u∈Nl−1(y)
∑
v∈N1(u)∩Nl(y)
pX|Y (v | y).
Thus
(n− l + 1)(m− 1)Pl−1
≤ e
∑
v∈Nl(y)
∑
u∈N1(v)∩Nl−1(y)
pX|Y (v | y) (A.4)
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= elPl. (A.5)
Recall that Nl , |Nl(x)| =
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)l. Then by (A.5) we obtain that, for any l with
1 ≤ l ≤ n,
Pl−1
Nl−1
≤ Pl
Nl
e.
As a consequence, for any l with 0 ≤ l ≤ n,
Pl ≤ Nl
Nn
e(n−l)Pn. (A.6)
Since
∑n
l=0 Pl = 1, taking summation over l in (A.6) yields
1 ≤ Pn 1
Nne−n
n∑
l=0
Nle
−l
= Pn
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
Nne−n
,
i.e.,
Pn ≥ Nne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
This lower bound on Pn gives the following lower bound:
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥
n∑
l=0
l
(
Pl + a
Nle
−l∑n−1
k=0 Nke
−k
)
+
nNne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n ,
where a = Pn − Nne−n(
1+(m−1)e−
)n .
Consider the following optimization problem:
min
n−1∑
l=0
lQl
subject to Ql ≥ 0, l = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1,
Ql−1
Nl−1
≤ Ql
Nl
e, l = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
n−1∑
l=0
Ql = 1− Nne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Suppose the optimal solution of this problem is {Q∗0, Q∗1, . . . , Q∗n−1}. Then
n−1∑
l=0
l
(
Pl + a
Nle
−l∑n−1
k=0 Nke
−k
)
≥
n−1∑
l=0
lQ∗l
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as
{
Pl + a
Nle
−l∑n−1
k=0 Nke
−k , l = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1
}
is a feasible solution. Therefore,
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥
n−1∑
l=0
lQ∗l +
nNne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Similar to {Pl, l = 0, . . . , n}, {Q∗l , l = 0, . . . , n− 1} satisfies
Q∗l ≤
Nl
Nn−1
e(n−1−l)Q∗n−1. (A.7)
Since
∑n−1
l=0 Q
∗
l = 1− Nne
−n(
1+(m−1)e−
)n , taking summation over l in (A.7) yields
Q∗n−1 ≥
Nn−1e−(n−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Using similar arguments we have
n−1∑
l=0
lQ∗l ≥
n−2∑
l=0
lC∗l +
(n− 1)Nn−1e−(n−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n ,
where {C∗l , l = 0, . . . , n− 2} is the optimal solution of
min
n−2∑
l=0
lCl
subject to Cl ≥ 0, l = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2,
Cl−1
Nl−1
≤ Cl
Nl
e, l = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2,
n−2∑
l=0
Cl = 1− Nn−1e
−(n−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n − Nne−n(1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Continue this procedure we obtain
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥
n∑
l=0
lNle
−(n−l)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n = n1 + em−1 = h().
Therefore, for any feasible {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn},
∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) =
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥ h(),
which completes the proof of the claim.
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By this claim, any feasible solution satisfies∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) ≥ h().
Therefore
D∗relaxed() ≥ h(). (A.8)
Next we prove the following claim, which gives an upper bound on the minimum
distortion D∗relaxed().
Claim. Consider
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn,
and any {pY (y), y ∈ Dn} with∑
y∈Dn
pY (y) = 1, pY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Dn.
Then {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} and {pY (y), y ∈ Dn} form a feasible solution of R-PD,
and ∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) = h().
Proof of the Claim. Obviously the considered {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} and
{pY (y), y ∈ Dn} satisfy constraints (2.16)–(2.18). Therefore to prove the feasibil-
ity, we are left with constraint (2.14) and (2.15). We first verify constraint (2.14).
Consider any pair of neighboring elements x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn. Then by the
triangle inequality,
d(x, y) ≤ d(x′, y)− d(x′, x) = d(x′, y)− 1.
Therefore,
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
≤ e
−(d(x′,y)−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
= epX|Y (x′ | y).
Next we verify constraint (2.15). For any y ∈ Dn and any integer l with 0 ≤ l ≤ n,
let Nl(x) be the set of elements with distance l to y as defined in (A.2). Then it is
easy to see that Nl , |Nl(y)| =
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)l, and for any y ∈ Dn,
Dn =
n⋃
l=0
Nl(y).
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Therefore, for any y ∈ Dn,∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)
=
∑
x∈Dn
e−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
=
1(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
n∑
l=0
∑
x∈Nl(y)
e−d(x,y)
=
1(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
n∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)le−l
= 1.
With feasibility verified, we can proceed to calculate the distortion. Let g =
1 + (m− 1)e−. Then ∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
=
1
(g)n
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
n∑
l=0
∑
x∈Nl(y)
e−d(x,y)d(x, y)
=
1
(g)n
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
n∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)le−ll
=
n(m− 1)e−(1 + (m− 1)e−)n−1
(g)n
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
=
n
1 + e

m−1
= h(),
which completes the proof of the claim.
By this claim, there exists a feasible solution such that∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) = h(),
which implies
D∗relaxed() ≤ h().
Combining this upper bound with the lower bound (A.8) gives
D∗relaxed() = h().
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Lemma 8. The optimal value D∗relaxed() = h() of R-PD implies the following lower
bounds for any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n:
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D), (A.9)
∗d(D) ≥ max{h−1(D)− X , 0}. (A.10)
Proof. First we derive the lower bound on ∗i (D). Let δ be an arbitrary positive
number. For any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n, let D,δ = ∗i (D) + δ. Then by the definition of
∗i , we have that (D,δ, D) is achievable under identifiability. Therefore
D ≥ D∗i (D,δ) ≥ D∗relaxed(D,δ) = h(D,δ),
where D∗i (·) is the optimal value of PD-I. Since h is a decreasing function, this implies
that D,δ ≥ h−1(D). Therefore
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D)− δ.
Letting δ → 0 yields
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D).
Next we derive the lower bound on ∗d(D) using arguments similar to those in the
proof of the lower bound on ∗i (D). Let δ be an arbitrary positive number. For any
D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n, let D,δ = ∗d(D) + δ. Then by the definition of ∗d, we have that
(D,δ, D) is achievable under differential privacy. Therefore
D ≥ D∗d(D,δ) ≥ D∗relaxed(D,δ + X) = h(D,δ + X),
where D∗d(·) is the optimal value of PD-DP. Since h is a decreasing function, this
implies that D,δ + X ≥ h−1(D). Therefore
∗d(D) ≥ h−1(D)− X − δ.
Letting δ → 0 yields
∗d(D) ≥ h−1(D)− X .
Since the privacy level is nonnegative, we obtain the lower bound in (A.10).
Lemma 9. The privacy–distortion function ∗i of a database X is bounded from below
as
∗i (D) ≥ X
for any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n, where X is the constant defined in (2.11).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n such that
∗i (D) < X . Let δ be an arbitrary positive number with 0 < δ < X − ∗i (D), and let
 = ∗i (D) + δ. Then  < X and (,D) is achievable under identifiability. Consider
the mechanism that achieves (,D). Then by the requirement of identifiability, for
any neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y). (A.11)
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Let pY (·) be the pmf of the output Y . Then pY (y) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ Dn. Therefore,
multiplying both sides of (A.11) by pY (y) and taking summation over y ∈ Dn yield∑
y∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)pY (y) ≤
∑
y∈Dn
epX|Y (x′ | y)pY (y),
which implies
pX(x) ≤ epX(x′).
Then there do not exist neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn with pX(x) = eXpX(x′) since  < X ,
which contradicts with the definition of X in (2.11).
Lemma 10. For  ≥ ˜X , the mechanism E i defined in (2.21) satisfies -identifiability,
and the distortion of E i is given by E[d(X, Y )] = h().
Proof. Consider any  ≥ ˜X . Then under the mechanism E i , the posterior probability
for any x, y ∈ Dn is given by
pX|Y (x | y) =
pY |X(y | x)pX(x)
pY (y)
=
e−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
As shown in the proof of Lemma 7, this {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} and the corresponding
{pY (y), y ∈ Dn} form an optimal solution of the relaxed optimization problem R-PD.
Following the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 7 we can conclude that E i
satisfies -identifiability, and the distortion of E i is given by E[d(X, Y )] = h().
Lemma 11. The mechanism E d defined in (2.22) satisfies -differential privacy, and
the distortion of E d is given by E[d(X, Y )] = h().
Proof. Under mechanism E d, {pY |X(y | x), x, y ∈ Dn} has the same form as the
posteriors under mechanism E i . Therefore still by similar arguments as in the proof
of Lemma 7, E d satisfies -differential privacy, and the distortion of E d is given by
E[d(X, Y )] = h().
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Proof. Consider any nonnegative payment mechanism R and a Nash equilibrium of
it, denoted by σ. For an individual i, consider any strategy σ′i of individual i and let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 1), q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 1),
p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 0), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 0).
When other individuals follow σ−i, the expected utility of individual i at the strategy
σ′i is a function of (p1, p0, q1, q0), denoted by Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0). We derive the form of
this function below. The expected payment to individual i can be written as
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)]
=
∑
xi,s
{
Pσ′i(Xi = xi, Si = si,S−i = s−i)
· E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi, Si = si,S−i = s−i]
}
=
∑
xi,s
{
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)P(Si = si,S−i = s−i)
· E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,S−i = s−i]
}
,
where we have used the fact that Xi is independent from S−i given Si, and X−i is
independent from Si givenXi and S−i. The term E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,S−i = s−i]
does not depend on the strategy of individual i since
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,S−i = s−i]
= E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(xi,X−i) | Xi = xi,S−i = s−i]
= Eσ−i [Ri(xi,X−i) | S−i = s−i],
where the last equality follow from the conditional independence between Xi and X−i
given S−i. Then
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)]
=
∑
xi,si
{
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)
·
∑
s−i
(
P(S = s)Eσ−i [Ri(xi,X−i) | S−i = s−i]
)}
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0,
where
Ksi =
∑
s−i
(
P(Si = si,S−i = s−i)
· Eσ−i [Ri(1,X−i) | S−i = s−i]
)
, si ∈ {0, 1},
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are the expected payment received by individual i when she reports 1, weighted by
P(Si = 1) and P(Si = 0) when her private signal is 1 and 0, respectively, and
Lsi =
∑
s−i
(
P(Si = si,S−i = s−i)
· Eσ−i [Ri(0,X−i) | S−i = s−i]
)
, si ∈ {0, 1},
are the expected payment received by individual i when she reports 0, weighted by
P(Si = 1) and P(Si = 0) when her private signal is 1 and 0, respectively. Note that
K1, K0, L1 and L0 do not depend on p1, p0, q1, and q0. The privacy level of the
reported data at strategy σ′i is
ζ(σ′i) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln q1q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− q11− q0
∣∣∣∣,∣∣∣∣ln 1− p1 − q11− p0 − q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln p1 + q1p0 + q0
∣∣∣∣}.
With a little abuse of notation, we regard ζ(σ′i) as a function ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0). The
expected utility of individual i can thus be written as
Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0)
= E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(ζ(σ′i))]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)).
Next we discuss the best response of individual i for different cases of the values
of K1, K0, L1 and L0. Since R is a nonnegative payment mechanism, these values
are all nonnegative. Notice that for any si ∈ {0, 1}, s−i ∈ {0, 1}N−1, P(Si = si,S−i =
s−i) > 0. Therefore, K1 and K0 are either both equal to zero or both positive. The
same argument also applies to L1 and L0. (1) When all of K1, K0, L1 and L0 are zero,
a best response of individual i should minimize the privacy cost. Thus the strategy
of individual i in a Nash equilibrium is to report Xi that is independent of Si so the
privacy cost is zero. (2) When K1 and K0 are positive but L1 and L0 are zero, the
best response of individual i is to always report Xi = 1. (3) Similarly, when K1 and
K0 are zero but L1 and L0 are positive, the best response of individual i is to always
report Xi = 0. We can see that the strategy of individual i in a Nash equilibrium is
non-informative in all the three cases above. (4) In the remainder of this proof, we
focus on the case that all of K1, K0, L1 and L0 are positive.
If a best response of individual i is to always not participate, then it is a non-
informative strategy. Otherwise, a best response of individual i is specified by an
optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
max
p1,p0,q1,q0
Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0)
subject to 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p1 + q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 + q0 ≤ 1,
p1 + q1 + p0 + q0 > 0.
(P)
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First, we prove that an optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) of (P) must satisfy that
p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0. Suppose not. Without loss of generality we assume that p
∗
1 + q
∗
1 <
p∗0 + q
∗
0. We will find another solution (p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) that yields better utility, which
contradicts the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0).
Since we assume that p∗1 + q
∗
1 < p
∗
0 + q
∗
0, then at least one of the following
two inequality holds: p∗1 < p
∗
0, q
∗
1 < q
∗
0. Still without loss of generality we as-
sume that p∗1 < p
∗
0. Then if q
∗
1 < q
∗
0, let p
′
1 = p
∗
0 and q
′
1 = q
∗
0. Since K1
and L1 are positive, (p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) yields higher payment. It is easy to verify that
ζ(p′1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) < ζ(p
∗
1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0). Thus (p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) yields better utility. For the
other case that q∗1 ≥ q∗0, let p′1 = p∗0 + q∗0 − q∗1 and q′1 = q∗1. Then p∗1 < p′1 ≤ p∗0. Since
K1 is positive, (p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) yields higher payment. To check the privacy cost, notice
that
ζ(p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) = max
{
ln
p∗0
p∗1
, ln
1− p∗1
1− p∗0
, ln
q∗1
q∗0
, ln
1− q∗0
1− q∗1
,
ln
1− p∗1 − q∗1
1− p∗0 − q∗0
, ln
p∗0 + q
∗
0
p∗1 + q
∗
1
}
,
and
ζ(p′1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) = max
{
ln
p∗0
p′1
, ln
1− p′1
1− p∗0
, ln
q′1
q∗0
, ln
1− q∗0
1− q′1
}
.
Since p′1 > p
∗
1 and q
′
1 = q
∗
1, ζ(p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) ≤ ζ(p∗1, p∗0, q∗1, q∗0). Thus (p′1, p∗0, q′1, q∗0) yields
better utility. Therefore, by contradiction, we must have p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0.
Next, we prove that an optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) must satisfy that p
∗
1 + q
∗
1 =
p∗0 + q
∗
0 = 1. Still, suppose not. Then we will find another solution (p
′
1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) that
yields better utility. Let
p′1 =
p∗1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
, q′1 =
q∗1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
,
p′0 =
p∗0
p∗0 + q
∗
0
, q′0 =
q∗0
p∗0 + q
∗
0
.
We have seen that p∗1+q
∗
1 = p
∗
0+q
∗
0. By the last constraint of (P), p
∗
1+q
∗
1 = p
∗
0+q
∗
0 > 0.
Since we assume that p∗1 + q
∗
1 and p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 are not equal to 1, they must be less than
1. Since K1, K0, L1 and L0 are positive, (p
′
1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) yields higher payment. It is
easy to verify that ζ(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) ≤ ζ(p∗1, p∗0, q∗1, q∗0). Thus (p′1, p′0, q′1, q′0) yields better
utility, which contradicts the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0).
By the results above, to find an optimal solution of (P), we can focus on feasible
(p1, p0, q1, q0) such that q1 = 1− p1 and q0 = 1− p0. Let
U i(p1, p0) = K1p1 +K0p0 +K − g(ζ(p1, p0)),
where K1 = K1−L1, K0 = K0−L0, K = L1+L0, and with a little abuse of notation,
ζ(p1, p0) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣}.
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Then (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) is an optimal solution of (P) if and only if (p
∗
1, p
∗
0) is an optimal
solution of the following optimization problem P’:
max
0≤p1≤1,0≤p0≤1
U i(p1, p0) (P’)
Let (p∗1, p
∗
0) be an optimal solution of (P’). The strategy specified by (p
∗
1, p
∗
0, 1 −
p∗1, 1− p∗0) is a symmetric randomized response if p∗1 + p∗0 = 1, and is non-informative
if p∗1 = p
∗
0. Thus it suffices to prove that if p
∗
1 + p
∗
0 6= 1, then p∗1 = p∗0. We divide the
case that p∗1 + p
∗
0 6= 1 into two cases: p∗1 + p∗0 > 1 and p∗1 + p∗0 < 1, and prove that
p∗1 = p
∗
0 in both cases.
Case 1: p∗1 + p
∗
0 > 1. Suppose, for contradiction, p
∗
1 6= p∗0.
If p∗1 = 1, then
max
{∣∣∣∣ln p∗1p∗0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p∗11− p∗0
∣∣∣∣} = +∞.
Consider p1 = 1 and p0 = 1. Then by the convention
max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣} = 0.
Since U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) ≥ U i(p1, p0), then K1 +K0p∗0 − g(+∞) ≥ K1 +K0 − g(0). Thus
g(+∞) ≤ −K0(1− p∗0) < +∞. (B.1)
Since g(+∞) ≥ 0, this also indicates that K0 ≤ 0. Next consider p1 = 1 and p0 = 0.
Then
max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣} = +∞.
Since U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) ≥ U i(p1, p0), then K1+K0p∗0−g(+∞) ≥ K1−g(+∞). Thus K0 ≥ 0,
where we have used the fact that g(+∞) < +∞. Combining the above arguments we
have K0 = 0. However, by (B.1), this indicates that g(+∞) = 0, which contradicts
the assumption that g(ξ) = 0 only for ξ = 0. Therefore, p∗1 6= 1. Following similar
arguments we have p∗0 6= 1, either.
If p∗1 > p
∗
0, then noticing that p
∗
1 + p
∗
0 > 1 we have
max
{∣∣∣∣ln p∗1p∗0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p∗11− p∗0
∣∣∣∣} = ln 1− p∗01− p∗1 .
Consider
p1 =
1−p∗0
1−p∗1
1−p∗0
1−p∗1 + 1
, p0 =
1
1−p∗0
1−p∗1 + 1
.
Then
max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣} = ln 1− p∗01− p∗1 .
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Since U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) ≥ U i(p1, p0), then
K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 − g
(
ln
1− p∗0
1− p∗1
)
+K
≥ K1p1 +K0p0 − g
(
ln
1− p∗0
1− p∗1
)
+K.
Thus, inserting p1 and p0 we obtain
K1(1− p∗1) +K0(1− p∗0) ≥ 0,
where we have used the condition p∗1 + p
∗
0 > 1. Next still consider p1 = p0 = 1. Since
U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) ≥ U i(p1, p0), then
K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 − g
(
ln
1− p∗0
1− p∗1
)
≥ K1 +K0 − g(0).
Thus
−g
(
ln
1− p∗0
1− p∗1
)
≥ K1(1− p∗1) +K0(1− p∗0) ≥ 0.
which indicates that ln
1−p∗0
1−p∗1 = 0. Thus p
∗
1 = p
∗
0, which contradicts the assumption.
If p∗1 < p
∗
0, then noticing that p
∗
1 + p
∗
0 > 1 we have
max
{∣∣∣∣ln p∗1p∗0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p∗11− p∗0
∣∣∣∣} = ln 1− p∗11− p∗0 .
We use similar arguments to obtain contradiction. Consider
p1 =
1
1−p∗1
1−p∗0 + 1
, p0 =
1−p∗1
1−p∗0
1−p∗1
1−p∗0 + 1
.
Then since U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) ≥ U i(p1, p0), we have K1(1 − p∗1) + K0(1 − p∗0) ≥ 0. Next still
consider p1 = p0 = 1. Then since U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) ≥ U i(p1, p0), we have
−g
(
ln
1− p∗1
1− p∗0
)
≥ K1(1− p∗1) +K0(1− p∗0) ≥ 0.
which again indicates that ln
1−p∗1
1−p∗0 = 0. So p
∗
1 = p
∗
0, which contradicts the assumption.
In summary, for the case that p∗1 + p
∗
0 > 1, p
∗
1 = p
∗
0.
Case 2: p∗1 + p
∗
0 < 1. Suppose, for contradiction, p
∗
1 6= p∗0. Then we obtain contradic-
tions by similar arguments as used in Case 1.
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First, by comparing U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) with U i(0, 0) and U i(0, 1) we can prove that p
∗
1 6=
0, p∗0 6= 0. If p∗1 > p∗0, then by comparing U i(p∗1, p∗0) with the expected utility at
p1 =
p∗1
p∗0
p∗1
p∗0
+ 1
, p0 =
1
p∗1
p∗0
+ 1
,
we have K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 ≤ 0. By comparing U i(p∗1, p∗0) with U i(0, 0), we have
g
(
ln
1− p∗1
1− p∗0
)
≤ K1p∗1 +K0p∗0 ≤ 0.
Therefore, p∗1 = p
∗
0, which contradicts the assumption. If p
∗
1 < p
∗
0, then by comparing
U i(p
∗
1, p
∗
0) with the expected utility at
p1 =
1
p∗0
p∗1
+ 1
, p0 =
p∗0
p∗1
p∗0
p∗1
+ 1
,
we have K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 ≤ 0. By comparing U i(p∗1, p∗0) with U i(0, 0), we have
g
(
ln
1− p∗1
1− p∗0
)
≤ K1p∗1 +K0p∗0 ≤ 0.
Therefore, p∗1 = p
∗
0, which contradicts the assumption. In summary, for the case that
p∗1 + p
∗
0 < 1, we also have p
∗
1 = p
∗
0 by similar arguments as used in Case 1. This
completes the proof.
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Proof. For any nonnegative payment mechanism R in which the strategy profile
(σ
(−)
i ,σ−i) is a Nash equilibrium, consider the payment mechanism R
′ defined by
R′(xi,x−i) = R(1− xi,x−i).
We first prove that (σ
()
i ,σ−i) is a Nash equilibrium in R
′. For an individual i,
consider any strategy σ′i of individual i and let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 1), q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 1),
p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 0), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 0).
We say (p1, p0, q1, q0) is feasible if it satisfies that
0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p1 + q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p0 + q0 ≤ 1.
Then following the notation in the proof of Lemma 1, in the mechanism R′ and R, we
denote the expected utility of individual i at σ′i when other individuals follow σ−i by
U ′i(p1, p0, q1, q0) and Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0), respectively, and they can be written as follows:
U ′i(p1, p0, q1, q0) = K
′
1,ip1 +K
′
0,ip0 + L
′
1,iq1 + L
′
0,iq0
− g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)),
Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0) = K1,ip1 +K0,ip0 + L1,iq1 + L0,iq0
− g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)).
We derive the relations between K ′1,i, K
′
0,i, L
′
1,i, L
′
0,i and K1,i, K0,i, L1,i, L0,i. By
definition,
K ′1,i =
∑
x−i
R′i(1,x−i)Pσ−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1)
=
∑
x−i
Ri(0,x−i)Pσ−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1)
= L1,i.
Similarly, K ′0,i = L0,i, L
′
1,i = K1,i and L
′
0,i = K0,i. Since (σ
(−)
i ,σ−i) is a Nash
equilibrium in R, for any feasible (p1, p0, q1, q0),
Ui
(
1
e + 1
,
e
e + 1
,
e
e + 1
,
1
e + 1
)
≥ Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0).
Therefore, for any feasible (p1, p0, q1, q0),
U ′i
(
e
e + 1
,
1
e + 1
,
1
e + 1
,
e
e + 1
)
≥ U ′i(p1, p0, q1, q0),
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where we have used the symmetry property of the cost function g. This implies that
σ
()
i is a best response of individual i in R
′ when other individuals follow σ−i. Now
consider any individual j with j 6= i and any strategy σ′j. Let
p1 = Pσ′j(Xj = 1 | Sj = 1), q1 = Pσ′j(Xj = 0 | Sj = 1),
p0 = Pσ′j(Xj = 1 | Sj = 0), q0 = Pσ′j(Xj = 0 | Sj = 0).
Let σ
()
−j = (σ
()
i ,σ−i,j) and σ
(−)
−j = (σ
(−)
i ,σ−i,j). Then similarly, in the mechanism R
′
and R, we denote the expected utility of individual j at σ′j when other individuals
follow σ
()
−j and σ
(−)
−j by U
′
j(p1, p0, q1, q0) and Uj(p1, p0, q1, q0), respectively, and they
can be written as follows:
U ′j(p1, p0, q1, q0) = K
′
1,jp1 +K
′
0,jp0 + L
′
1,jq1 + L
′
0,jq0
− g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)),
Uj(p1, p0, q1, q0) = K1,jp1 +K0,jp0 + L1,jq1 + L0,jq0
− g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)).
We derive the relations between K ′1,j, K
′
0,j, L
′
1,j, L
′
0,j and K1,j, K0,j, L1,j, L0,j. By
definition,
K ′1,j =
∑
x−i,j
∑
xi
R′i(xi, 1,x−i,j)
·
∑
si
P
σ
()
i
(Xi = xi | Si = si)
· Pσ−i,j(X−i,j = x−i,j, Si = si, Sj = 1)
=
∑
x−i,j
∑
xi
Ri(1− xi, 1,x−i,j)
·
∑
si
P
σ
(−)
i
(Xi = 1− xi | Si = si)
· Pσ−i,j(X−i,j = x−i,j, Si = si, Sj = 1)
= K1,j.
Similarly, K ′0,j = K0,j, L
′
1,j = L1,j, and L
′
0,j = L0,j. Therefore, for any feasible
(p1, p0, q1, q0),
U ′j(p1, p0, q1, q0) = Uj(p1, p0, q1, q0).
Thus σj is a best response of individual j in R
′ when other individuals follow σ()−j.
This completes the proof for (σ
()
i ,σ−i) to be a Nash equilibrium in R
′.
With the above proof, it is not hard to verify that the expected payment to each
individual at these two equilibria of the two mechanisms are the same.
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Proof. Consider any payment mechanism R and any Nash equilibrium σ of it. We
will construct a genie-aided mechanism R̂ such that σ is also a Nash equilibrium of
R̂ and the expected payment to each individual at this equilibrium is the same under
R and R̂.
As in the proof of Lemma 1, for any individual i, consider any strategy σ′i of
individual i and let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 1), q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 1),
p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 0), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 0).
Then we will first derive the expected utility of individual i at the strategy σ′i as a
function of (p1, p0, q1, q0), denoted by Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0), but using a slightly different ex-
pression from the form in Lemma 1. When other individuals follow σ−i, the expected
payment to individual i at the strategy σ′i can be written as
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)]
=
∑
xi,si,w
{
Pσ′i(Xi = xi, Si = si,W = w)
· E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi, Si = si,W = w]
}
=
∑
xi,si,w
{
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)P(Si = si,W = w)
· E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w]
}
,
where we have used the fact that Xi is independent from W given Si, and X−i is
independent from Si given Xi and W . Let Ri(xi;w) denote E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi =
xi,W = w] for xi, w ∈ {0, 1}. Then Ri(xi;w) does not depend on the strategy of
individual i since
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w]
= E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(xi,X−i) | Xi = xi,W = w]
= Eσ−i [Ri(xi,X−i) | W = w],
where the last equality follows from the conditional independence between Xi and
X−i given W . With this notation,
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)]
=
∑
xi,si
{
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)
·
∑
w
P(Si = si,W = w)Ri(xi;w)
}
.
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Therefore, the expected utility of individual i is given by
Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0)
= E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(ζ(σ′i))]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)),
where
Ksi =
∑
w
P(Si = si,W = w)Ri(1;w), si ∈ {0, 1},
Lsi =
∑
w
P(Si = si,W = w)Ri(0;w), si ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider a genie-aided mechanism R̂ defined as follows: for any individual i,
R̂i(xi, w) = Ri(xi;w), xi ∈ X , w ∈ {0, 1}.
Still consider any individual i and any strategy σ′i of individual i. Let Ûi(p1, p0, q1, q0)
denote the expected utility of individual i at the strategy σ′i when other individuals
follow σ−i. Then
Ûi(p1, p0, q1, q0)
= E(σ′i,σ−i)
[
R̂i(Xi,W )− g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0))
]
=
∑
xi,si,w
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)P(Si = si,W = w)R̂i(xi, w)
− g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0))
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)),
where the last equality follows from the definition of R̂i(xi, w). Thus,
Ûi(p1, p0, q1, q0) = Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0). Since σ is a Nash equilibrium of R, the
(p1, p0, q1, q0) that corresponds to σi maximizes Ui(p1, p0, q1, q0), which implies that
σi is also a best response of individual i under the genie-aided mechanism R̂ when
other individuals follow σ−i. Therefore, σ is also a Nash equilibrium of R̂, and the
expected payment to each individual at this equilibrium is the same under R and R̂.
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Proof. We first prove that ˜ is well-defined. Let a function r : (0,+∞)→ R be defined
as
r() =
D()
VLB()
.
Let P
()
1 and P
()
0 be the conditional distributions of the reported Xi at the -strategy
given W = 1 and W = 0, respectively, and let PU be the uniform distribution on
{0, 1}. Then note that
D() = DKL(PU||P ()1 ) = DKL(PU||P ()0 )
=
1
2
ln
(e + 1)2
4(θe + 1− θ)((1− θ)e + θ) .
Therefore, the function r is continuous on (0,+∞). Further, the function r attains its
maximum value in a bounded subset of (0,+∞) since for any  ∈ (0,+∞), r() > 0,
and
lim
→0
r() = 0
lim
→+∞
r() = 0.
The set arg max r() is a closed set since it is the inverse image of one point. Therefore,
˜ = inf{arg max r()} is well-defined.
Now consider any feasible (N, 1, 2, . . . , N) of (P1). By the construction of ˜, for
any individual i,
VLB(i) ≥ VLB(˜)
D(˜)
D(i).
Then
N∑
i=1
VLB(i) ≥ VLB(˜)
D(˜)
N∑
i=1
D(i)
≥ VLB(˜)
D(˜)
ln(1/τ),
where the second inequality follows from the feasibility of (N, 1, 2, . . . , N). By the
construction of N˜ ,
N˜ <
ln(1/τ)
D(˜)
+ 1.
Therefore,
N∑
i=1
VLB(i) ≥ (N˜ − 1)VLB(˜),
which completes the proof.
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Proof. We write R to represent the mechanism R(N,P,cth,) for conciseness in this
proof. Consider any individual i and any strategy σ′i. Given Ci = ci, let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 1), p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 0),
q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 1), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 0).
Consider the function
ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln q1q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− q11− q0
∣∣∣∣,∣∣∣∣ln 1− p1 − q11− p0 − q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln p1 + q1p0 + q0
∣∣∣∣}.
Then ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0) is the differential privacy level of σ
′
i at ci. When other individ-
uals follow σ−i, let J−i be the number of participants among individuals other than
individual i. Then the expected utility of individual i can be written as
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(Ci, σ′i) | Ci = ci]
=
N∑
n=1
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | J−i = n− 1, Ci = ci] · Pσ(J−i = n− 1 | Ci = ci)
− ciζ(p1, p0, q1, q0).
Next we derive the form of the utility as a function of p1, p0, q1 and q0. According
to σ−i,
{J−i = n− 1} =
{∑
j 6=i
1{Cj≤cth} = n− 1
}
, (F.1)
where 1E with E, an arbitrary event in the probability space, is the indicator function
of E. Therefore,
Pσ(J−i = n− 1 | Ci = ci) = Pσ
(∑
j 6=i
1{Cj≤cth} = n− 1 | Ci = ci
)
= P
(∑
j 6=i
1{Cj≤cth} = n− 1
)
,
which does not depend on the strategy of individual i. When n = 1, E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) |
J−i = n− 1, Ci = ci] = 0, and Pσ(J−i = n− 1 | Ci = ci) = 1− P≥1, where recall that
P≥1 = 1− (1−FC(cth))N−1. When n > 1, utilizing the equivalence relation (F.1) and
the prior,
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | J−i = n− 1, Ci = ci]
=
∑
xi∈{0,1,⊥},v∈{0,1}
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w, J−i = n− 1, Ci = ci]
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· Pσ′i(Xi = xi,W = w | Ci = ci)
=
∑
xi∈{0,1,⊥},v∈{0,1}
{
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w, J−i = n− 1] · P(W = w)
·
∑
Si∈{0,1}
P(Si = si | W = w)Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Ci = ci, Si = si)
}
.
Let
R̂i(xi, v, n) = E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w, J−i = n− 1],
xi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, v ∈ {0, 1}, 1 < n ≤ N.
Then R̂i(xi, v, n) does not depend on the strategy of individual i since
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | Xi = xi,W = w, J−i = n− 1]
= E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(xi, X−i) | Xi = xi,W = w, J−i = n− 1]
= Eσ−i [Ri(xi, X−i) | W = w, J−i = n− 1].
The value of R̂i(xi, v, n) can be calculated from the description of the mechanism.
With this notation,
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X) | J−i = n− 1, Ci = ci]
= R̂i(1, 1, n)PW (1)
(
θp1 + (1− θ)p0
)
+ R̂i(0, 1, n)PW (1)
(
θq1 + (1− θ)q0
)
+ R̂i(1, 0, n)PW (0)
(
(1− θ)p1 + θp0
)
+ R̂i(0, 0, n)PW (0)
(
(1− θ)q1 + θq0
)
=
1
P≥1
(K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0), (F.2)
where
K1 = P≥1
(
R̂i(1, 1, n)PW (1)θ + R̂i(1, 0, n)PW (0)(1− θ)
)
,
K0 = P≥1
(
R̂i(1, 1, n)PW (1)(1− θ) + R̂i(1, 0, n)PW (0)θ
)
,
L1 = P≥1
(
R̂i(0, 1, n)PW (1)θ + R̂i(0, 0, n)PW (0)(1− θ)
)
,
L0 = P≥1
(
R̂i(0, 1, n)PW (1)(1− θ) + R̂i(0, 0, n)PW (0)θ
)
,
and we have used the fact that R̂i(⊥, v, n) = 0 for any v and n. Note that K1, K0,
L1 and L0 do not depend on p1, p0, q1 and q0. By the description of the mechanism,
K1 = L0 =
1
2
(
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth
)
,
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K0 = L1 =
1
2
(
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth− cth(e
 + 1)2
e
)
.
We can see that K1, K0, L1 and L0 do not depend on n, either. Therefore, combining
the case that n = 1 and (F.2), the expected utility of individual i can be written as
E(σ′i,σ−i)[Ri(X)− g(Ci, σ′i) | Ci = ci]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − ciζ(p1, p0, q1, q0).
Let this utility define a function U of p1, p0, q1, and q0; i.e.,
U(p1, p0, q1, q0) = K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − ciζ(p1, p0, q1, q0).
Now we find the best response of individual i, i.e., an optimal solution of the following
optimization problem:
max
p1,p0,q1,q0
U(p1, p0, q1, q0)
subject to 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p1 + q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 + q0 ≤ 1,
by the following three steps.
Step 1: First we can focus on an optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) such that p
∗
1 = q
∗
0
and p∗0 = q
∗
1 for the following reasons. For any feasible solution (p1, p0, q1, q0), consider
the solution (p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) given by
p′1 = q
′
0 =
p1 + q0
2
, p′0 = q
′
1 =
p0 + q1
2
.
Then since K1 = L0 and K0 = L1,
K1p
′
1 +K0p
′
0 + L1q
′
1 + L0q
′
0 = K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0.
By the definition of the function ζ,
p0e
−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ p1 ≤ p0eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0),
(1− p0)e−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ 1− p1 ≤ (1− p0)eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0),
q0e
−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ q1 ≤ q0eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0),
(1− q0)e−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ 1− q1 ≤ (1− q0)eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0).
Then it is not hard to verify that
p′0e
−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ p′1 ≤ p′0eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0),
(1− p′0)e−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ 1− p′1 ≤ (1− p′0)eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0),
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q′0e
−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ q′1 ≤ q′0eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0),
(1− q′0)e−ζ(p1,p0,q1,q0) ≤ 1− q′1 ≤ (1− q′0)eζ(p1,p0,q1,q0).
Besides,
1− p′1 − q′1 = 1− p′0 − q′0, p′1 + q′1 = p′0 + q′0.
Thus
ζ(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) ≤ ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0),
and
U(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) ≥ U(p1, p0, q1, q0).
Further, an optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) such that p
∗
1 = q
∗
0 and p
∗
0 = q
∗
1 must satisfy
that p∗1 ≥ q∗1, since otherwise by swapping p∗1 and p∗0 with q∗1 and q∗0, respectively, the
utility is increased, which contradicts with the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0).
Step 2: Next, for any such an optimal solution, i.e., (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) with p
∗
1 = q
∗
0
and p∗0 = q
∗
1, we prove that one of the following two holds
p∗1 = q
∗
0 = p
∗
0 = q
∗
1 = 0, or (F.3)
p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 = 1, p
∗
1 > q
∗
1. (F.4)
Suppose not. Since (p1, p0, q1, q0) = (0, 0, 0, 0) is a feasible solution, U(p
∗
1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) ≥
U(p1, p0, q1, q0) ≥ 0, and thus K1p∗1 +K0p∗0 + L1q∗1 + L0q∗0 ≥ 0. Suppose that K1p∗1 +
K0p
∗
0 +L1q
∗
1 +L0q
∗
0 = 0. Then since U(p
∗
1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) ≥ 0, we have ζ(p∗1, p∗0, q∗1, q∗0) = 0,
which implies that p∗1 = p
∗
0 and q
∗
1 = q
∗
0. Thus,
K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 + L1q
∗
1 + L0q
∗
0 =
cth
2
(e− + 2− e)(p∗1 + q∗1).
Since e−+2−e < 0 for any  > 0, it must be that p∗1+q∗1 = 0, which contradicts with
the assumption that (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) does not satisfy (F.3). Therefore, K1p
∗
1 + K0p
∗
0 +
L1q
∗
1+L0q
∗
0 > 0. Since (p
∗
1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) does not satisfy (F.4), either p
∗
1+q
∗
1 = p
∗
0+q
∗
0 < 1
or p∗1 = q
∗
1. If p
∗
1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 < 1, consider the solution (p
′
1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) given by
p′1 =
p∗1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
, p′0 =
p∗0
p∗0 + q
∗
0
,
q′1 =
q∗1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
, q′0 =
q∗0
p∗0 + q
∗
0
.
Then
K1p
′
1 +K0p
′
0 + L1q
′
1 + L0q
′
0 =
1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
(K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 + L1q
∗
1 + L0q
∗
0)
> K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 + L1q
∗
1 + L0q
∗
0.
However, ζ(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) = ζ(p
∗
1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0). Thus U(p
′
1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) > U(p
∗
1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0),
which contradicts with the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0). If p
∗
1 = q
∗
1, then p
∗
1 = q
∗
0 =
p∗0 = q
∗
1 and
K1p
∗
1 +K0p
∗
0 + L1q
∗
1 + L0q
∗
0 = cth(e
− + 2− e)p∗1 < 0,
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which contradicts with the fact that K1p
∗
1 + K0p
∗
0 + L1q
∗
1 + L0q
∗
0 > 0. In summary,
for any optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) with p
∗
1 = q
∗
0 and p
∗
0 = q
∗
1, either (F.3) or (F.4)
holds.
Step 3: According to Step 1 and Step 2, we can find an optimal solution among
those feasible solutions, say (p1, p0, q1, q0), with p1 = q0 and p0 = q1, that satisfy
either
p1 = q0 = p0 = q1 = 0, or (F.5)
p1 + q1 = p0 + q0 = 1, p1 > q1. (F.6)
Consider any feasible solution (p1, p0, q1, q0) with p1 = q0 and p0 = q1 and satisfies
(F.6), which can be written as
p1 = q0 =
ei
ei + 1
, p0 = q1 =
1
ei + 1
,
for some i > 0. Then
U(p1, p0, q1, q0) = −cth(e
 + 1)2
e
1
ei + 1
− cii + cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth.
Consider a function h : (0,+∞)→ R defined as
h(i) = −cth(e
 + 1)2
e
1
ei + 1
− cii. (F.7)
Then
h′(i) =
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
ei
(ei + 1)2
− ci,
h′′(i) = −cth(e
 + 1)2
e
ei(ei − 1)
(ei + 1)3
< 0.
Thus, ∗i that satisfies
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
e
∗
i
(e
∗
i + 1)2
− ci = 0,
i.e., ∗i = ξ(ci) defined in (4.1), maximizes h(·), and hence maximizes the utility.
Therefore, among those feasible solutions that satisfy (F.6), the solution (p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0)
with
p˜∗1 = q˜
∗
0 =
eξ(ci)
eξ(ci) + 1
, p˜∗0 = q˜
∗
1 =
1
eξ(ci) + 1
maximizes the utility. This implies that an optimal solution is either (0, 0, 0, 0) or
(p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0). In the remainder of this step, we prove that if ci > cth, (0, 0, 0, 0) is an
optimal solution, and otherwise, i.e., ci ≤ cth, (p˜∗1, p˜∗0, q˜∗1, q˜∗0) is an optimal solution.
First consider the case that ci > cth. Then
U(p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0) = −
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
1
eξ(ci) + 1
+
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth
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− cth(e
 + 1)2
e
ξ(ci)e
ξ(ci)
(eξ(ci) + 1)2
=
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
(
1
e + 1
+
e
(e + 1)2
− 1
eξ(ci) + 1
− ξ(ci)e
ξ(ci)
(eξ(ci) + 1)2
)
.
Consider a function z : (0,+∞)→ R defined as
z(i) =
1
e + 1
+
e
(e + 1)2
− 1
ei + 1
− ie
i
(ei + 1)2
.
Then
z() = 0,
z′(i) =
ie
i(ei − 1)
(ei + 1)3
> 0.
Thus, for any i < , z(i) < 0. Since
U(p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0) =
cth(e
 + 1)2
e
z(ξ(ci)),
and ξ(ci) <  due to ci > cth, we have U(p˜
∗
1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0) < 0 = U(0, 0, 0, 0). Therefore,
for the case that ci > cth, (0, 0, 0, 0) is an optimal solution. Next consider the case
that ci ≤ cth. Write the utility as
U(p˜∗1, p˜
∗
0, q˜
∗
1, q˜
∗
0) = h(ξ(ci)) +
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth,
where the function h is defined in (F.7). Since
h() +
cth(e
 + 1)
e
+ cth = (cth − ci) ≥ 0,
and ξ(ci) maximizes h(·), we have U(p˜∗1, p˜∗0, q˜∗1, q˜∗0) ≥ 0 = U(0, 0, 0, 0). Therefore, for
the case that ci ≤ cth, (p˜∗1, p˜∗0, q˜∗1, q˜∗0) is an optimal solution.
In summary, by the three steps above, a best response of individual i is described
as follows:
• If ci > cth,
Pσi(Xi = ⊥ | Ci = ci, Si = si) = 1, for any Si ∈ {0, 1}.
• If ci ≤ cth,
Pσi(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 1) = Pσi(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 0) =
eξ(ci)
eξ(ci) + 1
,
Pσi(Xi = 0 | Ci = ci, Si = 1) = Pσi(Xi = 1 | Ci = ci, Si = 0) =
1
eξ(ci) + 1
,
where ξ(ci) is defined in (4.1).
This completes the proof that σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism
R(N,P,cth,).
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Proof. Let the parameter tuple (N, cth, ) be chosen according to (4.5)–(4.11). Then
cth is a function of N and . We write ne, ρ, pth, cth to represent ne(), ρ(), pth(N, ),
cth(N, ) and keep their dependence on N,  in mind for conciseness in this proof.
We first derive the form of the maximum likelihood decision function ψ. For any
realization X = x, since ψ uses maximum likelihood,
ψ(x) =
{
1 if Pσ(X = x | W = 1) ≥ Pσ(X = x | W = 0),
0 otherwise.
Let A(x) = {i ∈ N : xi 6= ⊥}. By Theorem 7,
Pσ(X = x | W = 1)
=
∏
i∈A(x)
Pσi(Xi = xi, Ci ≤ cth | W = 1) ·
∏
j /∈A(x)
P(Cj > cth)
=
∏
i∈A(x)
Pσi(Xi = xi | Ci ≤ cth,W = 1)P(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j /∈A(x)
P(Cj > cth)
=
∏
i∈A(x)
αxi(1− α)1−xiP(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j /∈A(x)
P(Cj > cth),
where recall that α is defined as in (4.2). Similarly,
Pσ(X = x | W = 0) =
∏
i∈A(x)
(1− α)xiα1−xiP(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j /∈A(x)
P(Cj > cth).
By Corollary 1,
α = θµ+ (1− θ)(1− µ) ≥ θ e

e + 1
+ (1− θ) 1
e + 1
>
1
2
.
Thus, the condition Pσ(X = x | W = 1) ≥ Pσ(X = x | W = 0) is equivalent to the
condition that the number of 1’s is larger than or equal to the number of 0’s in x.
Therefore,
ψ(X) =
{
1 if
∑
i 1{Xi=1} ≥
∑
i 1{Xi=0},
0 otherwise.
Next we calculate the probability of error, pe. Let
k =
√
2
pmaxe
, d =
√
Npth(1− pth).
By definition,
pe = Pσ(ψ(X) 6= W )
= Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
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+ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
.
Since the random variables 1{Xi 6=⊥} = 1{Ci≤cth} are i.i.d. with mean pth and variance
d2
N
, by Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
≤ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ kd
)
≤ 1
k2
=
pmaxe
2
.
For the second part of pe, we have
Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
≤ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
∣∣∣∣ W = 1
)
+ Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
∣∣∣∣ W = 0
)
=
∑
x∈B∩R1
Pσ(X = x | W = 1) +
∑
x∈B∩R0
Pσ(X = x | W = 0),
where
B = {x ∈ XN : ∣∣|A(x)| −Npth∣∣ < kd},
R1 =
{
x ∈ XN : ψ(x) 6= 1},
R0 =
{
x ∈ XN : ψ(x) 6= 0},
and |A(x)| is the cardinality of the set A(x) = {i ∈ N : xi 6= ⊥}. Since ψ uses
maximum likelihood,∑
x∈B∩R1
Pσ(X = x | W = 1) +
∑
x∈B∩R0
Pσ(X = x | W = 0)
=
∑
x∈B
min
{
Pσ(X = x | W = 1),Pσ(X = x | W = 0)
}
≤
∑
x∈B
√
Pσ(X = x | W = 1)Pσ(X = x | W = 0)
=
∑
x∈B
{(√
α(1− α)
)|A(x)|
·
∏
i∈A(x)
P(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j 6=A(x)
P(Cj > cth)
}
.
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Combining the x’s with the same A(x) yields∑
x∈B∩R1
Pσ(X = x | W = 1) +
∑
x∈B∩R0
Pσ(X = x | W = 0)
≤
∑
I⊆N :||I|−Npth|<kd
{
2|I|
(√
α(1− α)
)|I|
·
∏
i∈I
P(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j 6=I
P(Cj > cth)
}
=
∑
I⊆N :||I|−Npth|<kd
{
e−
|I|
2
ln 1
4α(1−α) ·
∏
i∈I
P(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j 6=I
P(Cj > cth)
}
.
For any I ⊆ N such that ∣∣|I| −Npth∣∣ < kd,
|I| > Npth − kd
= ρne −
√
2
pmaxe
√
ρne(1− pth)
> ρne −
√
2
pmaxe
√
ρne.
By the choice of ρ,
√
ρne >
√√√√ 1
pmaxe
+ ne +
√
1
(pmaxe )
2
+
2ne
pmaxe
=
√
1
2pmaxe
+
√
1
2pmaxe
+ ne.
Thus
|I| > ne.
We have known that
α ≥ θ e

e + 1
+ (1− θ) 1
e + 1
.
Combining the two inequalities above yields
e−
|I|
2
ln 1
4α(1−α) < e−
ne
2
ln
(e+1)2
4(θe+1−θ)((1−θ)e+θ) = e−neD().
By the choice of ne,
e−neD() =
pmaxe
2
.
145
Hence, ∑
x∈B∩R1
Pσ(X = x | W = 1) +
∑
x∈B∩R0
Pσ(X = x | W = 0)
≤ p
max
e
2
∑
I⊆N :||I|−Npth|<kd
{∏
i∈I
P(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j 6=I
P(Cj > cth)
}
≤ p
max
e
2
∑
I⊆N
{∏
i∈I
P(Ci ≤ cth) ·
∏
j 6=I
P(Cj > cth)
}
=
pmaxe
2
.
This gives an upper bound on the second part of pe; i.e.,
Pσ
(∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
1{Xi 6=⊥} −Npth
∣∣∣∣∣ < kd, ψ(X) 6= W
)
≤ p
max
e
2
.
Therefore,
pe ≤ pmaxe .
Finally, we bound the total expected payment. Let J be the number of partici-
pants. By Corollary 1,
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
∣∣∣∣ J
]
≤ Jcth(1 + e− + ).
By Theorem 7,
J =
N∑
i=1
1{Ci≤cth}.
Then Eσ[J ] = Npth = ρne. Therefore,
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
]
= Eσ
[
Eσ
[
N∑
i=1
R
(N,P,cth,)
i (X)
∣∣∣∣ J
]]
≤ Eσ[J ]cth(1 + e− + )
= ρnecth(1 + e
− + ).
The parameters ρ and ne do not depend on the choice of N . However, by Lemma 6,
lim
N→+∞
cth = 0.
Therefore, the total expected payment goes to zero as the chosen N goes to infinity.
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In this section we prove that D 6= 0 is equivalent to the statement Si and Sj
are not independent for any two distinct players i and j. The direction that D 6= 0
implies dependence is obvious since D is the covariance of Si and Sj.
For the other direction, suppose by contradiction that D = 0. Consider any two
distinct players i and j. Recall that
P1 = P(Si = 1), P0 = P(Si = 0).
First notice that P1 6= 0 and P0 6= 0 since otherwise Si and Sj are independent. Then
D = 0 implies that
P(Sj = 1 | Si = 1)P(Sj = 0 | Si = 0)
= P(Sj = 0 | Si = 1)P(Sj = 1 | Si = 0). (H.1)
Since P(Sj = 0 | Si = 1) = 1−P(Sj = 1 | Si = 1) and P(Sj = 1 | Si = 0) = 1−P(Sj =
0 | Si = 0), (H.1) further implies that
P(Sj = 1 | Si = 1) = 1− P(Sj = 0 | Si = 0)
= P(Sj = 1 | Si = 0).
Similarly,
P(Sj = 0 | Si = 1) = P(Sj = 0 | Si = 0).
Therefore, Si and Sj are independent, which contradicts with the assumption that
they are not independent. This completes the proof.
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Proof. We write R to represent the mechanism R(N,) for conciseness in this proof.
For any player i and any strategy σ′i, let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 1), p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 0),
q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 1), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 0).
We consider the case that D > 0. The proof for the case that D < 0 is similar.
Suppose that other players follow σ∗−i. Let the payment of player i be computed
using the reported data Xj of some other player j. Then the expected payment of
player i can be written as
E(σ′i,σ∗−i)[Ri(X)]
=
∑
xi,xj∈{0,1}
Ri(xi, xj)P(σ′i,σ∗−i)(Xi = xi, Xj = xj)
=
∑
xi,Si∈{0,1}
(
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)
·
∑
xj∈{0,1}
Ri(xi, xj)Pσ∗j (Xj = xj, Si = si)
)
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0,
where
K1 =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
A1,1 · Pσ∗j (Xj = 1, Si = 1),
K0 =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
A1,1 · Pσ∗j (Xj = 1, Si = 0),
L1 =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
A0,0 · Pσ∗j (Xj = 0, Si = 1),
L0 =
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
A0,0 · Pσ∗j (Xj = 0, Si = 0).
Note that K1, K0, L1 and L0 are all positive and they do not depend on p1, p0, q1
and q0.
The privacy level of σ′i can be written as
ζ(σ′i) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln p1p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− p11− p0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln q1q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln 1− q11− q0
∣∣∣∣,∣∣∣∣ln 1− p1 − q11− p0 − q0
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ln p1 + q1p0 + q0
∣∣∣∣}.
With a little abuse of notation, we consider ζ(σ′i) as a function ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0).
The expected utility of player i can thus be written as
E(σ′i,σ∗−i)[Ri(X)− g(ζ(σ′i))]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)).
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Let this utility define a function U(p1, p0, q1, q0). Now we find the best response of
player i, i.e., the (p1, p0, q1, q0) that maximizes U(p1, p0, q1, q0). If player i does not
participate, then p1 = p0 = q1 = q0 = 0 and U(0, 0, 0, 0) = 0. Otherwise, we find an
optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
max
p1,p0,q1,q0
U(p1, p0, q1, q0) (P)
subject to 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p1 + q1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ p0 + q0 ≤ 1,
p1 + q1 + p0 + q0 > 0, (I.1)
by the following three steps.
Step 1. First, we prove that an optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) must satisfy that
p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0. Suppose not. Without loss of generality we assume that p
∗
1 + q
∗
1 <
p∗0 + q
∗
0. We will find another solution (p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) that yields better utility, which
contradicts the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0).
Since we assume that p∗1 + q
∗
1 < p
∗
0 + q
∗
0, then at least one of the following two
inequality holds: p∗1 < p
∗
0, q
∗
1 < q
∗
0. Still without loss of generality we assume that
p∗1 < p
∗
0. Then if q
∗
1 < q
∗
0, let p
′
1 = p
∗
0 and q
′
1 = q
∗
0. Since K1 and L1 are posi-
tive, (p′1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) yields higher payment. It is easy to verify that ζ(p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) <
ζ(p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0). Thus (p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) yields better utility. For the other case that
q∗1 ≥ q∗0, let p′1 = p∗0 + q∗0 − q∗1 and q′1 = q∗1. Then p∗1 < p′1 ≤ p∗0. Since K1 is positive,
(p′1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) yields higher payment. To check the privacy cost, notice that
ζ(p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) = max
{
ln
p∗0
p∗1
, ln
1− p∗1
1− p∗0
, ln
q∗1
q∗0
, ln
1− q∗0
1− q∗1
,
ln
1− p∗1 − q∗1
1− p∗0 − q∗0
, ln
p∗0 + q
∗
0
p∗1 + q
∗
1
}
,
and
ζ(p′1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) = max
{
ln
p∗0
p′1
, ln
1− p′1
1− p∗0
, ln
q′1
q∗0
, ln
1− q∗0
1− q′1
}
.
Since p′1 > p
∗
1 and q
′
1 = q
∗
1, ζ(p
′
1, p
∗
0, q
′
1, q
∗
0) ≤ ζ(p∗1, p∗0, q∗1, q∗0). Thus (p′1, p∗0, q′1, q∗0) yields
better utility. Therefore, by contradiction, we must have p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0.
Step 2. Next, we prove that an optimal solution (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0) must satisfy that
p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 = 1. Still, suppose not. Then we will find another solution
(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) that yields better utility.
Let
p′1 =
p∗1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
, q′1 =
q∗1
p∗1 + q
∗
1
,
p′0 =
p∗0
p∗0 + q
∗
0
, q′0 =
q∗0
p∗0 + q
∗
0
.
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By Step 1, p∗1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0. By constraint (I.1), p
∗
1 + q
∗
1 = p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 > 0. Since we
assume that p∗1 + q
∗
1 and p
∗
0 + q
∗
0 are not equal to 1, they must be less than 1. Since
K1, K0, L1 and L0 are positive, (p
′
1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) yields higher payment. It is easy to
verify that ζ(p′1, p
′
0, q
′
1, q
′
0) ≤ ζ(p∗1, p∗0, q∗1, q∗0). Thus (p′1, p′0, q′1, q′0) yields better utility,
which contradicts the optimality of (p∗1, p
∗
0, q
∗
1, q
∗
0).
Step 3. By Step 1 and Step 2, the optimization problem (P) can be written as:
max
p1,p0∈[0,1]
K¯1p1 + K¯0p0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, 1− p1, 1− p0)) + K¯, (P1)
where
K¯1 = K1 − L1 = g
′()(e + 1)2
2e
,
K¯0 = K0 − L0 = −g
′()(e + 1)2
2e
,
K¯ = L1 + L0
=
g′()(e + 1)2
2e
(e + 1)2
e2 − 1
1
D
·
(
e
e + 1
P1 +
1
e + 1
P0
)(
1
e + 1
P1 +
e
e + 1
P0
)
.
The above calculation is done by noticing that
e2 − 1
(e + 1)2
D = Pσj(Xj = 1, Si = 1)Pσj(Xj = 0, Si = 0)
− Pσj(Xj = 0, Si = 1)Pσj(Xj = 1, Si = 0).
Solving (P1) is equivalent to solving the following optimization problem
max
p1,p0,ξ
K¯1p1 + K¯0p0 − g(ξ) + K¯ (P2)
subject to ln p1 − ln p0 − ξ ≤ 0
ln p1 − ln p0 + ξ ≥ 0
ln(1− p1)− ln(1− p0)− ξ ≤ 0
ln(1− p1)− ln(1− p0) + ξ ≥ 0
p1 ∈ [0, 1], p0 ∈ [0, 1], ξ ∈ [0,+∞].
The problem (P2) can be solved as follows: we first fix a ξ ∈ [0,+∞] and maximize
the objective function with respect to p1 and p0; then we find an optimal ξ. For
ξ = 0, the objective function always equals to K¯ for feasible (p1, p0). For ξ = +∞,
the objective function always equal to −∞. For any fixed 0 < ξ < +∞, the problem
(P2) is a linear programming problem. The optimal solution is
(p
(ξ)
1 , p
(ξ)
0 ) =
(
eξ
eξ + 1
,
1
eξ + 1
)
,
152
and the optimal value is
−g
′()(e + 1)2
e
1
eξ + 1
− g(ξ) + K¯1 + K¯.
Let this optimal value defines a function f of ξ; i.e.,
f(ξ) = −g
′()(e + 1)2
e
1
eξ + 1
− g(ξ) + K¯1 + K¯. (I.2)
To find the optimal ξ of f(ξ), we calculate the derivatives of f as follows:
f ′(ξ) =
g′()(e + 1)2
e
eξ
(eξ + 1)2
− g′(ξ),
f ′′(ξ) = −g
′()(e + 1)2
e
eξ(eξ − 1)
(eξ + 1)3
− g′′(ξ) ≤ 0,
where the second inequality is due to the convexity of the cost function g. Therefore,
f is concave. Since f ′() = 0, the maximum value of f is achieved at . The optimal
value is given by
f() = −g
′()(e + 1)2
e
1
e + 1
− g() + K¯1 + K¯
= g′()
e − e−
2
− g() + K¯.
By the convexity of g,
g() ≤ g′() ≤ g′()e
 − e−
2
.
Therefore, the optimal value satisfies that f() ≥ K¯, which is greater than 0, and the
optimal solution of (P1) is given by
p∗1 =
e
e + 1
, p∗0 =
1
e + 1
.
According to the three steps above, the optimal solution of (P) is given by
p∗1 =
e
e + 1
, p∗0 =
1
e + 1
,
q∗1 =
1
e + 1
, q∗0 =
e
e + 1
,
and the optimal value is greater than 0. Therefore, the best response of player i is
σ∗i , which implies that σ
∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism R(N,).
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Proof. In the equilibrium σ∗ of the mechanism R(N,), for each player i, given the
private bit Si, the reported data Xi is independent of S−i and X−i, and for any
si ∈ {0, 1},
Pσ∗i (Xi = si | Si = si) =
e
e + 1
,
Pσ∗i (Xi = 1− si | Si = si) =
1
e + 1
.
Therefore, given S = s for any s ∈ {0, 1}N , X1, X2, . . . , XN are independent random
variables and each Xi has the distribution:
Pσ∗i (Xi = 1 | S = s) =
esi
e + 1
,
Pσ∗i (Xi = 0 | S = s) =
e(1−si)
e + 1
.
Recall that the principal is interested in estimating S¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Si. The mech-
anism R(N,) estimates S¯ by µˆ, which can be written as follows in the equilibrium
σ∗:
µˆ =
e + 1
e − 1
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xi − 1
e − 1 .
We bound the probability for |S¯ − µˆ| > α in the equilibrium σ∗. First we write this
probability as follows:
Pσ∗(|S¯ − µˆ| > α)
=
∑
s∈{0,1}N
Pσ∗(|S¯ − µˆ| > α | S = s)P(S = s)
Given any s ∈ {0, 1}N , notice that
S¯ − µˆ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
e + 1
e − 1Xi − Si −
1
e − 1
)
is the average of N independent random variables. The expectation and variance of
S¯ − µˆ can be calculated as
Eσ∗ [S¯ − µˆ] = 0,
Vσ∗(S¯ − µˆ) = 1
N
e
(e − 1)2 .
Then by Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pσ∗(|S¯ − µˆ| > α | S = s) ≤ 1
α2N
e
(e − 1)2 .
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Therefore,
Pσ∗(|S¯ − µˆ| > α) ≤ 1
α2N
e
(e − 1)2 .
Since we choose
 ≥ ln
(
2 +
1
Nα2δ
)
,
we have
1
α2N
e
(e − 1)2 =
1
α2N
1
e + e− − 2
≤ 1
α2N
1
e − 2
≤ δ.
Therefore, Pσ∗(|S¯ − µˆ| > α) ≤ δ and thus Pσ∗(|S¯ − µˆ| ≤ α) ≥ 1− δ, which indicates
that the estimate µˆ is (α, δ)-accurate in the equilibrium σ∗.
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Proof. Consider any nonnegative payment mechanism R. For any player i and any
strategy σ′i, let
p1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 1), p0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 1 | Si = 0),
q1 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 1), q0 = Pσ′i(Xi = 0 | Si = 0).
Consider the strategy profile σ∗. Similar to the proof of Theorem 9, we write the
expected payment of player i as
E(σ′i,σ∗−i)[Ri(X)]
=
∑
x∈{0,1}N
Ri(xi, x−i)P(σ′i,σ∗−i)(Xi, X−i)
=
∑
xi,si∈{0,1}
(
Pσ′i(Xi = xi | Si = si)
·
∑
x−i∈{0,1}N−1
Ri(xi, x−i)Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = si)
)
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0,
where
K1 =
∑
x−i∈{0,1}N−1
Ri(1, x−i)Pσ−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1),
K0 =
∑
x−i∈{0,1}N−1
Ri(1, x−i)Pσ−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 0),
L1 =
∑
x−i∈{0,1}N−1
Ri(0, x−i)Pσ−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1),
L0 =
∑
x−i∈{0,1}N−1
Ri(0, x−i)Pσ−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 0).
Note that K1, K0, L1 and L0 are all nonnegative and they do not depend on σ
′
i. Then
the expected utility of player i can be written as
E(σ′i,σ∗−i)[Ri(X)− g(ζ(σ′i))]
= K1p1 +K0p0 + L1q1 + L0q0 − g(ζ(p1, p0, q1, q0)).
Consider the strategy σ
(ξ)
i of player i defined as follows
P
σ
(ξ)
i
(Xi = 1 | Si = 1) = Pσ(ξ)i (Xi = 0 | Si = 0) =
eξ
eξ + 1
,
P
σ
(ξ)
i
(Xi = 0 | Si = 1) = Pσ(ξ)i (Xi = 1 | Si = 0) =
1
eξ + 1
.
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Then the expected utility of player i can be further written as
E
(σ
(ξ)
i ,σ
∗
−i)
[Ri(X)− g(ζ(σ(ξ)i ))]
= (K1 − L1) e
ξ
eξ + 1
+ (K0 − L0) 1
eξ + 1
+ L1 + L0 − g(ξ)
= K¯1
eξ
eξ + 1
+ K¯0
1
eξ + 1
+ K¯ − g(ξ)
= −(K¯1 − K¯0) 1
eξ + 1
− g(ξ) + K¯1 + K¯,
where
K¯1 = K1 − L1, K¯0 = K0 − L0, K¯ = L1 + L0.
Let this expected utility define a function h of ξ; i.e.,
h(ξ) = −(K¯1 − K¯0) 1
eξ + 1
− g(ξ) + K¯1 + K¯.
Then a necessary condition for σ∗ to be a Nash equilibrium is that the level  in σ∗i
maximizes h(ξ). Since
h′(ξ) = (K¯1 − K¯0) e
ξ
(eξ + 1)2
− g′(ξ),
we must have
K¯1 − K¯0 = g
′()(e + 1)2
e
.
Next let us bound K¯1 + K¯. By definitions,
K¯1 − K¯0 =
∑
x−i
(
Ri(1, x−i)−Ri(0, x−i)
)
·
(
Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1)
− Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 0)
)
.
Let A = {x−i ∈ {0, 1}N−1 : Ri(1, x−i) ≥ Ri(0, x−i)}. Then
K¯1 + K¯ =
∑
x−i
(
Ri(1, x−i)Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1)
+Ri(0, x−i)Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 0)
)
≥
∑
x−i∈A
(
Ri(1, x−i)−Ri(0, x−i)
)
· Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 1)
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+
∑
x−i∈Ac
(
Ri(0, x−i)−Ri(1, x−i)
)
· Pσ∗−i(X−i = x−i, Si = 0)
≥ K¯1 − K¯0
=
g′()(e + 1)2
e
.
Therefore, the expected payment to player i at σ∗ is lower bounded as
Eσ∗ [Ri(X)] = −(K¯1 − K¯0) 1
eξ + 1
+ K¯1 + K¯
≥ g′()(e + 1),
and thus the total expected payment at σ∗ is lower bounded as
Eσ∗
[
N∑
i=1
Ri(X)
]
≥ Ng′()(e + 1).
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